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Preface
In general, there are two possible ways for ﬁrms to grow. They can grow internally, i.e. they
expand their production capacity by employing more workers and enlarging other production
factors. Alternatively, they can grow externally through mergers and acquisitions (M&A), that
is, they acquire a combination of existing production factors (Glaum and Hutzschenreuter,
2010). Both strategies have advantages and disadvantages. Buying a ﬁrm with already existing
employees, technology, and products saves substantial time compared to internal growth. This
is one of the main arguments for external growth in the form of M&A. Moreover, if ﬁrms need
a technology for their growth strategy, which is protected by patents, or they need resources
which are not easily available, the ﬁrms' goals usually cannot be reached with an internal growth
strategy. In addition, through internal growth new production capacity will be generated which
may increase the competition in the market. Instead, with an external growth strategy, the
overall capacity in the market will be held constant, and the ﬁrms can gain market power, and
thus, the competition in the market may probably even decline. A disadvantage of external
growth is that acquisitions are not scaleable, and they require large investments and involve high
risks. The acquired ﬁrms must be taken over with all their characteristics and employees, that
is, they may also exhibit excess capacity or run ineﬃcient plants. Contrarily, internal growth
allows expanding gradually, enlarging the ﬁrms only with employees that are required, modern
technology, eﬃcient processes, etc.
Both strategies are subject to research in economics for decades. Contrary to internal
growth, an external growth through acquisitions only redistributes existing property. Since
no additional production capacity is generated, acquisitions should not aﬀect growth in the
economy as a whole. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to assume that mergers aﬀect the ﬁrms'
performance if they reallocate the combined ﬁrms' resources, causing synergy eﬀects in the
form of cost reduction, increased sales, or they increase market power. In economics, research
questions about the eﬀects of M&A on ﬁrms' performance were ﬁrst discussed in the 1960ies
and 70ies with a focus on the USA, and came up in Europe in the 80ies. Since both the number
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and volume of worldwide M&A has sharply increased within the last two decades, and hence,
the phenomenon gained higher economic relevance, research activities have also become more
intensive. There were some mega deals between large companies that attracted attention not
only for researchers, but also for policy makers and the public, e.g. between the German steel
companies Thyssen and Krupp in 1997,1 the British mobile phone company Vodafone and the
German industry company Mannesmann in 2000,2 the Italian Bank UniCredit and the German
bank HypoVereinsBank in 2005,3 or the German automobile manufacturer Volkswagen and the
German premium automobile manufacturer Porsche in 2012.4 However, the increased M&A
activity was not only caused by such large deals, but medium- and small-size ﬁrms were, and
are, still engaged in M&A.
This dissertation builds on the economic research about M&A and the eﬀects on the merging
plants' performance. In particular, the objective of this thesis is to shed some light on questions
about causal eﬀects of M&A on plants' performance, taking ﬁrm heterogeneity into account.
Since there is no typical merger (Tichy, 2001) it distinguishes between acquiring and target
plants, and between horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. The thesis focuses on two major
research questions: do plants with speciﬁc characteristics self-select in merger activity, and is
there a causal eﬀect of M&A on the merging plants' performance parameters, in particular on
labor productivity, employment, and skill-intensity? The results allow drawing some conclusions
about the reasons why plants merge.
The thesis consists of four chapters. All contributions have in common that they focus on
questions about the eﬀects of M&A on plant performance. That is, the thesis does not discuss
questions about the eﬀects of M&A on industry and aggregation concentration levels, or the
eﬀects of M&A on social welfare.
Each chapter in this thesis can be read separately, because they are based on stand-alone
papers. Hence, all chapters have their own introduction and conclusion. The structure and
storyline of this thesis and the interaction of the chapters are as follows: the ﬁrst chapter is
a survey about M&A and acts as an introduction to this research ﬁeld. The second chapter
describes propensity score matching as a newer microeconometric evaluation method and ex-
plains its implementation in the econometric computer software STATA. In a certain sense, the
1http://www.thyssenkrupp.com/de/konzern/geschichte_konzern_k5.html [July 17th 2012].
2Handelsblatt, February 2nd 2010: http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/it-medien/vodafone-
mannesmann-die-mutter-aller-uebernahmeschlachten/3360804.html [July 17th 2012].
3Handelsblatt, July 27th 2008: http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/banken/hauptversammlu
ng-hvb-das-ist-nicht-mehr-meine-bank/2995600.html [July 17th 2012].
4Spiegel Online, July 4th 2012: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/fusion-volkswagen-ue
bernimmt-porsche-schon-im-august-komplett-a-842658.html [July 17th 2012].
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second chapter serves as a preparation for a better understanding of the econometric analysis
performed in chapters three and four, which form the heart of the thesis. They both discuss
questions about self-selection of plants into merger activity, and questions about causal aﬀects
on plants' performance. In particular, the third chapter focuses on the eﬀects on merging
plants' labor productivity, while the fourth chapter focuses on the eﬀects on both employment
and skill-intensity. Even if both chapters discuss the eﬀects on diﬀerent performance para-
meters, they are similar with respect to motivation, structure, and estimation strategy. Hence,
there is some inevitable overlapping between these two chapters which are based on stand-alone
papers as mentioned above.
The second, third, and fourth chapters use a new dataset, and, to the best of my knowledge,
I am the ﬁrst who was working with it so far. This dataset is a combined dataset from
the IAB Establishment Panel and the M&A DATABASE from the University of St. Gallen,
Switzerland. The IAB Establishment Panel is a representative employer survey for Germany,
annually performed by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) Nuremberg. The M&A
DATABASE contains information about transactions for Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.
The combined dataset contains German plants that merged domestically between 1996 and
2005, and also a control group of German plants that had not merged since 1980. The advantage
of this dataset is the richness of plant-level variables, the diﬀerentiation between acquirers and
targets, and between horizontal and non-horizontal mergers, and the availability of a control
group, allowing a comprehensive econometric analysis. The number of observations diﬀers
between the three chapters: in the second chapter, I use all observations, but in the third and
fourth chapter, some inevitable modiﬁcations of the dataset are necessary in order to perform
the empirical methods (e.g. exclusion of observations with missing data for relevant variables).
Finally, I will now brieﬂy explain the most important features, main contributions, and
ﬁndings of the four chapters. In the ﬁrst chapter, "Mergers & Acquisitions: trends, reasons,
eﬀects", I review the literature about M&A. In particular, after some deﬁnitions and taxonomy,
I describe the merger history and the current situation on the worldwide and German M&A
market. Then, I discuss several theoretical hypotheses about motivations for M&A. In a further
part, the chapter reviews empirical studies about eﬀects of M&A on proﬁtability, market share,
market power, eﬃciency, productivity, employment, skill-intensity, and wages. However, the
results do mostly not show a clear picture. For some performance parameters I observe diﬀerent
tendencies in the results between earlier and newer studies. Diﬀerent data or estimation methods
may be possible explanations. Studies about eﬀects also provide evidence that mergers are
diﬀerently motivated, i.e. no single hypothesis about motives of mergers explains all mergers.
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In the second chapter, "As easy as one, two, three... A guide to performing propensity
score matching with STATA", I describe how to perform matching, which has become a
popular tool in econometrics to evaluate treatment eﬀects. In particular, the chapter is about
the implementation of propensity score matching in the software STATA with the module
PSMATCH2 developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). It is addressed to researchers not yet
familiar with the method, and its objective is to quickly provide the basic understanding of the
method and to simply explain how it can be performed in STATA. For this, the chapter describes
the basic theoretical framework, and guides the reader step-by-step through the implementation
of the method. Based on the dataset including merged and control plants, it presents the
relevant commands in STATA, explains the corresponding results, discusses practical questions,
and refers to further literature.
The third chapter, "M&A and labor productivity: new evidence from micro-data for
German plants", analyzes the impact of M&A on labor productivity of German merged plants
in comparison to plants that were not involved in any M&A activity. I focus on two questions:
does M&A impact the merging plants' productivity, and do more productive plants self-select in
merger activity? Thereby, I apply a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching approach,
and I diﬀerentiate between subgroups of acquirers, targets, horizontally, and non-horizontally
merging plants. I identify substantial pre-merger heterogeneity between plants and a strong
support for a self-selection hypothesis of better performing plants into merger activities. I ﬁnd
a weak positive causal eﬀect for acquiring plants, but the results show no support for a causal
eﬀect on the other subgroups.
The fourth chapter, "Anybody afraid of M&A? Eﬀects on German plants' employ-
ment and skill-intensity", analyzes the impact of M&A on employment and skill-intensity.
The structure of the chapter is identical to the third chapter, and hence, the main research ques-
tions are: is there a self-selection of plants into M&A activity, and does M&A aﬀect the plants'
employment and the skill-intensity of the workforce? Again, I apply a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
propensity score matching, and diﬀerentiate between acquirers and targets, and horizontal and
non-horizontal mergers. In line with the third chapter, I conﬁrm substantial pre-merger het-
erogeneity between plants. However, I do not ﬁnd evidence for a causal eﬀect of M&A on
employment, but I ﬁnd robust estimates that the skill-intensity of the target plants' workforce
follows a U-shaped development path over time.
For a better reading, footnotes and equations are numbered independently in each chapter.
Figures and tables are integrated in the text, and appendices, if necessary, can be found at the
end of the chapters. Finally, I prefer American spelling to British spelling.
Chapter 1
Mergers & Acquisitions: trends, reasons, eﬀects
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1.1 Introduction
Diﬀerent types of associations of ﬁrms exist which can be classiﬁed according to how intensively
the ﬁrms are linked to each other, i.e. by how much ﬁrms reduce their economic independence
(Pausenberger, 1989). In cooperations like membership in organizations, strategic alliances, or
joint ventures ﬁrms preserve most of their independence. If, in contrast, the association of ﬁrms
leads to a combination, at least one ﬁrm loses its economic independence. These combinations
are either mergers or acquisitions. Figure 1.1 presents a classiﬁcation.
Figure 1.1: Diﬀerent types of associations of ﬁrms
Associations of firms
Mergers Acquisitions
Cooperations of 
firms
Combinations of 
firms
Source: Pausenberger, 1989.
The usage of the terms "mergers and acquisitions" (M&A) is not consistent in the literature.
Several deﬁnitions (e.g. from Vogel, 2002; Lucks and Meckl, 2002; Wirtz, 2003) characterize
M&A as a transfer of leadership, managerial, and control authority. This requires to hold
stakes or to invest in a ﬁrm's equity (Kirchner, 1991).1 Parts of the literature do not distinguish
between the terms "merger" and "acquisition", and they are often used as synonyms. However,
diﬀerences exist and they will be brieﬂy explained.
The diﬀerence between mergers and acquisitions: An acquisition describes the
takeover of control of an existing, but formerly independent ﬁrm. Through acquisitions, ﬁrms
fully give up their economic independence, but stay juridically independent. Two diﬀerent
modes of acquisitions exist. In acquisitions made by "asset deal" the acquirer buys all or the
fundamental assets of the target, e.g. property, buildings, machines, etc. Acquisitions by "share
deal" describe the acquisitions of shares in a capital company. In ﬁrms with other legal forms,
the transfer involves the acquisition of stakes. In contrast to acquisitions, a merger creates
1It depends on a ﬁrm's legal form how much percent have to be held to constitute the stake. According
to the German trade law ("Handelsrecht") 20% are suﬃcient, whereas the German law on stock
companies ("Aktienrecht") requires more than 50%. In addition, a blocking minority of 25% is a
possible way to inﬂuence corporate policy.
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a new entity of formerly economically and juridically fully independent ﬁrms. There are two
diﬀerent ways to merge: either the target ﬁrm will be fully integrated into the acquiring ﬁrm,
or both ﬁrms give up their legal entity and establish a new ﬁrm (Pausenberger, 1989; Glaum
and Hutzschenreuter, 2010).
However, the main criteria by which to diﬀerentiate between mergers and acquisition, i.e.
if ﬁrms preserve their legal entity or not after they combine, is obviously of minor importance
in the literature. In the Anglo-American literature the terms "mergers" and "acquisitions" are
virtually inseparable, which implies that diﬀerences disappear in practice (Grimpe, 2007). For
this reason, I will use the terms "mergers", "acquisitions", "M&A", or "takeovers" as synonyms
in the following text.
Diﬀerent types and kinds of M&A: The M&A literature commonly distinguishes be-
tween three diﬀerent types of mergers: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. In a horizontal
merger ﬁrms which compete in the same market combine. In a vertical merger a ﬁrm combines
with its supplier. And in a conglomerate merger ﬁrms of unrelated lines of businesses combine
(Carlton and Perloﬀ, 2005). Vertical and conglomerate mergers both decribe the combination
of ﬁrms from diﬀerent markets. Therefore, the literature uses the term "non-horizontal" M&A
for both types of mergers (Church, 2004). However, the distinction between diﬀerent types of
mergers is not always clear cut and often depends on industry classiﬁcations.2
In vertical mergers, there is a distinction between forward integration, i.e. an upstream ﬁrm
merges with a downstream ﬁrm, and backward integration, i.e. a downstream ﬁrm merges with
an upstream ﬁrm (Church, 2008b). There are also diﬀerent types of conglomerate mergers
(Church, 2008a). First, mergers between ﬁrms producing complementary products means that
consumers buy both products individually, but then assemble them for consumption. Second,
mergers between ﬁrms producing neighboring products describe that goods are purchased by
a common pool of buyers. That is, products are independent of each other, or they are
weak substitutes, but they share the same distribution channels. And third, a merger between
unrelated products means that products have no relation on either the demand or supply side.
The literature about M&A further distinguishes between friendly and hostile takeovers
(Glaum and Hutzschenreuter, 2010). In friendly takeovers, the target ﬁrm's management sup-
2Pesendorfer (2003) analyzed horizontal mergers in the paper industry, and there are two kinds of ﬁrms.
One group of ﬁrms produces ﬁnished cardboard boxes, and the other group produces linerboard, the
raw material for cardboard boxes. However, the merger can also be considered as vertical, because
the respective ﬁrms operate at diﬀerent stages of the production chain. This makes clear that the cut
between horizontal and vertical mergers also depends on industry classiﬁcations.
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ports the acquisition process, e.g. by delivering all information about the target ﬁrm to acquirers.
In contrast, takeovers are considered to be hostile if the management is not willing to negotiate
about an acquisition. In this case, the potential acquirer submits an oﬀer to shareholders to
buy their shares, usually for a limited period of time, and mostly with a bonus to make the oﬀer
attractive. As a response, the target ﬁrm's management can try to impede the hostile takeover
by making an alternative oﬀer to their shareholders.
Finally, mergers can either be domestic or cross-border. In a domestic merger, the merging
ﬁrms are located in the same country, whereas in cross-border M&A, the merging ﬁrms are
located in diﬀerent countries. Cross-border M&A are a way for ﬁrms to establish a foreign
subsidiary, and they are an alternative to greenﬁeld investments, where a new plant is built up
from scratch (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
Firms in the M&A process: There are three diﬀerent kinds of acquirers. First, acquirers
buy other ﬁrms for strategic reasons. Popular motivations mentioned in the literature are
market power, acquisition of complementary resources to strengthen the range of the ﬁrm's
products and services, cost savings through economies of scale, ﬁnancial synergies, etc.3 The
second group includes ﬁnancial acquirers like investment funds, venture capital investors, or
private equity companies. These acquirers buy ﬁrms with restructuring potential, and after
restructuring, they resell them. The third group of acquirers are managers which buy the ﬁrm
they work for in a so-called management-buy-out (MBO).
Owners of targets that are listed in a stock exchange are either private investors, institutional
investors (funds, banks, insurances, etc.), entrepreneurs, or families of entrepreneurs. If the
targets' shareholders sell their shares due to an attractive oﬀer made by the acquirer, the
acquirer takes control of the target. Owners of small or medium-size ﬁrms not listed on the
stock exchange may also want to sell the ﬁrm, either because a multinational ﬁrm with larger
personal and ﬁnancial resources oﬀers new growth opportunities, or, with respect to family
owned ﬁrms, because there is no successor. In addition, ﬁrms disinvest and sell parts of their
business for strategic reasons, e.g. because they put a higher focus on their core competences
and get rid of business units (Glaum and Hutzschenreuter, 2010).
The structure of this survey is as follows: section 1.2 describes merger waves between 1895
and today. It also gives a brief overview of the current situation of the worldwide and German
M&A market. Section 1.3 discusses the literature about reasons for mergers. In section 1.4,
the eﬀects of M&A on several performance parameters and are presented, and an overview of
3See section 1.3 for a more comprehensive discussion about motives for mergers.
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empirical studies is given. An explanation of the diﬀering results of eﬀects from mergers is also
included. Section 1.5 presents the lessons learned and mentions further research questions.
1.2 M&A activities between 1895 and today
The longest data series about merger activity exists for the USA, i.e. the number of mergers is
documented since 1895.4 There are two characteristics of M&A activities over the last century.
First, mergers come in waves, and second, M&A activities are correlated with stock market
prices and economic activities (Mueller, 2003a). Figure 1.2 displays the number of deals in the
USA between 1895 and 2010 and identiﬁes six merger waves within the observation period with
a peak in year 2000.
Figure 1.2: Number of M&A deals in the United States between 1895 and 2010
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Note: the data stems from diﬀerent sources. Hence, the number of deals diﬀer when curves overlap.
For example, the last curve is based on data from UNCTAD (2012) which only includes cross-border
deals from large transnational purchaser companies. Since no deals from smaller ﬁrms are included in
the data, the total number of deals is clearly lower. Source: 1895-1920: Nelson (1959); 1919-1967:
Federal Trade Commission (FTC); 1963-2002: Town (1992); 1990-2010: UNCTAD (2012), World
Investment Report (WIR).
1.2.1 Merger waves
The M&A literature about merger waves (e.g. Kleinert and Klodt, 2002; Hartford, 2005) has
identiﬁed economic, technological, and regulatory changes as reasons for merger waves. These
4For West Germany, M&A data exists since the mid-1970ies, and for the European Union, data is
available since the late 80ies.
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changes cause a restructuring of sectors and economies which lead to combinations of ﬁrms.
In this subsection, I brieﬂy describe the six merger waves.
The ﬁrst M&A wave occurred between 1897 and 1904 and was a reaction to the industrial
revolution. The steam engine and the emergence of heavy industries enabled the exploitation of
high scale economies in large ﬁrms. Large industry trusts emerged which are still characteristic
for the old economy in the USA. In these times, M&A were mostly horizontally. However,
the passing of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act stopped the merger wave because M&A
were impeded if they substantially increased a ﬁrm's market power. The second wave between
1920 and 1929 was dominated by vertical and conglomerate mergers. This was due to the
Clayton Act which made horizontal mergers more diﬃcult. The railway and utilities sectors
were mostly aﬀected by M&A in this time, and economies of scale were exploited due to new
opportunities from these networks. The third merger wave started in 1965 and ended in 1973.
The driving force behind the M&A activities were the exploitation of economies of scale from
mass industry production, a diversiﬁcation of products, and the acquisition of ﬁrms from other
markets. The USA further controlled mergers by passing the Hart-Scott-Rudino Improvement
Act of 1976, and Germany also introduced regulations in 1973 to control M&A activities. The
fourth merger wave occurred between 1984 and 1988, but mostly in Europe. National ﬁrms
prepared for the European single market and merged with European or international ﬁrms.
Merging plants expected synergy eﬀects due to a combination of production activities with
related technologies. M&A were focused on technology intensive industries. As a reaction
to increased merger activity, European antitrust laws were passed in 1989. The ﬁfth wave
started in 1995, and many merger activities were motivated by globalization and deregulation.
Globalization creates larger markets, and ﬁrms followed this expansion, i.e. mergers were cross-
border mergers. Another characteristic of this merger wave were large transactions, so-called
"mega deals", and they occurred mostly in the telecommunication, pharma, oil, or banking
sector. The ﬁfth wave ended in year 2000 after the technology and dotcom bubble burst with
a sharp decrease in the number of deals. However, only a few years later in 2002, the sixth
merger wave started with numbers and volumes of deals similar to the preceding wave. The
driving forces for mergers were institutional investors like hedge funds or private equity ﬁrms.
Low interest rates also stimulated merger activities. The merger wave ended 2008 with the
eruption of the ﬁnancial crisis (Glaum and Hutzschenreuter, 2010).
Alternative explanations for merger waves focus on correlations between high stock prices
and high numbers of acquisitions. This may be because a high number of acquisitions increases
the valuation level of ﬁrms which are listed on stock markets. However, the causality could
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be reverse: if stock market prices are high, managers have an incentive to ﬁnance mergers by
stocks, leading to higher merger activity (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005;
Mueller, Gugler, and Weichselbaumer, 2012).
1.2.2 The current M&A market
Worldwide trends: Figure 1.3 displays numbers and values of transnational ﬁrms' world-
wide cross-border M&A and greenﬁeld investments, the two main entry modes of foreign direct
investment (FDI). The data refers to the period between 2003 and 2011, and is based on the
World Investment Report (WIR) from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD).
Figure 1.3: Number and value of worldwide cross-border M&A deals and
greenﬁeld investments between 2003 and 2011
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Source: UNCTAD (2012), World Investment Report (WIR).
The ﬁgure shows that both value and number of greenﬁeld investments were higher than
those of M&A in almost every year. The numbers and values for both greenﬁeld investments and
M&A peaked in years 2007 and 2008, and the following decline was a reaction to the ﬁnancial
crisis. In 2011, the latest year displayed in the ﬁgure, the worldwide value of cross-border
M&A increased by 53% compared to the previous year and accounted for US-$ 526 billion.
However, this amount was only half of the peak in 2007. The recent increase reﬂects both
the growing value of assets on stock markets, and an increased ﬁnancial capacity of acquirers
to carry out these deals. This increase was driven by several mega deals in both developed
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countries and transition economies. In addition, corporate and industrial restructuring creates
new opportunities for M&A deals, mostly for transnational corporations which have suﬃcient
liquidity. In contrast, the values of greenﬁeld investments stay constant, and the number of
greenﬁeld investments slightly increased in 2011 compared to 2010. These diﬀering trends
between greenﬁeld investments and cross-border M&A emerge over time, because companies
may consider both entry modes as alternatives to each other (UNCTAD, 2012).
In addition to data from UNCTAD (2012) presented above, data from Dealogic delivers
some further information about worldwide M&A transactions for 2011 (Spanninger, 2012).
The sectors that accounted for the largest M&A volumes were real estate (10%), oil and gas
(10%), and ﬁnance (9%). The USA was the largest market for M&A, accounting for 37% of the
worldwide M&A volume, followed by China (7%), and Great Britain (5%). The European M&A
market exceeded the US market between 2006 and 2008 in volume, but now lagged behind the
USA again (29% of worldwide M&A volume). Within Europe, Great Britain accounted for the
largest M&A volumes (17%), followed by France (12%) and Russia (10%). The volume for
Germany was 7%. The emerging markets accounted for around 26% of the worldwide M&A
volume.
The situation in Germany: Based on data from M&A DATABASE St. Gallen, ﬁgure
1.4 presents the development of transactions in Germany between 1974 and 2011, i.e. deals
that involve German ﬁrms. Compared to the data from ﬁgure 1.2, Germany was less hit by the
sharp decline in deals in year 2000. The aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis also aﬀected Germany,
but in contrast to the worldwide trend with a time lag: compared to the respective previous
year, the number of deals with German ﬁrms involved declined by 6% in 2008 (1191 deals), and
by another 18% in 2009 (972 deals), reaching a historical bottom line (Kunisch and Wahler,
2010). In 2010 and 2011, the number of deals remained at this low level with 979 deals in
2010, and 975 deals in 2011 (Spanninger, 2011b; 2012).
Table 1.1 presents statistics about the home countries of acquirers of German targets, and
about home countries of targets acquired by German ﬁrms in 2011. More than half (51%) of
all transactions with German ﬁrms involved were domestic M&A. For German acquirers, most
foreign targets were located in neighboring countries (81 transactions): Switzerland (43), Aus-
tria (20), Netherlands (11), and France (7). Other important countries for German acquisitions
were USA (28) and Great Britain (17). Foreign acquirers buying German ﬁrms were also mostly
from neighboring countries (104), but from USA (45) and Great Britain (17) as well.
Table 1.2 displays the frequency of German mergers in diﬀerent sectors and diﬀerentiates
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Figure 1.4: Number of M&A deals in Germany between 1974 and 2011
Note: gray bar: data from M&A DATABASE; orange bar: sales by German Trust Agency
(Treuhandanstalt); line: reported ﬁnished deals by German Federal Cartel Oﬃce (Bun-
deskartellamt, BKA). The 7th amendment of the law against restraints on competition (Gesetz
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) changed the rules for announcements of ﬁnished
deals since 2005. This led to the decrease of reported deals by the BKA. The stagnant
numbers of the M&A DATABASE are also explained by this modiﬁcation. Source: M&A
DATABASE, University St. Gallen; M&A REVIEW, 2/2012.
Table 1.1: Acquirers and targets by countries for Germany, 2011
Targets of German acquirers are from... Acquirers of German targets are from...
Country Total number of mergers (in %) Country Total number of mergers (in %)
Germany 502 (51%) Germany 502 (51%)
Switzerland 43 (4%) Switzerland 53 (5%)
USA 28 (3%) USA 45 (5%)
Austria 20 (2%) Austria 29 (3%)
GB 17 (2%) GB 17 (2%)
Netherlands 11 (1%) France 12 (1%)
France/Italy 7 (1%) Netherlands 10 (1%)
Source: M&A REVIEW, 2/2012; M&A DATABASE, University of St. Gallen.
between acquirers and targets for the year 2011. The majority of acquirers (19%) came from
the ﬁnancial sector. Most of their targets were either from the ﬁnancial sector (34) as well, or
from the service sector (42). The largest share of targets (22%) came from the service sector,
followed by the chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector (8%), and the energy sector (8%). The
table also shows that approximately 50% of all deals were intrasectoral, i.e. acquirers and
targets belonged to the same sector.
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Table 1.2: Acquirers and targets by sectors for Germany, 2011
Sectors of targets
Sectors of acquirers 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Sum Share in %
01 Energy 44 2 3 3 2 2 1 5 1 1 64 6.6
02 Chemicals/Pharma 1 51 4 1 1 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 70 7.2
03 Steel/Metal 1 20 5 2 2 1 1 32 3.3
04 Manufacturing 1 4 29 1 1 3 1 1 3 44 4.5
05 Automobile 2 8 4 31 3 2 1 5 1 57 5.9
06 Electronics 5 2 12 1 14 1 1 4 1 3 44 4.5
07 Textile 1 10 1 1 13 1.3
08 Food 1 1 31 4 1 1 39 4.0
09 Trade 1 2 5 1 2 3 17 1 2 1 35 3.6
10 Finance 15 11 13 11 4 5 5 2 9 34 8 42 5 5 4 9 182 18.7
11 Insurance 2 1 2 11 1 1 18 1.8
12 Transport 1 1 23 4 29 3.0
13 Service 5 3 2 8 1 5 2 1 7 9 8 110 2 7 1 171 17.6
14 Media 2 1 10 17 1 31 3.2
15 Construction 1 2 1 3 11 18 1.8
16 Paper 3 1 1 1 1 6 13 1.3
17 Aerospace Techn. 1 3 4 0.4
18 Computer/IT 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 33 44 4.5
19 Others 3 3 2 4 4 3 5 1 3 4 2 13 4 2 5 8 66 6.8
Sum 79 82 74 71 45 42 25 39 48 57 13 44 211 33 22 18 5 64 2 974 100.0
Share in % 8.1 8.4 7.6 7.3 4.6 4.3 2.6 4.0 4.9 5.9 1.3 4.5 21.7 3.4 2.3 1.8 0.5 6.6 0.2 100.0 100.0
Source: M&A REVIEW, 2/2012; M&A DATABASE, University of St. Gallen.
1.3 M&A: diﬀerent hypotheses about motivations
and merging ﬁrms
The objective of this section is to understand why mergers occur. The literature has devel-
oped diﬀerent theories about motives for mergers in the last decades, and they were surveyed by
Müller-Stewens, Kunisch, and Binder (2010), Margolis (2006b), Jansen (2008), Scherer (2002),
Tichy (2001) and others. A useful classiﬁcation of hypotheses presented in the following sub-
sections is to diﬀerentiate between ﬁrms that merge in order to maximize proﬁts, and ﬁrms that
merge for other reasons (Mueller, 2003a). I also discuss if ﬁrms self-select in M&A activity.
1.3.1 Proﬁt maximizing motives
If ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts, M&A should increase proﬁts of the combining ﬁrms. Two ways
are possible: ﬁrms can increase their revenues, and this may come from an increase of their
market power. Alternatively, ﬁrms increase proﬁts by cutting their costs, and this comes from
increased eﬃciency. Thus, the most obvious motives for M&A are market power and eﬃciency
increases, but there are diﬀerences between horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers.
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Increase of market power: Horizontal mergers can increase market power because they
reduce the number of ﬁrms in the same market. In an oligopolistic industry, the merger then
leads to higher prices. Several studies exist using models with a Cournot framework. For exam-
ple, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) presented a model for horizontal mergers and used
a framework based on a symmetric Cournot equilibrium, homogeneous products, and identi-
cal constant unit costs for all ﬁrms. The model showed that mergers are never proﬁtable for
the merging ﬁrms, that is, horizontal mergers do not occur in this model. Other work using
Cournot models exists from Perry and Porter (1985), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Kamien and
Zang (1990), and Baye, Crocker, and Ju (1996). In contrast, Deneckere and Davidson (1985)
used a Bertrand framework, and the model predicted proﬁts from mergers. The anticompeti-
tive eﬀects of horizontal M&A were modeled by Farrell and Shapiro (2001) who discussed the
revised US Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Based on oligopoly theory regarding cost savings,
competition, and consumer welfare, they concluded that any signiﬁcant horizontal merger in-
volves a loss of direct competition, and thus, is at least slightly anticompetitive. Similarly, and
also based on oligopoly theory, Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003) pointed out
that horizontal M&A may increase market power.
Vertical mergers are a way to increase market power by increasing entry barriers at one or
more links in the vertical production chain (Comanor, 1967). Entry barriers can be established
by foreclosing markets to competitors willing to enter the market. The literature distinguishes
between input and customer foreclosure (Church, 2008b). Input foreclosure occurs if vertically
integrated ﬁrms with market power at the upstream market stage do not sell to downstream
rivals in the post-merger period any more, or they sell at higher prices, or oﬀer lower quality.
Anticompetitive eﬀects emerge because of these higher prices, or due to lower quality for
downstream rivals. Customer foreclosure means that the integrated downstream ﬁrm with
market power at the downstream market stage no longer sources supply from independent
upstream ﬁrms. This may lead to lower sales volumes and an increase in the average costs
of upstream rivals, reducing its competitive pressure on the integrated upstream ﬁrm. As a
consequence, the market power of the integrated upstream ﬁrm increases, and so do input prices.
If higher input prices lead to higher prices in the downstream market, eﬀects from customer
foreclosure are anticompetitive. Anticompetitive eﬀects may also emerge from coordination
(Church, 2008b). Firms coordinate the increase in their prices in order to reduce the possibilities
of substitution by customers to each other. Coordination eﬀects arise from vertical mergers if
post-merger ﬁrms are able to coordinate more eﬀectively, i.e. it is easier to reach agreements on
the coordinated outcome, or to make enforcements more eﬀective. In this context, Nocke and
White (2007) used models of symmetric upstream and downstream ﬁrms and demonstrated
that vertical mergers will facilitate upstream collusion in an unintegrated industry. In a further
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paper, Nocke and White (2010) showed that vertical mergers with larger (in terms of capacity
or products) downstream buyers are more likely to facilitate upstream collusion than mergers
with smaller buyers.
Conglomerate mergers also enable ﬁrms to gain market power. Firms make tacit collusion if
they compete over time (multi-period, supergame situations), and thus, are willing to cooperate
with their rivals and establish higher prices. This is beneﬁcial to ﬁrms because the present
discounted loss in proﬁts over all future periods are higher than the gains from cheating today
(Mueller, 2003a). Similarly, tacit collusion may also evolve if ﬁrms meet in diﬀerent markets
at the same time (multi-market contact). A high multi-market contact increases the costs for
ﬁrms to cut prices in any given market. Hence, this can lead to more cooperative behavior
(Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner, 2003). Furthermore, conglomerate mergers may
realize anticompetitive advantages because of an increase of the ﬁrms' portfolio or range of
products (Church, 2008a). This allows the ﬁrm to engage in "contingent sale", i.e. the sale
of one product in which the ﬁrm has market power is linked to the purchase of other products
that were acquired in the merger. Examples for contingent sale are bundling or tying. A tying
strategy means that customers who buy a product A also have to buy another product B, but
product B is also individually available. In a bundling strategy two products, A and B, are sold
only together in some ﬁxed proportion, and they are not individually available (Nalebuﬀ, 2003).
Finally, anticompetitive eﬀects emerge if conglomerate mergers lead to direct foreclosure, i.e.
the conglomerates are able to post-merger make acquired complements not compatible with
products of its rivals (Church, 2008a).
Eﬃciency increases: Increased proﬁts from M&A can also come from increased eﬃciency.
Again, there are diﬀerences between horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers. Figure 1.5
presents the average costs of ﬁrms (A to E) which diﬀer in size for an industry with signiﬁcant
scale economies. According to the ﬁgure ﬁrms exhibit smaller average costs if they increase
their scale. Thus, horizontal mergers increase the scale of ﬁrms, leading to reduced average
costs. If the decrease in average costs becomes smaller as the scale of the ﬁrms increase, as
presented in the ﬁgure, cost reductions are larger for smaller ﬁrms compared to larger ﬁrms.
Therefore, horizontal mergers should mostly be expected between smaller ﬁrms.5 Additionally,
horizontal mergers can lead to cost savings through a reorganization of production, or because
the combination of formerly separated sales and distribution networks eliminates duplications
(Pesendorfer, 2003).
With respect to vertical mergers, cost reductions come from the elimination of production
5However, this was not supported by empirical studies, e.g. from Mueller (1980a) for seven diﬀerent
countries.
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Figure 1.5: Industry with signiﬁcant scale economies
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steps. For example, consider a ﬁrm producing steel ingots that have to be cooled down before
they are sold to another ﬁrm, which in turn has to reheat the steel in order to produce steel
wire (Mueller, 2003a). Hence, vertical mergers may lead to higher quality, shorter lead times,
improved quality control, reduced costs of inventory, optimized production runs, etc. (Riordan
and Salop, 1995). Another argument for vertical mergers are transaction costs which emerge
from the transfer of goods and services between ﬁrms. Thus, a vertical integration of ﬁrms
reduces these transaction costs (Williamson, 1975). In addition, if two ﬁrms are in a mutual
dependence due to a trading relationship, and they have to invest in assets that are speciﬁc to
this relationship, i.e. the investment does not have any other use, ﬁrms behave opportunistic
and underinvest. A vertical merger may solve this so-called "hold up problem" (Church, 2004).6
In addition, a vertical merger is a way to eliminate double marginalization (Spengler, 1950).
That is, if there are an upstream and a downstream monopolist, both set prices above marginal
costs. If the downstream monopolist purchases inputs from the upstream monopolist, there
is a markup on the markup (Church, 2004). With a vertical integration of the upstream
monopolist the input will be transferred within the ﬁrm at marginal costs, eliminating the
double marginalization.
The existence of economies of scope can also lead to conglomerate mergers. For example,
two diﬀerent products can be stored in a warehouse and delivered to a retailer. Since both
products are stored and shipped together, the merged ﬁrms save costs (Mueller, 2003a).
Finally, the literature has identiﬁed several arguments why mergers can also create ineﬃ-
ciencies. For example, M&A may create diseconomies of bureaucracy, and the costs from the
6However, Grossman and Hart (1986) point out that integration does not entirely solve the hold up
problem.
Mergers & Acquisitions: trends, reasons, effects 18
administration of larger units may more than oﬀset the eﬃciency gains from economies of scale
(Williamson, 1988). Vertical mergers can also lead to disadvantages like increased ﬁxed costs
if inputs are produced internally, less ﬂexibility in changing business partners and relations, etc.
(Porter, 1992). Moreover, synergy gains between targets and acquirers may not be realized
because of geographical or cultural distances between the merging parties (Uhlenbruck, 2004).
1.3.2 Further motives
According to the arguments discussed above one should assume a counter cyclical pattern
between M&A activities and economic growth. In a recession with low demand and high excess
capacity, the competitive pressure is high, and ﬁrms want to cut costs. Thus, mergers that
reduce costs should mostly occur in a recession. Similarly, in a recession the pressure to cut
prices and to steal rivals' customers is high. Firms may see mergers as a way to eliminate
rivals and increase their market power (Mueller, 2003a). However, empirical studies present a
diﬀerent picture and point to a positive correlation between merger activity and stock market
prices over time (Glaum and Hutzschenreuter, 2010). This implies that other motives than
those discussed above exist which explain the empirical ﬁndings about merger waves. Some
motives will be brieﬂy presented in this subsection (Mueller, 2003a).
The hypothesis about "empire building" states that managers merge because they pursue
the ﬁrm's size growth instead of proﬁt maximization. One explanation is the positive correla-
tion between managers' income and the ﬁrms' size (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Graßhoﬀ and
Schwalbach, 1997), i.e. managers may seek to increase the ﬁrm's size through M&A in order to
expect an increase of their income afterwards. Other reasons why managers merge in order to
increase the ﬁrm's size are the pursuit of non-monetary goals like increased power or prestige.
Another argument for mergers is the "free cash ﬂow hypothesis" from Jensen (1986). If
cash ﬂow exists, and there are no more investment opportunities that are expected to increase
the ﬁrm's value, this free cash ﬂow should normally be paid to the ﬁrm's shareholders in order
to maximize shareholder value. However, managers may instead prefer to keep the power over
these ﬁnancial resources, and one possibility is to use it for the takeover of other ﬁrms, even
if the merger is not expected to increase the ﬁrm's value. This hypothesis is more relevant in
mature industries with high cash ﬂows and low investment needs.
The "hubris hypothesis" from Roll (1986) provides another explanation for mergers. When
ﬁrms bid for a target, the acquirer with the most optimistic expectations about the target's
future proﬁts acquires it. Assuming that bidders have rational expectations, the bidder with
the highest bid pays a price above the expected true value of the ﬁrm. This true value should
be at the mean of the distribution. Thus, the winning bidder has probably bid too much, a
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phenomenon described by the literature as "winner's curse". However, it seems paradox that
ﬁrms bid for targets even if they already know that the winner will lose. This can be explained
by manager's hubris, i.e. they overestimate their M&A competence and claim to have better
knowledge than the eﬃcient capital market about the target's true value.
Mergers may also occur for "speculative motives", i.e. mergers are caused by promoters'
proﬁts, i.e. promoters (e.g. investment banks) approached corporate managers and suggested
possible mergers. The promoters earn by fees charged from their advice and the services they
rendered to ﬁnance and facilitate the merger.
According to the "adaptive (failing ﬁrm) hypothesis" mergers are seen as an alternative
to bankruptcy (Dewey, 1961), i.e. mergers rescue ﬁrms from impending bankruptcy. Some
mergers are part of a Darwinian process, i.e. underperforming ﬁrms disappear, even if they are
not yet immediately bankrupt (Mueller, 2003a).
The "market for corporate control hypothesis" from Marris (1963, 1964) deﬁnes a valuation
ratio V as the ratio of a ﬁrm's market value M and the book value of the ﬁrm's assets K. Under
perfect competition this ratio should be one if managers maximize shareholder wealth. If, in
contrast, managers pursue growth instead of shareholder wealth, V falls below its maximum
value. According to Manne (1965) buyers in the market for corporate control acquire other
ﬁrms as soon as V falls below its maximum value. This process ensures that corporate assets
are allocated to the most competent managers and those who maximize shareholder wealth.
The "economic disturbance hypothesis" from Gort (1969) states that individual shareholders
have expectations about a ﬁrm's future proﬁts. These expected proﬁts are associated with a
price for shares. Shareholders are those individuals which expect these or higher proﬁts. If those
who did not hold shares change their expectations about the ﬁrm's future proﬁts, and if they
ﬁnd that shares are undervalued, they buy the entire ﬁrm. If these individuals that did not hold
shares before are managers of another ﬁrm, the transaction takes place as a merger.
There are two hypotheses about "ﬁnancial eﬃciencies" due to mergers. First, larger ﬁrms
face lower borrowing costs than smaller ﬁrms, and ﬁrms invest until the marginal return on
investment equals the cost of capital. If the smaller and the larger ﬁrms merge, the smaller ﬁrm
is able to make additional investments with lower returns at lower borrowing costs. Second, and
according to the portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952), mergers may be motivated by reasons of
risk pooling. A portfolio of assets generates the same average return at a lower risk (measured
as variance) compared to the sum of its elements if the correlation of returns on assets is
not perfect. A diversiﬁed ﬁrm can be thought of as a portfolio of assets of separate lines of
businesses which faces a lower risk than the same number of businesses as stand-alone-ﬁrms.
According to the "capital redeployment hypothesis" multidimensional organized ﬁrms are
able to establish an internal capital market, and thus, avoid the dangers of external capital
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markets. Mergers are a way to establish a diversiﬁed ﬁrm with such an internal capital market.
This hypothesis goes beyond the hypothesis about saved borrowing costs from above. It points
out that potential gains are generated from the ability of a central management to monitor
the diﬀerent investment opportunities of diﬀerent divisions and to shift capital across them
(Williamson, 1970; Weston, 1970).
Of course, no single hypothesis about M&A is able to explain all mergers, but all hypotheses
are able to explain at least some of them (Steiner, 1975). In particular, some of the presented
hypotheses are more consistent with the observed merger waves than others.7 Mueller and
Sirower (2003) tested which of the competing hypotheses received the most support. The test
was based on a dataset of 168 large acquisitions between 1978 and 1990, and the authors found
out that the mean lost for bidders is US-$ 50 million with a large variance of US-$ 3,580 billion.
They wondered why managers are willing to play a game with negative expected winnings and
such a high variance and concluded that managerial hubris is one plausible explanation. These
managers believe they are able to see values in the target ﬁrm which other managers do not.
The second hypothesis which received the most support from the tests is managerial discretion,
i.e. mergers do not create any gains, and managers merge in order to increase the ﬁrms' size.
Thus, prices paid as premium to targets' shareholders are losses to the bidder. In other words,
managers gamble with other people's money.
In addition to the motives for M&A mentioned above, the literature also discusses reasons
for cross-border mergers. Firms have diﬀerent options to enter foreign markets, either through
exporting, greenﬁeld FDI, or cross-border M&A. They may prefer M&A for strategic reasons,
e.g. because the foreign target possesses speciﬁc assets like better knowledge of the foreign
local market. Several theoretical contributions discussed the ﬁrms' choice between diﬀerent
entry modes. For example, Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) used a model to compare
mergers with greenﬁeld investments and argued that M&A are promoted when ﬁrm-level ﬁxed
costs are large relative to the market size of home and foreign country. A further contribution
is provided by Görg (2000) who formalized a ﬁrm's decision between cross-border M&A and
greenﬁeld investment when entering foreign markets via FDI. He showed that in an asymmetric
duopoly situation the new entrant will be best oﬀ by taking over an existing indigenous low
technology ﬁrm, and thus, forming a duopoly with an indigenous high technology ﬁrm. Nocke
and Yeaple (2007) developed a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous ﬁrms. They found
out that cross-border mergers involve the most or the least eﬃcient active ﬁrms, depending on
whether ﬁrms diﬀer in their mobile or immobile capabilities.
In this context, the literature identiﬁed positive eﬀects from lower trade costs and liberal-
7See Mueller (2003a) for an assessment of each hypothesis and the compatibility with the picture of
merger waves.
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ization on cross-border M&A activity. Horn and Persson (2001) presented a model to analyze
cross-border M&A in an international oligopolistic market. They found out that high trade
costs may be conducive to national ownership of assets, and international ﬁrms may arise when
trade costs are lower. This is in contrast to what the "tariﬀ-jumping" argument suggests. Neary
(2007) presented a two country model of oligopoly in general equilibrium for cross-border acqui-
sitions and showed that trade and capital market liberalization leads to an international merger
wave. Breinlich (2008) used the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 to esti-
mate the impact of trade liberalization on M&A activity. He showed that freer trade leads to a
signiﬁcant increase in merger activity. Hijzen, Görg, and Manchin (2008) empirically analyzed
the role of trade costs for cross-border M&A for 23 OECD countries. They found evidence
that trade barriers negatively impact cross-border M&A activities. However, horizontal mergers
are less negatively aﬀected compared to non-horizontal mergers, supporting the tariﬀ-jumping
argument.
1.3.3 Which ﬁrms merge? The self-selection hypothesis
There is both theoretical and empirical support for a self-selection of ﬁrms into M&A activity,
i.e. ﬁrms that merge seem to systematically diﬀer in certain characteristics from ﬁrms that do
not merge. Hence, the pre-merger performance of ﬁrms has become an important issue in the
M&A literature.
From a theoretical perspective, acquiring ﬁrms may be overperforming ﬁrms because they
are able to bear ﬁxed costs that emerge due to the takeover process. This argument corresponds
with the discussion from Melitz (2003), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), and others about
heterogeneous ﬁrms. They found out that only the most productive ﬁrms engage in foreign
activities like exporting or FDI. Contrary, acquirers may also be poor performing ﬁrms which
merge with another ﬁrm in order to survive on the market. Spearot (2007a) added M&A into
the model framework of heterogeneous ﬁrms from Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2004) and found that mid-productivity ﬁrms are most likely to acquire other ﬁrms. In
a further paper from Spearot (2007b), using the same model framework, ﬁrms that acquired
abroad were more productive than ﬁrms that acquired at home. In an empirical study about
mergers in US manufacturing ﬁrms, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) found that acquirers tend
to be relatively more productive ﬁrms. These ﬁndings are consistent with the results from
Andrade and Staﬀord (2004) for ﬁrms in diﬀerent US industries. Earlier studies came to
diﬀerent results: Mueller (1980b) and Harris, Stewart, and Carleton (1982) provided evidence
that acquiring ﬁrms' average proﬁt rates do not diﬀer from other ﬁrms. For conglomerate
mergers, Weston and Mansinghka (1971) and Melicher and Rush (1974) found that acquiring
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ﬁrms had proﬁts below average, and also lower proﬁts than the acquired ﬁrms.
Turning towards targets, acquirers may select overperforming ﬁrms, so-called "cherries".
Acquirers expect to beneﬁt from the targets' assets and capabilities like advanced technology,
management skills, and large market shares in order to realize eﬃciency gains (Balsvik and
Haller, 2011). In contrast, acquirers may also focus on underperforming targets, so-called
"lemons". Acquirers expect the targets' performance to improve after the merger due to new
management which realizes the potential of the targets' assets. Empirical evidence on this issue
came from Bellak, Pfaﬀermayr, and Wild (2006). They compared performance parameters for
Austrian manufacturing ﬁrms and showed that lemons exhibit signiﬁcantly higher proﬁtability
growth rates than cherries, but there were no diﬀerences with respect to employment and
productivity growth. Salis (2008) found support for the cherry-picking argument based on
data for Slovenia. Arndt and Mattes (2010) analyzed cross-border M&A and found that both
cherries and lemons are acquired.
1.4 Eﬀects of M&A on ﬁrms' performance: an
empirical overview
There are three diﬀerent sets of consequences from mergers (Mueller, 2003a). First, M&A may
aﬀect the performance of ﬁrms. Second, M&A can aﬀect industry and aggregation concentra-
tion levels, and third, M&A may aﬀect social welfare. In this section, I discuss the ﬁrst group
of eﬀects. In particular I present a survey of studies that estimate the eﬀects from M&A on
ﬁrms' proﬁtability, market share, market power, productivity, employment, skill-intensity, and
wages,8 and I provide an overview of the empirical results over the last decades. For each
performance parameter, I will ﬁrst provide an overview of earlier studies, and then, present
the results from recent studies, mostly published since year 2000. I will show that the results
are often ambiguous, and for some performance parameters, the results of newer studies diﬀer
slightly from those of earlier studies. Then, I brieﬂy discuss further eﬀects of M&A, and also
present the results from event studies, an alternative approach to assess the eﬀects of mergers.
Finally, I discuss why empirical analysis does not give clear answers about eﬀects of M&A.
1.4.1 Eﬀects on proﬁtability
From a theoretical point of view, the average merger should generate positive proﬁts if managers
maximize proﬁts and have rational expectations. Moreover, it should be expected that managers
8There also exists research about eﬀects on other performance parameters, e.g. R&D (e.g. see Tichy
(2001) for an overview), but the literature is scarce.
Mergers & Acquisitions: trends, reasons, effects 23
undertake mergers deliberately and make the decision with great care (Mueller, 2003a).
Nevertheless, empirical studies provide a diﬀerent picture and present ambiguous results.
One of the most comprehensive studies about eﬀects of mergers on proﬁtability came from
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) for the USA who analyzed 6000 observations between 1950 and
1977. The authors found that proﬁts of acquired ﬁrms declined after the acquisition. Negative
eﬀects were also found in Reid (1971), Melicher and Rush (1973, 1974), and Mueller (1986) for
the USA, Meeks (1977), Hughes (1989), Cosh, Hughes, and Singh (1980) and Kumar (1985)
for the UK, in Peer (1980) for Holland, and Ryden and Edberg (1980) for Sweden. In contrast,
there exist studies that found positive eﬀects: Weston and Mansinghka (1971), Mueller (1980b)
and Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) for the USA, Baldwin (1998) for Canada, and Ikeda
and Doi (1983) for Japan. No signiﬁcant changes were found in Cable, Palfrey, and Runge
(1980) for Germany, McDougall and Round (1986) for Australia, and Rhoades (1987) and
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1997) for the USA.9
Table 1.3: Recent studies about eﬀects of M&A on proﬁts
Country Authors Period Unit Merger sample Control group Estimation
method
Proﬁt measure Change
Austria Bellak, Pfaﬀer-
mayr, and Wild
(2006)
1985-
2002
Firms 60 foreign merg-
ers in manufactur-
ing ﬁrms
421 non-
acquired ﬁrms
DiD PSM Cash ﬂow Lemons:
>0;
cherries: <0
France Bertrand and
Zitouna (2008)
1993-
2000
Firms 371 targets in
horizontal M&A
of manufacturing
ﬁrms; domestic/
cross-border M&A
Non-acquired
ﬁrms
DiD PSM EBITDA ≈0
UK Conyon, Girma,
Thompson, and
Wright (2004)
1979-
1991
Firms 190 domestic
related/ unrelated
mergers in 140
manufacturing
ﬁrms
236 non-
acquired ﬁrms
Regression Proﬁt per
worker
>0
USA Bhuyan (2002) 1992 Firms Vertical mergers in
43 food manufac-
turing industries
None Regression (Total sales -
total costs)/
total sales
<0
Pesendorfer
(2003)
1984-
1987
Firms 31 horizontal
mergers in the
paper industry
Non-acquired
ﬁrms in the
same industry
Regression Proﬁts before
tax
>0
Gugler, Mueller,
Yurtoglu, and
Zulehner (2003)
1981-
1998
Firms ≈2700 mergers
in manufacturing
and service sector
Non-acquired
ﬁrms in the
same industry
Regression Proﬁts before
interest and
taxes/ total
assets
>0
Note: DiD PSM: diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching.
In addition to these earlier studies, table 1.3 presents an overview of recent empirical studies,
and they have two major advantages: ﬁrst, the quality and availability of data is better, and
second, research about questions on causality and self-selection has improved due to advanced
research designs (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). However, similar to earlier contributions the
empirical results of these newer studies about eﬀects of M&A on proﬁts are also ambiguous,
9Comprehensive overviews of empirical studies mostly published before year 2000 can be found in Tichy
(2001), Mueller (2003a), Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003), and Jansen (2008).
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i.e. despite newer data and advanced methods research has not brought us forward in this issue.
In subsection 1.4.9 I will discuss several reasons why the results diﬀer from each other.
The conclusion from a large number of empirical studies from the last decades about eﬀects
from M&A on proﬁts is that mergers do not necessarily increase proﬁts, and it seems even more
likely that a large proportion of mergers even decrease merging ﬁrms' proﬁts. These ﬁndings
support the view that not all mergers are motivated by proﬁt maximizing reasons, but occur
for other reasons as discussed above. Hence, these conclusions are similar to those from earlier
surveys, e.g. from Bühner (2002).
1.4.2 Eﬀects on market share, market power, and eﬃciency
Even if not all mergers are proﬁtable, it is important to understand how M&A increase proﬁts.
Taking a simple model from Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003) there are two
possibilities how proﬁts can increase after mergers. First, mergers lead to eﬃciency increases
with a fall in the merging ﬁrms' costs. In proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms, lower marginal costs should
lead to lower prices, increasing both sales and proﬁts.10 Alternatively, eﬃciency improvements
may also occur in the form of better product quality, and this should also lead to a rise in ﬁrms'
sales and proﬁts. This situation is shown in the upper left cell of table 1.4. Second, increased
proﬁts can also come from increased market power. If ﬁrms have market power and are able
to control prices, and if they maximize proﬁts, an increase in prices can be expected, leading
to a decrease in output and sales (lower left cell). By simply analyzing how output changed
in comparison to the situation in which the ﬁrms had not merged, one can conclude if proﬁts
increased due to eﬃciency gains or due to market power increase.
Table 1.4: Possible consequences of M&A
Proﬁts > 0 Proﬁts < 0
Sales > 0 Eﬃciency increase Market power reduction (?)
Sales < 0 Market power increase Eﬃciency decrease
Source: Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003).
Since one can expect that changes in sales will translate into corresponding changes in
market shares (Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner, 2003), studies analyzing market shares
help to ﬁnd out if mergers increase eﬃciency or market power. If mergers increase eﬃciency or
improve the products' quality, the mergers are expected to increase the ﬁrms' market shares.
10A merger is also eﬃciency improving if it reduces ﬁxed costs but not marginal costs. This should
increase proﬁts but not change sales. This case is not considered here (Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu,
and Zulehner, 2003).
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However, no changes were found in studies from Goldberg (1973) for a sample of advertising
intensive ﬁrms, and in Rhoades (1987) for acquired banks. Mueller (1985, 1986) compared
the market shares of acquired manufacturing ﬁrms between 1950 and 1972 to a group of
non-acquired ﬁrms and found a decrease in market shares. Baldwin and Gorecki (1990) found
evidence for a decrease of market shares for acquired Canadian plants in horizontal mergers, but
no eﬀects for other sorts of mergers. In a study about horizontal mergers in the US paperboard
industry, Pesendorfer (2003) also found that merging ﬁrms lose market shares. With respect to
changes in sales, Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003) found a decrease for merging
ﬁrms on average. The decrease in sales was stronger in conglomerate mergers compared to
horizontal mergers. These studies did not provide any evidence that M&A led to an increase
in the ﬁrms' market shares, and thus, they did not provide evidence for an eﬃciency increase
after M&A.
The model from Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003) also analyzed negative
proﬁts and changes in sales, displayed in the right part of table 1.4. If mergers are motivated
by growth, or because managers suﬀer from hubris, eﬃciency must not necessarily decline or
market power must not increase. Nevertheless, one can expect that these mergers lead to
transaction costs which arise if two ﬁrms with diﬀerent organizational structures and diﬀerent
company cultures are brought together, with a negative impact on eﬃciency. Therefore, ef-
ﬁciency decreasing mergers should both decrease proﬁts and sales, as displayed in the lower
right cell of table 1.4. Alternatively, mergers may also reduce proﬁts but increase sales (upper
right cell). This situation can be labeled with "market-power reduction", because it reﬂects
the opposite to a market power increase. However, the combination of reduced proﬁts but
increased sales seems not really plausible,11 and this scenario may most likely occur if managers
maximize growth or sales instead of proﬁts.
Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003) empirically tested these four hypotheses
from table 1.4 and showed that the fractions of mergers resulting in eﬃciency increase, market
power increase, and eﬃciency decrease all account for almost 30%. The puzzling situation
with decreased proﬁts and increased sales ("market-power reduction") accounts for around
15%. Summarizing, less than 30% of all mergers increase eﬃciency, and therefore, are welfare
enhancing. Assuming that increased market power and decreased eﬃciency is welfare reducing,
the majority of mergers reduces social welfare.
11For this reason, Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003) add a question mark to this catego-
rization (see table 1.4).
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1.4.3 Eﬀects on productivity
Eﬀects of M&A on productivity are of great interest, because it is a measure of economic
eﬃciency. There are several ways to estimate productivity, e.g. as labor productivity, deﬁned
as output or sales per employee, or as total factor productivity (TFP). The latter is superior
because it measures eﬀects on all inputs, but the required data to estimate TFP is not always
available.
If mergers are motivated by proﬁt maximizing reasons, productivity changes after M&A
are expected to be positive. Diﬀerent studies exist that analyze eﬀects on productivity. For
example, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992a) found that productivity in US manufacturing plants
fell before the merger, but rose afterwards. Productivity increases after horizontal mergers
are found in Baldwin (1998) for Canadian plants. McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) examined
productivity eﬀects for plants in the US food manufacturing industry. They observed post-
merger productivity improvements for acquired plants but productivity losses for the buyer's
existing plants. Contrary, Caves and Barton (1990) and Lichtenberg (1992a) found lower
productivity in plants that were held by diversiﬁed ﬁrms compared to plants in undiversiﬁed
ﬁrms. A survey of earlier studies about productivity eﬀects of M&A is provided by Caves
(1989). Summarizing, the majority of earlier studies concluded that M&A reduces productivity,
and this is in line with the results from several studies identifying a negative impact of M&A
on proﬁts.
In contrast to these earlier studies, a large majority of recent studies found positive pro-
ductivity eﬀects, as shown in table 1.5. Hence, these results support proﬁt maximizing hypothe-
ses as explanations for mergers. However, this seems somewhat puzzling with respect to the
results from studies about the eﬀects on proﬁts and sales. Several explanations are possible,
e.g. diﬀerent estimation methods, observation periods, datasets, etc., which will be explained
in greater detail at the end of this section.
1.4.4 Eﬀects on employment
Predictions about eﬀects of M&A on employment are diﬃcult. Mergers which are motivated by
proﬁt maximization are more likely to be followed by cost savings and employment reductions
compared to mergers that are diﬀerently motivated (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright,
2002a). Ownership changes may lead to displacement of management, plant closure, etc. with
negative eﬀects on employment on the one hand. On the other hand, new ownership may
also bring new capital inﬂows, expertise, etc. with positive employment eﬀects (McGuckin
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Table 1.5: Recent studies about eﬀects of M&A on productivity
Country Authors Period Unit Merger sample Control group Estimation
method
Proﬁt mea-
sure
Change
Austria Bellak, Pfaﬀer-
mayr, and Wild
(2006)
1985-
2002
Firms 60 foreign acquisi-
tions in manufac-
turing ﬁrms
421 non-
acquired ﬁrms
DiD PSM Labor
productivity
(value added
per worker)
≈0
France Bertrand and
Zitouna (2008)
1993-
2000
Firms 371 targets in
horizontal M&A
of manufacturing
ﬁrms; domestic/
cross-border M&A
Non-acquired
ﬁrms
DiD PSM Total factor
productivity
>0, stronger
for cross-
border M&A
Germany Arndt and
Mattes (2010)
1997-
2003
Firms 158 cross-border
M&A
Non-acquired
domestic
multinationals
DiD PSM Total factor
productivity
>0
Mattes (2010) 2000-
2007
Plants 352 foreign acqui-
sitions of domestic
plants
≈15000 non-
acquired
plants
Regression;
DiD PSM
Labor
productivity
(sales per
worker)
≈0
India Petkova (2009) 2001-
2006
Firms 150 cross-border
M&A in manufac-
turing ﬁrms
1470 non-
acquired
plants
DiD PSM Total factor
productivity
>0
Indonesia Arnold and
Javorcik (2009)
1984-
1994
Plants 185 plants that
switched from do-
mestic to foreign
ownership
≈2000 non-
acquired
plants
Regression;
DiD PSM
Total factor
productivity
>0
Italy Piscitello and
Rabbiosi (2005)
1994-
1997
Firms 113 foreign acqui-
sitions of domes-
tic manufacturing
plants
374 non-
acquired ﬁrms
from a random
control sample
Regression Labor
productivity
(sales per
worker)
>0
Slovenia Salis (2008) 1994-
1997
Firms 186 foreign acqui-
sitions of manu-
facturing ﬁrms
≈1000
domestically-
owned and
non-acquired
ﬁrms
DiD PSM Total factor
productivity
≈0
Sweden Bandick (2011) 1993-
2002
Firms 464 foreign merg-
ers of manufactur-
ing ﬁrms; MNEs/
non-MNEs; hori-
zontal/ vertical
mergers
≈4000 non-
acquired ﬁrms
Regression;
DiD PSM
Total factor
productivity
Vertical
acquisition:
>0;
Horizontal
acquisition:
≈0
UK Conyon, Girma,
Thompson, and
Wright (2002b)
1989-
1994
Firms 129 foreign merg-
ers
Random con-
trol sample of
642 ﬁrms
Regression Labor
productivity
(sales per
worker)
>0
Griﬃth and
Simpson (2004)
1980-
1996
Plants ≈8.800 ob-
servations of
plants chang-
ing ownership
from domestic to
foreign
≈4600 ob-
servations of
plants chang-
ing ownership
from foreign
to domestic
Regression Labor
productivity
(value added
per worker)
>0
Girma,
Thompson,
and Wright
(2006)
1988-
1996
Firms 542 foreign acqui-
sitions (US and
European MNEs)
of domestic manu-
facturing plants
454 non-
acquired ﬁrms
Regression;
DiD PSM
Total factor
productivity
>0
USA Maksimovic and
Phillips (2001)
1974-
1992
Plants 17720 mergers in
manufacturing in-
dustry
Non-merged
plants
Regression Total factor
productivity
>0
Ollinger,
Nguyen,
Blayney, Cham-
bers, and Nelson
(2006)
1977-
1992
Plants ≈5.000 acquired
and ≈12000 buyer
plants in food
industries
≈10000 non-
acquired
plants in the
same industry
Regression Labor
productivity
(total value
of shipments
(output) per
worker)
>0
Note: DiD PSM: diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching.
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and Nguyen, 2001). Another argument points out that new management is less committed
to employees, and therefore, renegotiates explicit and implicit labor contracts and conditions.
These renegotiations may be seen as a "breach of trust" by employees with negative employment
eﬀects (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Eﬀects on the workforce may also diﬀer between diﬀerent
types of mergers. Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2002a) argued that horizontal
mergers lead to higher employment losses if there are increasing returns to scale. Dutz (1989)
also expected negative eﬀects from horizontal mergers in declining industries. Williamson (1975)
expected negative eﬀects from vertical integration due to layoﬀs in the sales function in the
upstream ﬁrm, and in the procurement function of the downstream ﬁrm. In addition, because of
a closer proximity between acquirer and target, domestic mergers make radical structural reforms
with negative employment eﬀects more likely than cross-border M&A (Lehto and Böckerman,
2008). Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) argued that mergers are seen as a way to restructure and
optimally adjust the workforce, and thus, higher employment losses can be expected in countries
with rigid labor markets.
The empirical evidence about employment eﬀects is ambiguous. In earlier studies, a reduc-
tion in employment was found in Baldwin (1998) who showed that M&A had a negative eﬀect
on employment of non-production workers. According to Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990),
45% of US ﬁrms involved in hostile takeovers laid oﬀ workers. Brown and Medoﬀ (1988)
found negative eﬀects for the state of Michigan, USA. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) showed
that employment growth was lower in central oﬃce plants compared to production plants after
M&A. In a further study, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992a) found negative eﬀects for larger ﬁrms
in the US manufacturing sector. In contrast, several studies estimated positive eﬀects. For
example, McGuckin, Nguyen, and Reznek (1995) reported about rising employment in acquired
plants in the USA, but they did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects at the ﬁrm-level. In McGuckin,
Nguyen, and Reznek (1998), positive employment eﬀects after M&A were found for the US
food manufacturing industry.
Table 1.6 presents a list of newer studies about employment eﬀects.12 The results of the
studies are also ambiguous, but with a tendency towards a decrease of employment. Hence,
these negative employment eﬀects provide support that mergers are rather driven by proﬁt
maximizing motivations than other reasons (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright, 2002a).
12See also Siegel und Simons (2008) for an overview of plant- and ﬁrm-level studies about eﬀects of
M&A on employment and wages.
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Table 1.6: Recent studies about eﬀects of M&A on employment
Country Authors Period Unit Merger sample Control group Estimation
method
Change
Austria Bellak, Pfaﬀer-
mayr, and Wild
(2006)
1985-
2002
Firms 60 foreign acquisitions
in manufacturing ﬁrms
421 non- merged
ﬁrms
DiD PSM ≈0
Finland Lehto and Böcker-
man (2008)
1989-
2003
Plants 7923 foreign and
domestic mergers
Non-merged
plants
DiD PSM <0
Germany Arndt and Mattes
(2010)
1997-
2003
Firms 158 cross-border M&A Non-merged
domestic multi-
nationals
DiD PSM ≈0
Mattes (2010) 2000-
2007
Plants 353 foreign acqui-
sitions of domestic
plants
≈12000 non-
merged plants
DiD PSM ≈0
Sweden Siegel and Simons
(2008)
1985-
1998
Employees Employer-employee
data for 19000 ﬁrms;
diﬀerentiated in full/
partial acquisitions,
divestitures; related/
unrelated
Employees in
non-merged ﬁrms
Regression <0
UK Conyon, Girma,
Thompson, and
Wright (2001)
1983-
1996
Firms 201 friendly and
39 hostile domestic
mergers in 195 ﬁrms
238 non-merged
ﬁrms
Regression Hostile: <0;
Friendly: <0
Conyon, Girma,
Thompson, and
Wright (2002a)
1967-
1996
Firms 442 domestic mergers
in 277 ﬁrms; diﬀer-
entiated in related/
unrelated; hostile/
friendly
298 non-merged
ﬁrms
Regression <0
Girma and Görg
(2004)
1980-
1993
Plants 239 foreign acquisi-
tions in the electronics
and 121 in the food in-
dustry
524 domestic
plants in elec-
tronics and 241
plants in food
industry
DiD PSM <0
Girma (2005) 1988-
1998
Firms 542 foreign mergers
in the manufacturing
sector
454 matched
non-merged
domestic ﬁrms
Regression;
DiD PSM
≈0
Amess and Wright
(2007)
1999-
2004
Firms 1350 leveraged buy-
outs (LBOs)
4029 non-LBOs Regression ≈0
USA McGuckin and
Nguyen (2001)
1977-
1987
Plants ≈20000 merging
plants in the manu-
facturing sector
≈300.000 non-
merged plants
Regression Typical plant:
>0; Bigger
plants: <0
Gugler and
Yurtoglu (2004)
Since
1970
Firms 646 mergers; diﬀeren-
tiated in related/ un-
related; friendly/ hos-
tile; tender/no ten-
der; domestic/ cross-
border mergers
≈10.000 non-
merged ﬁrms
Regression US: ≈0;
UK: <0;
Continental
Europe: <0
Ollinger, Nguyen,
Blayney, Nelson,
and Chambers
(2005)
1977-
1992
Plants ≈31.000 merged
plants in food industry
Non-merged
ﬁrms in the same
industry
Regression ≥0
Note: DiD PSM: diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching.
1.4.5 Eﬀects on skill-intensity
In the context of employment changes due to M&A it is an interesting question if the merging
ﬁrms' skill-intensities change. From a theoretical point of view, merging ﬁrms may be able to
use ﬁrm-level assets together (e.g. management, administration, marketing, R&D, etc.), and
therefore, they may seek to rationalize these activities (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004).
These ﬁrm-level activities are supposed to be mostly performed by white-collar workers. If these
white-collar workers are higher skilled than production workers, and if production workers are
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not aﬀected by M&A, a reduction of the merging ﬁrms' skill-intensities should be expected. In
contrast, unskilled workers may suﬀer if mergers lead to reorganizational changes. Lindbeck
and Snower (2000) argued that measures of reorganizational changes require speciﬁc skills of
employees. If skilled workers have these skills, unskilled workers may be laid oﬀ, leading to
higher skill-intensities in ﬁrms.
The empirical literature on this issue is scarce. For plants of the US manufacturing sector,
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) found that white-collar workers suﬀer more from M&A compared
to production workers. Similar results were found in Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) for
the USA. In a study for Finland, Huttunen (2007) found that acquired plants reduce the share
of highly educated workers after a change from domestic to foreign ownership. Contrary, Girma
and Görg (2004) found negative employment eﬀects after foreign takeovers, in particular for
unskilled workers in the UK electronics industry. There are studies about hostile mergers that
report about negative employment eﬀects for higher skilled workers. For example, Franks and
Mayer (1996) found higher resign rates for directors after hostile mergers for the UK. For the US
and the UK, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) observed that mainly board members are displaced,
and Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) reported that mostly white-collar workers are laid oﬀ
after hostile M&A. Some further studies exist that examined management turnover after M&A:
Martin and McConnell (1991) reported that 42% of top managers in targets have been replaced
in the ﬁrst, and 21% in the second post-merger year after hostile mergers. In friendly mergers,
the replacement rate was 41% and 17%. This was conﬁrmed by Franks and Mayer (1996). Kini,
Kracaw, and Mianc (1995) found that 58% of the CEOs have been replaced after takeovers.
1.4.6 Eﬀects on wages
In general, if M&A increase productivity, as found in several recent empirical studies listed
in table 1.5, wages should be expected to rise if ﬁrms pay according to workers' marginal
product. In addition, horizontal mergers can lead to changes in the structure of the product
market. This may increase the amount of surplus available for wages. Vertical mergers may
also generate a surplus because of reduced transaction costs or eliminated mark-ups (Conyon,
Girma, Thompson, and Wright 2004). Negative eﬀects can be expected if new management
renegotiates about explicit and implicit employment contracts after mergers, as mentioned
above (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
Earlier studies exist from Brown and Medoﬀ (1988) who found little positive eﬀects on wages
after M&A for small ﬁrms in the state of Michigan, USA. Another study is from McGuckin,
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Nguyen, and Reznek (1998). They identiﬁed an increase in wages after M&A for the US food
and beverage manufacturing industry. Contrary, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) analyzed wage
changes in the manufacturing sector of the USA, and they estimated a wage decrease in central
oﬃces, but only little eﬀects in production plants.
Table 1.7: Recent studies about eﬀects of M&A on wages
Country Authors Period Unit Merger sample Control group Estimation
method
Change
Finland Huttunen (2007) 1988-
2001
Plants 284 foreign acqui-
sitions of domestic
plants
≈14.000 non-
merged plants
Regression;
DiD PSM
>0
Germany Andrews, Bell-
mann, Schank,
and Upward
(2009)
2000-
2004
Employees Employer-employee
data
Employees in
non-merged
plants
Regression ≈0
Indonesia Lipsey and
Sjöholm (2006)
1975-
1999
Plant 1045 domestic and
1243 foreign takeovers
≈40.000 non-
merged plants
Regression >0
Sweden Siegel and Simons
(2008)
1985-
1998
Employees Employer-employee
data for 19.000 plants;
diﬀerentiated in full/
partial acquisitions,
divestitures; related/
unrelated
Employees in
non-merged ﬁrms
Regression ≥0
Bandick (2011) 1993-
2002
Firms 464 foreign acquisi-
tions of manufacturing
ﬁrms; MNEs/ non-
MNEs; horizontal/
vertical mergers
≈4.000 non-
merged ﬁrms
Regression;
DiD PSM
≈0
UK Conyon, Girma,
Thompson, and
Wright (2002b)
1989-
1994
Firms 129 foreign mergers;
139 domestic merg-
ers; horizontal/ verti-
cal mergers
Random control
sample of 642
ﬁrms
Regression >0;
Horizontal
domestic
M&A: <0
Conyon, Girma,
Thompson, and
Wright (2004)
1979-
1991
Firms 190 domestic related/
unrelated mergers in
140 manufacturing
ﬁrms
236 non-merged
ﬁrms
Regression >0
Girma and Görg
(2007)
1980-
1994
Plants 203 foreign acqui-
sitions of domestic
plants in the electron-
ics and 100 in the
food industry
Non-merged
plants
DiD PSM Acquisitions
by US ﬁrms:
>0; acquisi-
tions by EU
ﬁrms: ≈0
Amess and Wright
(2007)
1999-
2004
Firms 1.350 leveraged buy-
outs (LBOs)
4.029 non-LBOs Regression <0
USA McGuckin and
Nguyen (2001)
1977-
1987
Plants ≈20.000 merging
plants in the manu-
facturing sector
≈300.000 non-
merged plants
Regression Typical plants:
>0; Bigger
plants: <0
Note: DiD PSM: diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching.
Results from newer studies about the impact of M&A on wages are presented in table
1.7. Despite little exceptions, most studies found that wages stay unchanged or increase after
mergers. This is in line with results from newer studies about mostly positive productivity
eﬀects.
1.4.7 Further eﬀects
In the literature on international trade and heterogeneous ﬁrms, mergers are discussed as a way
to restructure industries. With an oligopoly framework, Neary (2007) showed that cross-border
Mergers & Acquisitions: trends, reasons, effects 32
M&A lead to a restructuring of industries with a specialization in the direction of comparative
advantage, because low cost ﬁrms in one country buy high-cost ﬁrms in another country. In
an empirical study about the role of M&A as a way of industry restructuring, Breinlich (2008)
provided evidence that M&A are a channel for industrial restructuring if trade becomes freer.
He also found that M&A transfers resources from less to more productive ﬁrms. Andrade and
Staﬀord (2004) showed that mergers have both a contractionary and expansionary function in
industrial restructuring, which changes over time. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, industries
with excess capacity were rationalized and restructured via mergers. Their ﬁndings supported
the contractionary role of M&A which led to a more eﬃcient allocation of resources and
capacity within industries and the economy. In the 1990s, however, merger activity was highest
in industries with high growth prospects and proﬁtability, which underlined the expansionary
role of M&A.
1.4.8 A diﬀerent approach: event studies
Event studies are a diﬀerent way to assess the success of mergers. The methodology goes back
to Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) and analyzes abnormal returns of stock prices around
the announcement of an acquisition. This approach is based on the assumption of perfect
capital markets which display all information available about past, present, and future at any
time, and stock prices immediately adjust to new information. However, the analysis of share
prices leads to some problems (Mueller, 2003a): when share prices change due to a merger,
how should one know at which point of time this change occurs? And how to separate price
changes caused by mergers from price changes caused by other factors? There are also justiﬁed
doubts about the reliability of the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial markets and their ability to correctly
predict eﬀects of mergers. In order to demonstrate the failure of ﬁnancial markets to analyze
mergers, Scherer (2002) presented two examples of abnormal positive returns for targets after
a merger announcement, one of them ending in bankruptcy.
However, event studies are also not able to present an unambiguous picture about eﬀects
of M&A. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarized 13 earlier empirical studies and
found that M&A increased stock value due to improved allocation. The observation period
only covered several days or months around the merger announcement. In contrast, Tichy
(2001) surveyed studies with long windows and concluded that results have a wide distribution
with a negative mean after the acquisitions. The main ﬁndings were: there is a clear trend of
declining abnormal bidder returns; cash ﬁnanced mergers perform better than stock ﬁnanced
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mergers; and bidders with a low book-to-market-ratio (so-called "glamor bidders") showed high
abnormal announcement returns, but perform badly after the takeover.
There are studies that found increases in stock prices of target ﬁrms, but only little reaction
of the acquirers' stock prices. For example, Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001) presented
a survey about abnormal stock market returns of M&A deals of NASDAQ companies between
1973 and 1998, and they analyzed long run eﬀects. They found that M&A created abnormal
stock market returns of 0.4% for the acquiring ﬁrm, which is similar to other types of invest-
ments. However, there were large premiums for stockholders of target ﬁrms from 16 to 25%.
Mueller (2003b) found that there were no abnormal returns to acquiring companies on average
over a short period of time around the merger announcement. But over a longer observation
period between one and three years, returns of acquirers declined on average relative to the
market. Scherer (2002) summarized that after adding up gains for stockholders of targets and
losses for stockholders of acquirers, the net eﬀect of M&A depended on the relative size of the
companies.
1.4.9 Why do the empirical results diﬀer?
So far, empirical studies about eﬀects of M&A do not present an unambiguous picture. Instead,
studies even ﬁnd opposing eﬀects. There are some possible explanations for this phenomenon.13
 Diﬀerent datasets can be an explanation for diﬀerent results. They can diﬀer from each
other with respect to the number of observations included, the ﬁrms' size, the covered
time periods, countries, industries, the availability and quality of control groups, etc.
Moreover, diﬀerent results can emerge from sample selection bias due to missing data
(e.g. no data about smaller merging ﬁrms) (Schwert, 2000).
 Diﬀerent empirical methods may estimate diﬀerent eﬀects. This is of great importance,
because earlier studies do often not control for selection bias, while newer studies apply
advanced econometric methods in order to identify causalities and control for selection
eﬀects. And even with newer techniques like matching,14 results may diﬀer because
the performance of each step of the method is not yet standardized. Hence, diﬀerent
researchers may come to diﬀerent results even if they use the same dataset (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009).
13See Tichy (2001) for a more comprehensive discussion.
14See Caliendo (2006) for an introduction.
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 Moreover, diﬀerent types of mergers could also be a cause for ambiguous empirical results.
For example, some studies focus on horizontal mergers (e.g. Pesendorfer, 2003), others
on non-horizontal mergers (e.g. Bhuyan, 2002). There is some evidence that mergers
between ﬁrms with similar products or markets perform better. For example, Ravenscraft
and Scherer (1987) ﬁnd that horizontal mergers are more proﬁtable than vertical ones,
and conglomerate mergers are the least proﬁtable.
 There are studies that examined domestic M&A, while others examined cross-border
M&A. Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes (2001) found a better performance for cross-
border M&A, while Black (2000) showed that domestic M&A perform better. The
motivations behind mergers may be diﬀerent and can cause diﬀerent results, e.g. market
extension in the case of cross-border M&A, or cost reductions in the case of domestic
M&A (Capron, 1999). Similarly, eﬀects from hostile mergers may also diﬀer from friendly
mergers (e.g. Martin and McConnell, 1991).
 Studies also diﬀer with respect to the observation unit, i.e. between ﬁrm- (e.g. Bellak,
Pfaﬀermayr, and Wild, 2006) and plant-level (e.g. Girma and Görg, 2004). Results
may diﬀer because plants are fully involved in a merger, whereas eﬀects from M&A may
disperse at ﬁrm-level if the ﬁrm is a multi-plant ﬁrm. Moreover, several studies analyzed
eﬀects for only one party involved in the merger, e.g. only for targets (e.g. Arndt and
Mattes, 2010).
 The method of payment may also inﬂuence the success of mergers. Most studies point to
a better performance of studies ﬁnanced by cash (e.g. Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes,
2001). Cash bids may be seen as an indicator of a good performance of the bidder
(Loughran and Vijh, 1997).
1.5 Lessons learned and open research questions
The preceding sections provided a broad picture of research results about determinants and
eﬀects of mergers. I will try to draw some general conclusions, present important lessons that
can be learnt, and ﬁnish with open research questions.
First, the large number of studies that found proﬁt losses after mergers suggest that a
high fraction of managers do not merge for proﬁt maximizing reasons. Instead, other motives
obviously play an important role, e.g. empire building, hubris, speculative motives, etc. This is
in line with earlier surveys, e.g. from Tichy (2001) or Mueller (2003a).
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Second, recent studies about eﬀects on productivity, employment, and wages point to an
increased importance of proﬁt and eﬃciency maximizing motivations for mergers, and this is
not fully in line with implications drawn from studies about eﬀects on proﬁts. In particular,
there is evidence from newer studies that productivity increases after M&A, even if older studies
show ambiguous eﬀects. This may be due to newer research methods, diﬀerent observation
periods, or due to a larger proportion of ﬁrms than before that merge for eﬃciency reasons.
Recent studies show a tendency towards employment losses after mergers. This also supports
the relevance of proﬁt and eﬃciency maximizing reasons for mergers, because employment
losses are more likely if mergers are motivated by these reasons. However, studies do not point
to mass layoﬀs after mergers, which is an often held fear by the public. Moreover, the fear of
a large decrease in wages after mergers is also not conﬁrmed by the data. Instead, the results
point to positive eﬀects. This is what could be expected if productivity eﬀects are positive, and
if wages are paid according to workers' productivity.
Third, a simple comparison of the empirical results is problematic. This is because studies
highly diﬀer from each other with respect to the underlying data, econometric methods, etc.
Moreover, a diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent types and motivations of mergers is necessary, be-
cause there is no typical merger (Tichy, 2001). Otherwise, we might compare the incomparable.
With respect to hostile and friendly mergers, Morck, Shleifer, and Summers (1988) stated that
"research results on friendly bids may have little to say about hostile bids, and vice versa".
Which research questions remain? The number of empirical studies about eﬀects of M&A
on several performance parameters is still to small to draw stylized facts (e.g. eﬀects on R&D
activities, investment, etc.).15 This is also true for the diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent types
of mergers, i.e. horizontal, vertical, and in particular conglomerates. Moreover, while eﬀects
of cross-border M&A has gained much attention in the last years, almost no research work has
focused on eﬀects from domestic mergers, which account for a large fraction of all M&A.16
In addition, studies often have a bias towards larger ﬁrms, and eﬀects of smaller ﬁrms are
less examined. This may also be a question of data availability. Finally, in addition to results
from studies that are based on datasets with a large number of merged ﬁrms, studies analyzing
individual mergers may provide further important information about the mechanisms at work,
the motives and eﬀects of mergers.
15Even if Tichy (2001) presented several stylized facts about eﬀects of M&A on diﬀerent performance
parameters, I do not consider suﬃcient empirical support for several statements. This was also
criticized by Lyons (2001).
16For Germany, around 50% of all M&A were domestic (Spanninger, 2012).
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2.1 Motivation
Matching is a useful tool for situations in which the eﬀect of a treatment on a group should
be evaluated in comparison to the counterfactual situation in which the same group had not
received the treatment. In other words, the intuition of the method is to mimic the situation
in which the researcher is able to step back in time to observe the same group again, but now
not participating in the treatment.
Matching has been applied in diﬀerent ﬁelds of economics in order to discuss questions
about self-selection and causality. For example, within international economics, Wagner (2002)
was the ﬁrst who used a matching approach to examine how a ﬁrm's productivity is aﬀected
if it starts to export. Later, Wagner (2007a) surveyed 45 microeconometric studies about
exports and productivity for 33 countries which were published over the years 1995 to 2006,
and several of these studies also applied matching strategies. In addition, studies exist that
applied matching to evaluate the eﬀects of ﬁrms' outward FDI on domestic performance. For
example, Barba Navaretti, Castellani, and Disdier (2010) evaluated eﬀects for Italian and French
ﬁrms on several performance indicators, and Hijzen, Inui, and Todo (2007) investigated eﬀects
for Japanese ﬁrms. A similar study is from Jäckle and Wamser (2010) about German ﬁrms
switching their status from national to multinationals. There are also studies that used matching
techniques to study eﬀects of foreign acquisitions on acquired ﬁrms' performance: with respect
to productivity eﬀects Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2006) for the UK, Salis (2008) for
Slovenia etc.; with respect to eﬀects on the ﬁrms' proﬁts Bellak, Pfaﬀermayr, and Wild (2006)
for Austria, Bertrand and Zitouna (2005) for France etc.; with respect to employment changes
Girma (2005) for the UK, Arndt and Mattes (2010) for Germany etc.; and with respect to
eﬀects on wages Girma and Görg (2007) for the UK, or Bandick (2011) for Sweden etc.
The matching techniques were ﬁrst applied in the areas of labor economics, mostly to
evaluate the eﬀectiveness of labor market programs (e.g. Stephan (2008) analyzed labor market
programs in Germany). The method is also used in medical science to evaluate eﬀects of
therapies (e.g. see Austin (2007) for an evaluation of 47 articles published between 1996 and
2003 in the medical literature using propensity-score matching). There are further research ﬁelds
in which the matching approach may be a useful strategy (e.g. see Brand and Halaby (2006)
who investigated the eﬀects of elite college attendance on educational and career achievement).
How is matching included in the econometrics literature? Generally, evaluation methods
diﬀer with respect to the data (Caliendo, 2006). The most compelling results are generated from
experimental data, i.e. individuals are assigned randomly to a treatment, and randomization
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ensures the group of treated and the group of untreated1 to have the same distribution of
characteristics. That is, they only diﬀer in their treatment status. Therefore, the data generates
the correct missing counterfactual and eliminates the evaluation problem. This is the problem
that arises because both states - treatment and no treatment - are not observable for the
same individual at the same time. However, for most research questions only non-experimental
data is available, i.e. data that is not generated by a controlled experiment. Since treated
and untreated diﬀer in more than their treatment status, a simple comparison of the outcome
after treatment does not reveal the true impact of the treatment. In other words: since
individuals do not randomly select in the treatment group, a comparison between treated and
control suﬀers from selection bias. This selection problem requires the use of non-experimental
estimation strategies. The performance of non-experimental estimators can be evaluated by
using experimental data as a benchmark (e.g. LaLonde, 1986; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd,
1997; Heckman, Smith and Clements, 1997).
Figure 2.1 presents a classiﬁcation of estimation strategies. As explained above, data is
classiﬁed in experimental and non-experimental data. Methods dealing with non-experimental
data are separated in two broad categories, depending in how they handle the selection eﬀect
(Caliendo, 2006). The ﬁrst group of estimators is based on the assumption that the selec-
tion process is based on variables that are observable to the researcher. This assumption, also
called "conditional independence assumption" (CIA), implies that systematic diﬀerences in the
outcome between treated and untreated individuals with the same values for observable charac-
teristics are caused by the treatment. There are two estimation methods that rely on the CIA
and therefore, fall in this category: matching and linear regression. In order to justify the CIA,
and to yield a good performance of the methods, rich data about observable characteristics and
outcomes is required. Brieﬂy explained, the major diﬀerences between matching and regression
as estimation strategies when selection is on observables are, ﬁrstly, that matching is non- or
semi-parametric, i.e. no functional form is required.2 In contrast, linear regression requires a
functional form. Hence, estimations from regression are biased if the functional form is not
correctly speciﬁed. Secondly, matching requires ﬁnding a control to each treated observation,
but for some treated, no controls may be found. Thus, the estimated eﬀects from the matching
1I will use the terms "treated" and "participant" interchangeably, and I will also use the terms "control",
or "non-participant" as synonyms for "untreated".
2If a parametric model for the estimation of the participation probability (e.g. with logit or probit models,
see subsection 2.3.2) is combined with a non-parametric comparison of the outcomes, propensity
score matching is semi-parametric. In contrast, exact (or cell) matching is completely non-parametric
(Caliendo, 2006).
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method only refer to those treated which ﬁnd comparable controls.3 In contrast, regression
analysis produces estimates even if there are no untreated comparables to treated, i.e. the
functional form ﬁlls in for the missing data and extrapolates for treated without comparable
controls.4 However, if selection on unobservable characteristics may also be relevant, estima-
tors from the second group can be applied: these are instrumental variables (IV) methods, or
selection models. Because this paper's focus is about matching as a strategy if selection is on
observables, I will not further discuss these methods.5
Figure 2.1: Estimation strategies
Type of data
Selection on 
observables
Non-experimental data Experimental data
Selection on 
unobservables
Instrumental 
variables 
methods
Matching Regression Selection
methods
Source: Caliendo (2006).
My paper adds to the existing literature about the implementation of propensity score
matching (e.g. Caliendo (2006) and others). It is addressed to researchers not yet familiar with
the method, and provides a stepwise description of how to perform propensity score matching
with STATA, a widely used software program in econometrics. I use the module PSMATCH2, a
matching program developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). The focus is on diﬀerent practical
questions: what is propensity score matching good for? How to perform propensity score
matching in STATA? Which algorithm should be applied to match treated and controls to each
other? How do the algorithms diﬀer from each other? How can the quality of the process be
assessed? And how do I know if the results are useful?
The ﬁrst contribution in the evaluation literature which deals with the matching approach
based on propensity scores came from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The methodology was
extended by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd
3This so-called "common support condition" will be explained in greater detail later in this paper.
4See Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Caliendo (2006) for a more detailed discussion about similarities
and diﬀerences between matching and regression.
5See Caliendo (2006) for more details about IV methods and selection models. In addition, see Caliendo
and Hujer (2006) for a discussion of estimators if selection is on unobservables.
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(1998). Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) used data from National Supported Work Demonstra-
tion (NSW) data and diﬀerent comparison groups from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
and Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to perform matching with diﬀerent matching
algorithms, i.e. diﬀerent ways how to match treated with controls. Their paper was a reply to
LaLonde's (1986) critique on non-experimental estimators: LaLonde (1986) applied diﬀerent
standard evaluation estimators and showed that they produced diﬀerent estimates. Diﬀerent
matching algorithms were introduced or analyzed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997),
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998), Imbens (2004), Smith and Todd (2005a), and
Caliendo (2006). Moreover, there are contributions about certain aspects of the method like
the estimation of the propensity score. This score determines which treated and controls will
be matched to each other. For this, Rubin and Thomas (1996), Bryson, Dorsett, and Pur-
don (2002) as well as Augurzky and Schmidt (2001) discussed speciﬁcations of the estimation
of the propensity score. Rosenbaum (2002) and Lechner (2008) addressed questions about
robustness analysis. Reinowski (2008) discussed matching algorithms for small sample sizes.
Imbens (2000), Hirano and Imbens (2004), and Imai and van Dyk (2004) extended the standard
matching approach to continuous treatments.
This paper is closest to several contributions about practical implementation of the method.
For example, Caliendo (2006) provided a comprehensive introduction to the method, but there
are no descriptions about how to implement the method in a computer software. This is also true
for Gensler, Skiera, and Böhm (2005) who described the theory about matching and provide
a practical example. Becker and Ichino (2002) demonstrated their own developed software
program att* to perform propensity score matching in STATA. The intension of the paper of
Essama-Nssah (2006) is similar to this contribution, but the author used the software EViews.
In addition, there are also introductions to propensity score matching and its implementation in
STATA with the software PSMATCH2 that are available in the form of downloadable internet
presentations,6 or as documents or handouts from research workshops.7
Despite the availability of several instructions and to the best of my knowledge, there is no
paper that explains the implementation of the method in STATA8 with the program PSMATCH2
step-by-step, i.e. with all relevant STATA-commands9 and the respective outcomes, all displayed
6For example, see http://www.stata.com/meeting/germany10/germany10_sianesi.pdf [May 9th 2012]
from Sianesi.
7For example, the workshops from Caliendo at the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) Nuremberg.
However, the documents are not downloadable from the internet.
8I use STATA version 11.1.
9I present all necessary commands, but the reader should be familiar with the basics in STATA. Kohler
and Kreuter (2008) provided an introduction to the software.
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in tables and ﬁgures. Hence, my paper should provide a more comprehensive introduction than
most existing internet presentations or workshop documents. Its objective is to make the
researcher able to apply the method without any further teaching instructions. With respect
to the description of the theoretical framework, I closely follow Caliendo (2006), but contrary
to him, I do not go into details and restrict explanations to the most important aspects of
the theory. The presented STATA-commands and the respective explanations in this paper are
mostly guided by the descriptions in the help-ﬁle available from the program PSMATCH2. To
demonstrate how the method works, I use a dataset with plants that merged and a control group
of plants that had not merged, and I estimate the eﬀect of mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
on the plants' number of employees. The dataset is a combination of the IAB (Institute of
Employment Research Nuremberg) Establishment Panel and the M&A DATABASE from St.
Gallen.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the theoretical framework of
the method. Section 2.3 describes how to estimate the propensity score, and section 2.4 is
dedicated to the explanation of several matching algorithms. Section 2.5 is about the quality
of the procedure and presents robustness checks. Finally, section 2.6 concludes with a critical
review of the matching method.
2.2 Theoretical framework
The focus of this section is to discuss the theory behind the matching method. The presentation
closely follows Caliendo (2006). Matching is based on the theoretical framework developed by
Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974), and it is known as the Roy-Rubin-Model. The central question in
evaluating the eﬀect of a treatment or of program participation is: what would have happened
to an individual who received a treatment if it had not received the treatment? Of course, both
states cannot be observed at the same time, and thus, the Roy-Rubin-Model is also known as
the "potential outcome approach".
Average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT): First, let Y be an outcome variable
and D a treatment variable with D = 1 if the individual participated in a treatment, and
D = 0 if there is no treatment. Hence, Yi(1) is the outcome if an individual i participated
in the treatment D, and Yi(0) if the same individual did not participate in the treatment D.
To measure the eﬀect of the treatment it would be desirable to compare both outcomes for
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individual i, that is
∆ = Yi(1)−Yi(0). (1)
Of course, ∆ cannot be identiﬁed because for one individual i only Yi(1) or Yi(0) can be
observed at one point of time. The literature refers to this missing data problem as "fundamental
evaluation problem", and the missing outcome as the "counterfactual outcome". The evaluation
problem can be solved under the assumption of "unit homogeneity" (Holland, 1986). That is,
the outcome of a participant will be compared to a non-participant who exhibits the same
observable and non-observable characteristics before the treatment. However, the assumption
of unit homogeneity can usually not be held because of heterogeneity between participants and
non-participants with regard to their observable and unobservable pre-treatment characteristics.
Therefore, the focus of interest has to switch from the observation of a single individual to the
diﬀerences in mean values between groups of treated and untreated, because it is not possible
to observe the counterfactual outcome for a single individual. This diﬀerence - known as the
average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT) - is
ATT = E[Y(1)|D = 1]− E[Y(0)|D = 1]. (2)
However, the mean outcome of a treated without treatment, E[Y(0)|D = 1], can also not
be observed. Therefore, the evaluation problem is to identify an adequate control group for
the participants. Taking E[Y(0)|D = 0] for E[Y(0)|D = 1] may lead to a selection bias if
individuals are not randomly assigned to the treatment, i.e. every individual does not face the
same ex ante probability of being treated. The resulting estimate would then include a selection
bias and can be written as
E[Y(1)|D = 1]− E[Y(0)|D = 0] = ATT + E[Y(0)|D = 1]− E[Y(0)|D = 0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection bias
. (3)
In non-experimental data individuals do not assign randomly to treatment. This implies that
E[Y(0)|D = 1]− E[Y(0)|D = 0] can be expected to be diﬀerent from zero.
The matching method oﬀers a way to estimate the ATT without selection bias. Therefore,
to each individual of the treatment group an individual of the control group with identical -
or at least similar - pre-treatment characteristics will be assigned. It should be clear that the
identiﬁcation of a causal eﬀect is only possible if all pre-treatment characteristics, which are
relevant for the treatment decision, are included. If there is a diﬀerence in the mean outcome
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between the treated and control group after treatment, it can be ascribed to the treatment.
Conditional independence assumption (CIA): To make a matching approach work,
some important assumptions have to hold. First, the "conditional independence assumption"
(CIA) states that - conditioning on the values of a set of observable characteristics X which
are not aﬀected by treatment - the outcome of both groups would be the same in the absence
of treatment (Lechner, 1999):
Y(0),Y(1)⊥D|X, ∀X (4)
with ⊥ indicating independence.10 This assumption is called "unconfoundedness" (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983), but the terms "conditional independence assumption" (Lechner, 1999) and
"selection on observables" (Heckman and Robb, 1985) mean the same.11
Taking the mean, the CIA allows stating that
E[Y(0)|D = 1,X] = E[Y(0)|D = 0,X], (5)
that is, given the CIA, the selection bias from equation 3 disappears after conditioning on the
covariates X.
Propensity score: Matching is based on a set of several observable pre-treatment char-
acteristics X. Even with a small number of characteristics and its diﬀerent values it becomes
diﬃcult to ﬁnd matching partners with equal characteristics. Then, treated individuals may
remain unmatched. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that the use of a propensity score
P(X) as a single index is also suﬃcient in order to reduce a "potentially high dimensional
matching problem" (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998). The propensity score P(X)
is a measure of the probability of participation for each individual conditional on observed
characteristics X. The propensity score is then estimated from a probit or logit model, and
the matching of individuals is then based on the propensity score of treated and untreated
individuals. The ATT can now be estimated:
ATT = E[Y(1)|D = 1, P(X)]− E[Y(0)|D = 0, P(X)]. (6)
The self-selection bias is eliminated, and diﬀerences in outcomes can be ascribed only to the
treatment.
10For the estimation of ATT it is suﬃcient to assume that Y(0)⊥D|X, ∀X (Smith and Todd, 2005a).
11I will use these terms interchangeably in this paper.
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Common support: The "common support condition" ensures that the propensity scores of
both groups overlap and all participants have a counterpart in the control group. This ensures
that only individuals which are suﬃciently similar to each other will be matched. The assumption
is stated as 0 < P(D = 1|X) < 1. It implies that an individual has a positive probability of
being both in the treated and control group (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999), and it also
implies that for every treated a control can be found as a matching partner.12 The assumptions
of unconfoundedness and common support are called "strong ignorability" (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983).
Figure 2.2 presents a graphical illustration for a situation with similar distributions of propen-
sity scores in both groups and a corresponding large overlap, and another situation with diﬀerent
distributions and a small overlap.13
Figure 2.2: Diﬀerent distributions of propensity scores
and region of common support
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Note: the ﬁgure present the distributions of propensity scores and the
regions of common support; solid line: distribution for treated; dotted
line: distribution for controls; left ﬁgure: large overlap of distributions;
right ﬁgure: small overlap of distributions. Source: Gensler, Skiera, and
Böhm (2005).
Further assumptions: Another assumption, the "stable unit treatment value assumption"
(SUTVA), states that the participation of a treated does not inﬂuence the treatment decision
and outcome variable of other treated (Rubin, 1990). Finally, individuals should not change
their behavior because of an anticipation of a treatment, because matching results may then
be biased. This is known as the Ashenfelter's Dip.14
12A probability of 0 or 1 would imply that given the covariates X the individual either never or always
participates in the treatment and there are no counterparts in the other group (Heckman, Ichimura,
and Todd, 1997). For the estimation of ATT it is suﬃcient to assume that P(D = 1|X) < 1. See
Smith and Todd (2005a) for a further discussion.
13I will discuss consequences of diﬀerent distributions of propensity scores later.
14Ashenfelter (1978) found that the employment situation of individuals worsens shortly before they
participate in a labor market program. For more details see Hagen and Steiner (2000), and for a
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2.3 How to start and estimate the propensity score
In this section, I ﬁrst introduce the data I use, the software STATA, and the matching program
PSMATCH2. Then, I describe the estimation of the propensity score. I explain how it can
be computed from binary treatment models, and how the robustness of the models can be
assessed. I also discuss the implications of the estimated scores for the matching process. For
a better understanding, I present an example and show the corresponding results.
2.3.1 The data and the software
The dataset used for the following estimations is a combination of the IAB Establishment Panel
and the M&A DATABASE St. Gallen. It contains plants that merged between 1996 and 2005,
and control plants not involved in any M&A activity since 1980. All plants are located in
Germany. The matching process should evaluate the eﬀect of M&A on employment, which
is a research question that has been extensively discussed for several decades with ambiguous
results.15 However, the focus of this paper is on the performance of the method, i.e. the
empirical results generated in this paper will be of minor interest. I use an observation period
of three years: pre-merger characteristics are all measured in t = 1, the merger occurs in
t=2, and the impact on employment will be measured in t=3. The following variables are of
relevance for the matching process: a treatment indicator for M&A (value one if treated and zero
otherwise), dummies for diﬀerent size categories, sector dummies, dummies for diﬀerent legal
forms (partnership, individually-owned, public, etc.; limited; limited by shares), and a dummy
for the location of plants in East Germany. The dataset contains 1817 treated observations
and 581 controls.16
To start the matching procedure, a matching software has to be installed in STATA. In
this paper, I use the PSMATCH2 module developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) which is a
comprehensive and user-friendly program. Most empirical studies applying matching use this
software, but there also exist other programs, e.g. attnd, attnw, attk, attr, attrw, and atts
from Becker and Ichino (2002), nnmatch from Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004), or
cem from Blackwell, Iacus, King, and Porro (2009).
The package PSMATCH2 will be installed with the STATA-command
comprehensive description of Ashenfelter's Dip and its impacts on estimations see Hujer, Caliendo,
and Radic (2001).
15See Mueller (2003a) for a survey.
16In contrast to this dataset, the number of controls usually clearly exceeds the number of treated in
most datasets.
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ssc install psmatch2
A short description of the method and the relevant syntaxes is given by the command
help psmatch2
The module PSMATCH2 performs a variety of matching algorithms, and it also incorporates
several features like the graphical illustration of the propensity score for the treatment and
control group in a histogram, or the storage of the ATT to allow bootstrapping in order to
reestimate standard errors of the treatment eﬀect. Furthermore, it enables the researcher to
assess the matching quality with respect to the balancing of the covariates. Sections 2.4 and
2.5 will provide more detailed information.
2.3.2 The estimation of the propensity score
The propensity score is the probability of receiving a treatment D in year t conditional on a set
of characteristics X for individual i, measured prior to the treatment in t− 1:
P(Dit = 1) = F(Xit−1) (7)
With respect to this dataset, the propensity score describes the probability that a plant merges
conditioning on a set of pre-merger characteristics X. For the estimation of the propensity
score any standard probability model like probit or logit models can be used, and the dependent
variable presents the participation decision (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). That is, for each
observation, the models estimate the probability of merging.17 The results from logit and probit
models are usually similar, and thus, the choice between both models is of minor importance.18
In this paper I apply a probit model with a dummy variable for merger activity as dependent
variable (with value one if plants merged and zero otherwise), and a set of explaining variables.
The choice of explanatory variables has to be consistent with economic theory and has to
ensure that the CIA holds (Smith and Todd, 2005a). As noted above, all relevant characteristics
X which inﬂuence the treatment decision (here: M&A) as well as the outcome variable (here:
17See Gensler, Skiera, and Böhm (2005) or Dehejia and Wahba (2002) for a formal presentation of
logit and probit models in order to estimate the propensity score for each observation.
18Logit models are based on a logistic distribution function while probit models are based on a standard
normal distribution function. The main diﬀerence is that the logit distribution has more density mass
on the bounds (Caliendo, 2006). See Verbeek (2005) for a further discussion of logit and probit
models.
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number of employees) have to be included in the model. Rubin and Thomas (1996) suggested
that variables should only be excluded if they are not related to the outcome or if they have no
relevance. In contrast, Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998), Augurzky and Schmidt
(2001), and Bryson, Dorsett, and Purdon (2002) recommended a smaller set of variables. The
latter argue that the inclusion of insigniﬁcant variables leads to a less exact estimation of the
propensity score. However, it should be clear that the objective of the matching process is to
balance the covariates and not to obtain an exact estimation of the propensity score (Caliendo,
2006). The chosen variables have to be ﬁxed over time, or they have to be measured before
the treatment.
With respect to the number of observations Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) recommended
more than 100 observations to obtain meaningful results from the regression. If there are
categories due to dummy variables for nominal or ordinal scaled independent variables (e.g.
employment size categories), the number of observations in each category should be larger than
25. Moreover, no multicollinearity (Menard, 2001) and autocorrelation (Aldrich and Nelson,
1984) should exist in logistic regression models.
The following probit regression model includes only a small set of explaining variables as
suggested by Rubin and Thomas (1996). The STATA-command is:
probit DUMMY_MA SIZE_CAT_T1_2-SIZE_CAT_T1_6 SECTOR_T1_2-SECTOR_T1_16
LEGAL_FORM_T1_2 LEGAL_FORM_T1_3 EAST_T1
probit is the STATA-command to start a probit regression.19 It has to be followed by the de-
pendent variable, here a dummy for M&A, DUMMY_MA. The following variables are all explaining
variables, and they have to be consistent with economic theory. For this model, the choice of the
variables is inﬂuenced by the literature about determinants of M&A,20 and they are all measured
prior to the merger in t = 1: SIZE_CAT_T1_2 to SIZE_CAT_T1_6 are dummies for diﬀerent
size categories,21 SECTOR_T1_2 to SECTOR_T1_16 are dummies for sectors, LEGAL_FORM_T1_2
and LEGAL_FORM_T1_3 are dummies for legal forms, and EAST_T1 is a dummy for location in
East Germany.
Table 2.1 reports the results from the probit regression. Regression parameters are generated
19To perform a logit instead of a probit regression, simply exchange the command probit with logit.
20See Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2002a, 2002b), Harris and Robinson (2002), Margolis
(2006a), Girma and Görg (2007), and others for a discussion about determinants of M&A.
21SIZE_CAT_T1_1 is the reference category and contains the smallest plants. Coeﬃcients of the other
size dummies refer to this group. This applies also to other dummy variables, and thus, avoids that
exact multicollinearity arises (Verbeek, 2005).
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Table 2.1: Probit regression
. probit DUMMY_MA SIZE_CAT_T1_2-SIZE_CAT_T1_6 SECTOR_T1_2-SECTOR_T1_11 
LEGAL_FORM_T1_2-LEGAL_FORM_T1_3 EAST_T1 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1328.0495   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -820.82145   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -757.98407   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -754.50846   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -754.48562   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -754.48562   
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =       2398 
                                                  LR chi2(18)     =    1147.13 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -754.48562                       Pseudo R2       =     0.4319 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    DUMMY_MA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
SIZE_CAT_T~2 |  -.0987562   .1369382    -0.72   0.471      -.36715    .1696377 
SIZE_CAT_T~3 |  -.2097664   .1412184    -1.49   0.137    -.4865494    .0670165 
SIZE_CAT_T~4 |   .2507293   .1252634     2.00   0.045     .0052176     .496241 
SIZE_CAT_T~5 |   .6840995   .1524464     4.49   0.000     .3853101     .982889 
SIZE_CAT_T~6 |   2.088776    .157313    13.28   0.000     1.780448    2.397103 
 SECTOR_T1_2 |   .0822164   .4442876     0.19   0.853    -.7885714    .9530042 
 SECTOR_T1_3 |  -.9571824   .2741334    -3.49   0.000    -1.494474   -.4198909 
 SECTOR_T1_4 |  -1.299743   .2659028    -4.89   0.000    -1.820903   -.7785834 
 SECTOR_T1_5 |  -1.153739   .1859073    -6.21   0.000    -1.518111   -.7893676 
 SECTOR_T1_6 |  -1.378838    .180157    -7.65   0.000     -1.73194   -1.025737 
 SECTOR_T1_7 |  -1.070766   .2834113    -3.78   0.000    -1.626242   -.5152899 
 SECTOR_T1_8 |  -1.088695   .1872647    -5.81   0.000    -1.455727    -.721663 
 SECTOR_T1_9 |  -.3572387    .220214    -1.62   0.105    -.7888502    .0743729 
SECTOR_T1_10 |  -1.458521   .8776002    -1.66   0.097    -3.178586    .2615435 
SECTOR_T1_11 |  -1.172693   .2044493    -5.74   0.000    -1.573406   -.7719794 
LEGAL_FOR~_2 |  -.1516684   .1119252    -1.36   0.175    -.3710377    .0677008 
LEGAL_FORM~3 |   1.595019   .1689148     9.44   0.000     1.263952    1.926086 
     EAST_T1 |   .2989708    .092083     3.25   0.001     .1184915    .4794501 
       _cons |   .8438046   .2017243     4.18   0.000     .4484321    1.239177 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, M&A DATABASE St. Gallen.
with the maximum likelihood method (ML).22 One test to evaluate the goodness-of-ﬁt of the
binary choice model is the likelihood-ratio test (LR chi2). The principle of this test is to compare
a model in which all coeﬃcients are set to zero except the constant, with a model including
all variables. For both models a so-called loglikelihood value will be calculated. The larger
the diﬀerence of these values, the higher the explanation of the independent variables of the
model. The diﬀerence should exceed the value of the χ2-distribution for the number of degrees
of freedom (here: 18). The respective prob-value describes the probability of coeﬃcients to be
zero (Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber, 2010; Rohrlack, 2009). In this regression, the
diﬀerence of the coeﬃcients to zero is statistically signiﬁcant.
Another important measure of ﬁt is the McFadden's R2. It measures how much of the
variation of the dependent variable is explained by the regression.23 Higher values indicate
a better ﬁt: values above 0.2 are considered as acceptable, values of 0.4 and higher can be
considered as good (Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber, 2010; Rohrlack, 2009; Kraﬀt,
1997). Here, a pseudo-R2 of 0.432 is suﬃciently high.
Finally, the coeﬃcients need some attention. The second column in table 2.1 reports
standard errors as a measure of the accuracy of the estimated coeﬃcients. High standard errors
22For a detailed description see Verbeek (2005), or Greene (2011).
23Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke provided further pseudo-R2 measures. For more information see
Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber (2010) and Rohrlack (2009).
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indicate that estimated coeﬃcients are not precise and reliable. The third and fourth columns
report z-values and respective p-values. The z-values are the ratio of the coeﬃcients to the
standard errors. Based on z-values, the associated p-values indicate if the regression coeﬃcients
are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, given the other variables. In particular, if
p-values are equal or smaller than 0.1, 0.05, or 0.01, the coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 10%, 5%, or 1%-level. The last column presents the 95%-conﬁdence interval: 95%
of several conﬁdence intervals, calculated from diﬀerent samples of the same population, will
include the true value of the coeﬃcient. If explaining variables inﬂuence the dependent variable,
the respective conﬁdence intervals should neither change signs nor include the value zero.
Now, for each observation a propensity score is estimated from the probit model, and it
expresses the probability to merge. The variable pscore, that will be generated next, simply
includes the propensity score for each observation:
predict pscore, p
The distribution of the propensity scores can be analyzed by the STATA-command
bys treated: summarize pscore
and results are shown in table 2.2. It lists the range of propensity scores for both groups, which
is from 0.185 to 0.962 for controls, and from 0.185 to 0.999 for treated.24
Table 2.2: Distribution of propensity scores
. bys DUMMY_MA: sum pscore 
 
-> DUMMY_MA = Controls 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      pscore |       581    .4319791    .1788804   .1850013   .9623671 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-> DUMMY_MA = Treated 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      pscore |      1817    .8622568    .2234217   .1850013   .9999995 
In addition to table 2.2 it is helpful to analyze the distribution of propensity scores among
treated and controls with a graphical illustration. Figure 2.3 is generated with command
24The ranges of propensity scores start with exactly the same value in both groups. That is, there
are obviously plants in both groups which have identical characteristics, and this leads to the same
probability for M&A.
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hist pscore, by(treated)
Ideally, the distribution of propensity scores is similar in both groups. If there are many observa-
tions for certain ranges of the propensity score, a suﬃciently high number of matching partners
with similar scores can be found. Instead, if the distribution strongly diﬀers, matching partners
with similar propensity scores are scarce for certain ranges. The matching quality suﬀers if
treated with high propensity scores are matched to controls with low propensity scores and vice
versa. Figure 2.3 shows an asymmetric distribution of propensity scores for this paper's data.25
Figure 2.3: Graphical distribution of propensity scores
As already discussed in section 2.2, the estimation of the ATT is only deﬁned in the region
of common support (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999), i.e. there has to be a potential
matching partner for each observation. For this, observations with propensity scores higher
than the maximum or lower than the minimum of the other group should be deleted. For
example, if the propensity scores in one group range from 0.1 to 0.7, and propensity scores
in the other group range from 0.3 to 0.9, the region of common support is from 0.3 to 0.7.
However, if propensity scores in both groups range from 0.01 to 0.99, but in one group there
are no observations with propensity scores between 0.5 and 0.7, the maximum and minimum
comparison fails. A way to deal with this situation is to impose a common support condition by
trimming as suggested by Smith and Todd (2005a). According to this approach, a density for
values of propensity scores is estimated, and the region of common support consists of those
values for propensity scores with a positive density within the distribution of both groups. If the
25There are many treated observations with propensity scores close to one. One explanation may be
that these observations all belong to sectors that were strongly aﬀected by M&A.
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density is exactly zero, the propensity scores will be excluded. Additionally, to ensure that the
densities are strictly positive, a further percentage of propensity score values - determined by
the researcher - with a very low density are also excluded. It is highly recommended to visually
analyze the distribution of the propensity scores, as done in ﬁgure 2.3.
The propensity score is now estimated and its distribution among both groups is known.
Now, there are several ways how to assign controls to treated in order to create matching pairs.
Therefore, the focus of the next section is on the description of diﬀerent matching algorithms.
2.4 Choosing a matching algorithm
Since the propensity score is a continuous variable, it seems not very likely to ﬁnd enough
observations out of both groups with exactly the same score. Thus, diﬀerent algorithms were
developed in order to match pairs. For the choice of a matching algorithm, a measure of
proximity has to be deﬁned. That is, for each treated a neighborhood will be deﬁned which
consists of observations of the control group which are suﬃciently close to the treated in terms
of propensity scores. Then, controls are assigned with a speciﬁc weight to a participant. Thus,
diﬀerent neighborhoods and diﬀerent weights lead to diﬀerent matching algorithms (Smith and
Todd, 2005a). In this section, nearest neighbor matching, caliper matching, radius caliper
matching, and kernel matching will be described in detail. These algorithms are used most
often (e.g. Girma and Görg, 2007; Barba-Navaretti, Castellani, and Disdier, 2010, and others)
in empirical studies which apply matching. Algorithms can be classiﬁed according to the number
of matching partners, and according to a maximum distance between treated and controls.
Figure 2.4 presents a graphical classiﬁcation of these algorithms.
In general, the choice for speciﬁc matching algorithms should be of minor importance and
diﬀerent algorithms should lead to similar results if the sample size is large enough (Smith and
Todd, 2005a). However, if the sample is smaller the choice of the algorithm becomes more
important (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997) because of the trade-oﬀ between bias and
variance of the estimators. Therefore, there is no superior algorithm which is recommended in
all situations. The structure of the data, especially the sample size, plays a crucial role for the
correct choice of algorithms.
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998), Smith and Todd (2005a), Imbens (2004), and
Caliendo (2006) presented a comprehensive overview of matching algorithms. Here, I present
a brief formal description of the algorithms, using a notation similar to Caliendo (2006). The
general notation will be introduced: I1 and I0 are the samples of treated and controls. The
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Figure 2.4: Classiﬁcation of diﬀerent matching algorithms
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Source: Gensler, Skiera and Böhm (2005).
eﬀect of a treatment of each observation i ∈ I1 is estimated by comparing its outcome with a
weighted average outcome of control observations j ∈ I0 in the following way:
∆ =
1
N1
∑
i∈I1
[
Y1i − ∑
j∈I0
WN0(i, j)Y
0
j
]
. (8)
N1 and N0 are the numbers of observations in the treatment group I1 and control group I0. The
matching estimators diﬀer with respect to the weights attached to controls. Hence, WN0(i, j)
is the weight of a control j from the control group in order to construct the counterfactual
for treated observation i of the treatment group. For each treated individual i the sum of the
weights of all controls j must equal one: ∑jWN0(i, j) = 1, ∀ i.
In addition, matching estimators also diﬀer with respect to the neighborhood C(Pi) they
deﬁne for each treated i. The neighborhood of treated i with its propensity score Pi includes
all those controls j ∈ I0 which have propensity scores Pj that lie within this neighborhood:
Pj ∈ C(Pi). Controls j ∈ I0 that were matched to a treated i are in the set Ai with Ai = {j ∈
I0|Pj ∈ C(Pi)}. Finally, Y1i is the outcome of a treated individual i and Y0j is the outcome of
a control j.
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2.4.1 Nearest neighbor matching
The ﬁrst algorithm presented in this paper is a nearest neighbor algorithm. This algorithm
assigns the control j to a treated i which is closest in terms of propensity scores Pi and Pj.
Formally, the neighborhood for treated i is deﬁned as
CNN(Pi) = min
j
‖Pi(X)− Pj(X)‖, j ∈ N0 (9)
with ”‖” as a norm or length.26 Control j with a propensity score of Pj(X) which is closest to
treated i has the weight
WNNN0 (i, j) =

1 if ‖Pi − Pj‖ = minj‖Pi − Pj‖
0 otherwise.
(10)
If only one single control j is matched to a treated i, the matching is also called "one-to-one-
matching". Table 2.5 presents a graphical illustration about the matching process in nearest
neighbor matching.
Figure 2.5: Graphical illustration of nearest neighbor matching
Treated
Controls
0 1
0 1
Note: the two horizontal lines represent the range of propen-
sity scores between zero and one, the upper line for treated,
the lower line for controls. The circles represent single ob-
servations, each with a certain propensity score. Red circles
indicate that observations are matched. Source: own illus-
tration.
The respective STATA-command is
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore)
with SIZE_T3 as the outcome variable. This command also generates several additional useful
26This simply means the distance between treated i and control j in terms of propensity scores.
A Guide to Performing Propensity Score Matching with STATA 54
variables.27
The results for this nearest neighbor algorithm are shown in table 2.3. Mean values of
the outcome variable for both treated and control group, the diﬀerence, and the corresponding
standard error as well as the t-statistics with regard to the diﬀerence are reported for the
unmatched sample. In the row below, calculations for the matched sample are reported. The
ATT estimates the eﬀect of M&A on the outcome variable. Here, the number of employees after
M&A is 1,151 higher compared to plants that did no merge, and the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant.
Table 2.3: Nearest neighbor matching
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) 
There are observations with identical propensity score values. 
The sort order of the data could affect your results. 
Make sure that the sort order is random before calling psmatch2. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT | 1612.47111   460.669785   1151.80132   149.018271     7.73 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
           | psmatch2: 
 psmatch2: |   Common 
 Treatment |  support 
assignment | On suppor |     Total 
-----------+-----------+---------- 
 Untreated |       581 |       581  
   Treated |     1,817 |     1,817  
-----------+-----------+---------- 
     Total |     2,398 |     2,398  
  
However, at this point some questions about the reliability of this estimation are necessary.
This algorithm does not impose a common support condition, and this may lead to bad matches.
Moreover, the algorithm allows replacing controls, i.e. a single control j can be used more than
once as a matching partner. In general, this may be useful if the distribution of propen-
sity scores strongly diﬀers between both groups which is mostly the case in smaller samples
(Caliendo, 2006). This increases the matching quality on average and decreases the bias be-
cause matching pairs are better on average. However, replacement increases the variance of
the estimator, because less information is used when constructing the counterfactual for each
treated individual (Smith and Todd, 2005a). Moreover, a replacement option may also have the
27I brieﬂy describe these generated variables: _treated is a dummy variable with value one for treated
and zero for control observations, _support is also a dummy with value one if the observation
is within the region of common support, and zero if the observation is oﬀ the region of common
support. Variable _pscore is the estimated propensity score (if the propensity score is estimated
with pscore(), variable _pscore is only a copy), _outcome_variable is a variable for the outcome
variable, here _SIZE_T3. The following generated variables all apply to nearest neighbor matching:
_weight shows the frequency of how often the observation is used as a match, _id creates a new
identiﬁcation number for matched observations. For every treated _n1 shows the observation number
of the matched control if the data is sorted by _id. _nn stores the number of matched controls, and
_pdif shows the absolute distance from treated to controls in terms of propensity scores. See help
psmatch2 for further explanation.
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negative consequence that a small number of controls is used very often. This can be checked
with the command
tabulate _weight DUMMY_MA
Table 2.4 enables the researcher to see how often a single control is used as a match. Here,
one single control was matched 1,008 times with a treated, and only 78 out of 581 controls
were actually used as a matching partner. These numbers are not a good basis for a reliable
estimation of the ATT.
Table 2.4: Nearest neighbor matching (weights of controls)
. tab _weight DUMMY_MA 
 
 psmatch2: | 
 weight of | 
   matched |        Plants 
  controls |  Controls    Treated |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         1 |         7      1,817 |     1,824  
         2 |        13          0 |        13  
         3 |         9          0 |         9  
         4 |         5          0 |         5  
         5 |         5          0 |         5  
         6 |         2          0 |         2  
         7 |         3          0 |         3  
         8 |         7          0 |         7  
         9 |         4          0 |         4  
        10 |         3          0 |         3  
        11 |         3          0 |         3  
        12 |         3          0 |         3  
        14 |         1          0 |         1  
        15 |         1          0 |         1  
        17 |         1          0 |         1  
        18 |         1          0 |         1  
        19 |         1          0 |         1  
        22 |         1          0 |         1  
        26 |         1          0 |         1  
        27 |         1          0 |         1  
        28 |         1          0 |         1  
        29 |         1          0 |         1  
        41 |         1          0 |         1  
        81 |         1          0 |         1  
       143 |         1          0 |         1  
      1008 |         1          0 |         1  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |        78      1,817 |     1,895  
Hence, the following modiﬁcation of the algorithm does not allow replacing controls and
imposes a common support condition. The commands in STATA are
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) noreplacement common
tabulate _weight DUMMY_MA,
The results for this algorithm are shown in table 2.5. The ATT now clearly diﬀers from the
ATT estimated in table 2.3 with a diﬀerence in employment between treated and controls of
only 254. Moreover, due to the implementation of a region of common support a large fraction
of treated is not matched.
The histogram in ﬁgure 2.3 above showed that there are almost no observations in several
regions of the propensity score. In this case, a trimming condition may be an alternative to
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Table 2.5: Nearest neighbor matching without replacement
and with a common support condition
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) noreplacement common 
There are observations with identical propensity score values. 
The sort order of the data could affect your results. 
Make sure that the sort order is random before calling psmatch2. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT | 389.681583   135.500861   254.180723    32.199705     7.89 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |     1,236        581 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     1,236      1,162 |     2,398  
 
 
. tab _weight DUMMY_MA 
 
 psmatch2: | 
 weight of | 
   matched |        Plants 
  controls |  Controls    Treated |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         1 |       581        581 |     1,162  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       581        581 |     1,162 
 
impose a common support condition (see subsection 2.3.2). The STATA-command for trimming
the observations by those 10% observations which exhibit the lowest estimated density is
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) trim(10)
The results are shown in table 2.6. Even if the ATT of 318 diﬀers from the ATT of 254 from
table 2.5 by approximately one fourth, they are both similar in their magnitude, compared to
the ATT of 1,151 from table 2.3.
Table 2.6: Nearest neighbor matching without replacement and with trimming
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) noreplacement trim(10) 
There are observations with identical propensity score values. 
The sort order of the data could affect your results. 
Make sure that the sort order is random before calling psmatch2. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT | 454.335628   135.500861   318.834768    35.876856     8.89 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |     1,236        581 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     1,236      1,162 |     2,398 
 
A further modiﬁcation within the nearest neighbor algorithm is to use more than one
matching partner. This algorithm is mostly meaningful in large samples, and allows generating
more information. It reduces the variance of the estimator, but the bias increases due to worse
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matching pairs (Caliendo, 2006). The modiﬁcation is called "oversampling". m controls will
be chosen as neighbors for each treated i, and each matched control within the set Ai will be
assigned with the same weight 1/m, and all others receive weight zero:28
WNNO(i, j) =

1
m if j∈ Ai
0 otherwise.
(11)
The command (here for m = 5 neighbors) including a common support condition is
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) neighbor(3) common
and table 2.7 reports the results.
Table 2.7: Nearest neighbor matching with ﬁve neighbors
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) neighbor(5) common 
There are observations with identical propensity score values. 
The sort order of the data could affect your results. 
Make sure that the sort order is random before calling psmatch2. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT | 653.891727   270.539173   383.352555   42.2143558     9.08 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |       995        822 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       995      1,403 |     2,398 
As a summary from the diﬀerent modiﬁcations of the nearest neighbor matching algorithm,
one can conclude that the ATT displayed in table 2.3 is diﬀerent in its magnitude from the
ATTs shown in tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7. Hence, an asymmetric distribution of propensity scores
among both groups as shown in ﬁgure 2.3 is a possible explanation for a bad matching quality
if controls are replaced and used several times as matching partners, and if no common support
or trimming condition is imposed. Nevertheless, since the ATTs in tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7
also diﬀer from each other between a wide range of 254 and 383, further algorithms should be
applied.
28Davies and Kim (2004) suggested an algorithm which assigns diﬀerent weights to the neighbors.
Neighbors which are closer to the treated get higher weights.
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2.4.2 Caliper matching
If samples are small or distributions of propensity scores diﬀer, nearest neighbors may be far
away from each other, and the matching quality is low. To ensure that matching partners are
suﬃciently close to each other, a maximum distance e, called "caliper", between neighbors can
be imposed. The neighborhood for this caliper matching (Cochran and Rubin, 1973) is deﬁned
as
CCM(Pi) = {Pj| ‖Pi − Pj‖ < e}, j ∈ N0. (12)
The control j has the weight
WCM(i, j) =

1 if ‖Pi(X)− Pj(X)‖ = minj ‖Pi(X)− Pj(X)‖ ∧ ‖Pi(X)− Pj(X)‖ < e
0 otherwise.
(13)
Of course, there may be treated which do not ﬁnd a matching partner within the neighborhood
C(Pi). These treated observations will not be considered for the analysis. The caliper ensures
that a control is only assigned to a treated if the control lies within the neighborhood C(Pi). It
should be clear that a caliper restriction is an alternative to impose a common support condition
(Caliendo, 2006).29 Figure 2.6 displays how treated and controls are matched within the caliper
algorithm.
Figure 2.6: Graphical illustration of caliper matching
ε ε
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Controls
0 1
0 1
Note: the two horizontal lines represent the range of propen-
sity scores between zero and one, the upper line for treated,
the lower line for controls. The circles represent single ob-
servations, each with a certain propensity score. Red circles
indicate that observations are matched. The vertical lines
indicate the caliper restriction: treated are matched to the
nearest control within this caliper range. Source: own illus-
tration.
29If common is also included in the STATA-command, the number of treated observations should not
diﬀer.
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The lower the caliper, the more precise the matching, the higher the quality, and the lower
the bias. However, the lower the caliper, the higher the variance. Moreover, low caliper values
also lead to a higher number of treated which do not ﬁnd a matching partner, and this reduces
the number of matching pairs (Caliendo, 2006). The STATA-command for a caliper algorithm
with e = 0.01 is
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) caliper(0.01)
Table 2.8 reports the results for caliper matching with a maximum distance of 0.01, and the
ATT is 354.
Table 2.8: Caliper matching with a maximum distance of 0.01
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) caliper(0.01) 
There are observations with identical propensity score values. 
The sort order of the data could affect your results. 
Make sure that the sort order is random before calling psmatch2. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT | 667.982843   314.139706   353.843137   59.2845514     5.97 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |     1,001        816 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     1,001      1,397 |     2,398 
 
In table 2.9, the ATT is estimated for a maximum distance between treated and controls
of only 0.001. As expected, the number of observations being matched is smaller, but the ATT
does not substantially diﬀer from the ATT in table 2.8.
Table 2.9: Caliper matching with a maximum distance of 0.001
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) caliper(0.001) 
There are observations with identical propensity score values. 
The sort order of the data could affect your results. 
Make sure that the sort order is random before calling psmatch2. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT |  712.03653   323.554033   388.482496   67.2079517     5.78 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |     1,160        657 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     1,160      1,238 |     2,398 
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2.4.3 Radius caliper matching
Radius caliper matching from Dehejia and Wahba (2002) is a further matching algorithm similar
to caliper matching. Instead of using only the closest control within a maximum distance, all
neighbors within the radius α will be used. Radius caliper matching leads to the following
neighborhood:
CRM(Pi) = {j| ‖Pi(X)− Pj(X)‖ < α}, j ∈ N0. (14)
All controls with a propensity score of Pj(X) which lie within the radius α have the same weight:
WRM(i, j) =

1
C(Pi)
, if j ∈ CRM(Pi),
0 otherwise.
(15)
Table 2.7 presents a graphical illustration for the radius algorithm.
Figure 2.7: Graphical illustration of radius caliper matching
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Note: the two horizontal lines represent the range of propen-
sity scores between zero and one, the upper line for treated,
the lower line for controls. The circles represent single ob-
servations, each with a certain propensity score. Red circles
indicate that observations are matched. The vertical lines
indicate the caliper restriction: treated are matched to all
controls lying within the caliper radius. Source: own illustra-
tion.
The corresponding STATA-command for a radius of α = 0.01 is
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) radius caliper(0.01)
Radius caliper matching is similar to nearest neighbor matching with more neighbors, and
to caliper matching by imposing a maximum distance. Radius caliper matching shares the
attractive feature of oversampling, and also avoids the risk of bad matches. Radius caliper
matching increases bias and decreases variance (Caliendo, 2006). Tables 2.10 and 2.11 report
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the results for radius calipers of 0.01 and 0.001. The estimated ATTs of 374 and 377 are very
similar to each other.
Table 2.10: Radius caliper matching with a maximum distance of 0.01
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) radius caliper(0.01) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT | 667.982843   294.482566   373.500277   42.8193644     8.72 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |     1,001        816 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     1,001      1,397 |     2,398 
Table 2.11: Radius caliper matching with a maximum distance of 0.001
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) radius caliper(0.001) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT |  712.03653   335.290726   376.745803   49.4253376     7.62 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |     1,160        657 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     1,160      1,238 |     2,398 
2.4.4 Kernel matching
In comparison to the preceding algorithms, kernel matching uses all individuals j from the control
group as neighbors for each single treated i. Thus, the neighborhood in kernel matching contains
all observations in the control group I0, which is equal to the set of matched controls Ai:
C(Pi) = {I0} (16)
Controls j are weighted according to their distance to the treated i, i.e. controls which are
closer receive a higher weight than others:
WKMN0 (i, j) =
Gij
∑k∈I0 Gik
, (17)
where Gik = G[(Pi − Pk)/aN0 ] is a kernel function which downweighs observations j which are
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distant from the treated i, and aN0 is a bandwidth parameter which impacts the form of the
kernel function.30 Table 2.8 shows a graphical illustration of the kernel algorithm.
Figure 2.8: Graphical illustration of kernel matching
0 1
0 1
Treated
Controls
Note: the two horizontal lines represent the range of propen-
sity scores between zero and one, the upper line for treated,
the lower line for controls. The circles represent single ob-
servations, each with a certain propensity score. Red circles
indicate that observations are matched. In kernel matching,
all treated are matched with all controls at diﬀerent weights.
Source: own illustration.
The researcher can choose between Gaussian (normal), biweight, epanechnikov, uniform,
and tricube kernel. They diﬀer with respect to the underlying kernel function that approximates
density kurves. However, the choice of the kernel function is less important for the results, as
DiNardo and Tobias (2001) showed. In contrast, the choice of the bandwidth parameter is more
relevant (Silverman, 1986; Pagan and Ullah, 1999): higher values of the bandwidth parameter
aN0 smooth the density function. This leads to a better ﬁt and decreased variance between the
estimated and the true density function. However, if the bandwidth parameter is too high the
underlying structure may be smoothed away, and the estimate is biased. Thus, the researcher
faces a trade-oﬀ between a small variance and an unbiased estimate of the underlying true
density function (Caliendo, 2006).
The default in STATA is epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.06. Because all controls
are used as matching partners, applying a common support is likely to improve the matching
quality. The respective STATA-command is
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) kernel common
The results are displayed in table 2.12. The ATT of 388 is close to the estimations from other
algorithms like caliper or radius caliper matching.
30See Fahrmeir, Künstler, Pigeot, and Tutz (2009) for an introduction to kernel density estimation,
and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) for a discussion about kernel matching estimators.
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Table 2.12: Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.06
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) kernel common 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT | 653.891727   265.799443   388.092285   39.4509803     9.84 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |       995        822 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       995      1,403 |     2,398 
The alternative command for kernel matching with a Gaussian kernel31 and a bandwidth
of 0.01 is
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) kernel
kerneltype(normal) bandwidth(0.01) common
The results of this kernel algorithm are shown in table 2.13. The ATT of 383 is similar to the
ATT displayed in table 2.12.32
Table 2.13: Gaussian kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.01
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) kernel kerneltype(normal) bwidth(0.01) 
common 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT | 653.891727   270.643997    383.24773   40.1674143     9.54 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |       995        822 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       995      1,403 |     2,398 
The STATA-command for a modiﬁed kernel matching algorithm with a bandwidth of 1.0
is similar to the one above:
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) kernel
kerneltype(normal) bandwidth(1.0) common
31Commands for other kernel functions are kerneltype(epanechnikow) (this is the default),
kerneltype(biweight), kerneltype(uniform), kerneltype(tricube).
32I estimated several ATTs based on diﬀerent kernel functions, holding the bandwidth parameter con-
stant. Results were all similar, conﬁrming the ﬁndings from DiNardo and Tobias (2001).
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In table 2.14 the results from the kernel matching algorithm with a bandwidth of 1.0 are
presented. The ATT is now clearly diﬀerent from the other ATTs based on kernel matching.
Table 2.14: Gaussian kernel matching with a bandwidth of 1.0
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) kernel kerneltype(normal) bwidth(1.0) 
common 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_T3  Unmatched | 1612.47111   135.500861   1476.97025   178.450092     8.28 
                        ATT | 653.891727   137.289282   516.602446   37.9295991    13.62 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |       995        822 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       995      1,403 |     2,398 
Several conclusions from diﬀerent algorithms are possible. Eight out of eleven diﬀerent
algorithms estimate comparable ATTs which range between 318 and 388, and all are highly
statistically signiﬁcant. This is in line with the prediction of Smith and Todd (2005a) who stated
that the choice of the algorithm should be of minor interest if samples are larger. However,
three algorithms estimate ATTs which are diﬀerent in their magnitude: the very ﬁrst nearest
neighbor algorithm estimates an ATT of 1,151 (table 2.3). This algorithm allows replacement,
and it does not impose a common support condition, which is obviously not a good idea given
the asymmetric distribution of propensity scores in both groups. Second, the existence of
several gaps for some ranges of propensity scores recommends the imposition of a trimming
condition rather than a common support condition in nearest neighbor algorithms. This is a
likely explanation for an estimated ATT of 254 (table 2.5). Third, a bandwidth parameter of
1.0 in a kernel algorithm is obviously too high, resulting in an ATT of 516 (table 2.14).
Finally, table 2.15 shows a summary of the diﬀerent algorithms presented in this section
with respect to the trade-oﬀ between bias and variance.
2.4.5 Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is a resampling method developed by Efron (1979), and it is used to estimate
standard errors if analytical estimates are biased or unavailable (Brownstone and Valletta, 2001).
With bootstrapping, repeated samples can be drawn from an original sample, and due to
replacement the new bootstrap samples are of the same size as the original sample. Therefore,
the population is to the sample as the sample to the bootstrap samples (Fox, 1997).
In the context of matching, n bootstrap-replications calculate n new estimates for propensity
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Table 2.15: Summary of algorithms
Algorithm Bias Variance ATT
NN matching with replacement ↓ ↑ 1151.97
NN matching without replacement and common support ↑ ↓ 254.18
NN matching without replacement and trimming ↑ ↓ 318.83
NN matching with ﬁve neighbors ↑ ↓ 383.35
Caliper matching, distance of 0.01 ↓ ↑ 353.84
Caliper matching, distance of 0.001 ↓ ↑ 388.48
Radius caliper matching, distance of 0.01 ↑ ↓ 373.50
Radius caliper matching, distance of 0.001 ↑ ↓ 376.75
Kernel matching (Epanechnikov), bandwidth of 0.06 ↑ ↓ 388.09
Kernel matching (Gaussian), bandwidth of 0.01 ↓ ↑ 383.25
Kernel matching (Gaussian), bandwidth of 1.0 ↑ ↓ 516.60
Note: NN = nearest neighbor; ↑ = increase; ↓ = decrease. With respect to kernel matching, bias decreases with low
and increases with high bandwidth parameters. There is no clear benchmark, as may be incorrectly concluded from the
changing arrows. This is also true for the variance. Source: Caliendo, 2006; own presentation.
scores, the corresponding regions of common support, ATTs, standard errors, and t-statistics.
The default for the number of bootstrap-replications in PSMATCH2 is 50, but Efron (1990)
suggested 50 to 200 replications in order to yield proper results for standard errors.
Since the program PSMATCH2 stores the estimated ATT in r(att), bootstrapping of the
standard error of the ATT is possible. However, Abadie and Imbens (2008) criticized the use
of bootstrapping in the context of matching because no formal justiﬁcation has been provided.
Nevertheless, many empirical studies that apply matching perform bootstrapping (e.g. Girma,
Görg, and Wagner, 2009). The corresponding STATA-command to apply bootstrapping within
the matching process - here for a caliper matching with e = 0.001 and 200 replications - is
bootstrap r(att) reps(200): psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3)
pscore(pscore) caliper(0.001)
The results are reported in table 2.16. The ATT is still statistically signiﬁcant.
2.4.6 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching
There are several ways to combine propensity score matching with other methods (Caliendo,
2006): ﬁrst, diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) propensity score matching as suggested by Heck-
man, Imichura, and Todd (1997), and Heckman, Imichura, Smith, and Todd (1998); second,
regression-adjusted matching estimator from Heckman, Imichura, and Todd (1997), and Heck-
man, Imichura, Smith, and Todd (1998); and third, bias-corrected matching estimator accord-
ing to Abadie and Imbens (2011), and Imbens (2004). I only present DiD in combination with
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Table 2.16: Caliper matching (0.001) and bootstrapped standard errors
. bootstrap r(att), reps(200) : psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) 
 caliper(0.001) 
(running psmatch2 on estimation sample) 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is 
estimated. 
 
Bootstrap replications (200) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
..................................................   100 
..................................................   150 
..................................................   200 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =      2398 
                                                Replications       =       200 
 
      command:  psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_T3) pscore(pscore) 
                    caliper(0.001) 
        _bs_1:  r(att) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |   388.4825   70.27417     5.53   0.000     250.7477    526.2173 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
propensity score matching. This approach is widely used in empirical studies, whereas there are
only a few studies applying the other modiﬁcations.
In general, a DiD estimator compares changes in a variable over time between groups. The
use of a DiD method in combination with propensity score matching may improve the results
compared to the standard matching estimator: after conditioning on observables there may
still be diﬀerences between the outcomes of participants and non-participants which are due
to systematic diﬀerences in both groups, i.e. because of selection into the treatment based on
unmeasured characteristics (Smith and Todd, 2005a). Due to the comparison of changes instead
of levels, DiD propensity score matching helps to eliminate unobserved time-invariant diﬀerences
between both groups, and relaxes the strong assumption of selection on observables. Smith and
Todd (2005a) found that DiD matching performs substantially better than the corresponding
cross-sectional matching estimator. For this reason, several empirical studies combine DiD with
propensity score matching, e.g. in the ﬁelds of international economics Girma and Görg (2006),
Hijzen, Inui, and Todo (2007), Görg, Henry, and Strobl (2007), and Barba-Navaretti, Castellani,
and Disdier (2010), and others.
The DiD propensity score matching estimator is based on the identifying assumption:
E(Y0t −Y0t′ |P(X),D = 1) = E(Y0t −Y0t′ |P(X),D = 0). (18)
Under the consideration of the common support condition, the estimator can be implemented
as
∆DiDATT =
1
N1
∑
i∈I1∩SP
[
(Y1it −Y0it′)− ∑
j∈I0∩SP
W(i, j)(Y0jt −Y0jt′)
]
, (19)
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with SP denoting the region of common support, and t′ as an indicator for pre-treatment
periods. In the respective STATA-command, only the outcome variable is modiﬁed, which is
now SIZE_31, the change in the number of employees between t = 1 and t = 3. I use the
caliper algorithm with a caliper of 0.01:
psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_31) pscore(pscore) caliper(0.001)
Table 2.17 shows the estimated ATT from a DiD propensity score matching. Now, the results
from the combined estimator are diﬀerent from the results above: plants that merged decreased
their employment over time, while comparable plants that had not merged increased the number
of employees. However, diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant, i.e. there is no eﬀect of M&A
on the merging plants' employment.
Table 2.17: Caliper matching (0.001) with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator
. psmatch2 DUMMY_MA, outcome(SIZE_31) pscore(pscore) caliper(0.001) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample |    Treated     Controls   Difference         S.E.   T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
         SIZE_31  Unmatched |  -48.70776  -1.29604131  -47.4117187    28.687518    -1.65 
                        ATT |-4.37290715   4.66210046  -9.03500761   16.9785876    -0.53 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. for ATT does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
 psmatch2: |   psmatch2: Common 
 Treatment |        support 
assignment | Off suppo  On suppor |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
 Untreated |         0        581 |       581  
   Treated |     1,160        657 |     1,817  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     1,160      1,238 |     2,398 
How can these diﬀerences in the results be explained? As argued above, the combination
of the standard matching estimator with a DiD estimator relaxes the strong assumption of
selection on observables, i.e. with a combined estimator a selection of unobservables is also
possible, as long as they are time-invariant. Thus, the diﬀerent results between the standard
and the combined matching estimator imply that unobserved time-invariant variables play a
crucial role for the selection. The standard estimator obviously fails to eliminate diﬀerences in
employment between merged and non-merged plants caused by time-invariant unobservables.
To conclude, a combination of DiD and the standard estimator makes a causal interpretation
of the results more reliable, and it improves the quality of non-experimental evaluation results
signiﬁcantly (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).
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2.5 Was the matching procedure successful?
After performing diﬀerent matching algorithms it is reasonable to ask if the results are useful.
There are several indicators which assess the quality of the matching process, and I will brieﬂy
explain them.
Common support: The results from matching may be biased if treated and control obser-
vations are not similar enough in terms of propensity scores. The implementation of a common
support condition eliminates observations lying outside a common region of propensity scores
and avoids bad matches. However, excluding a certain number of observations from the analysis
is not harmless per se (Lechner, 2008). The estimated treatment eﬀect does no longer corre-
spond to the original parameter of interest, if treatment eﬀects are heterogeneous inside and
outside the common support. Moreover, throwing away all observations outside the common
support ignores useful information, because treatment eﬀects can still be estimated outside the
region of common support.
The relevance of these concerns clearly depends on the fraction of observations lying outside
the region of common support. That is, the higher the number of observations excluded from
the analysis, the lower the explanatory power of the matching process and the generality of
estimations (see tables 2.5, 2.6, etc.). In general, causal inference is restricted only to those
matched observations lying within the region of common support. A graphical visualization of
the distribution of propensity scores among both groups may be helpful (see ﬁgure 2.3).
Weights of controls: A further important indicator is how often a single control is used
as a match, as already shown in table 2.4. Again, the command is
tabulate _weight treated
and lists the frequency a single control is used as a matching partner. The matching quality
suﬀers if the same controls are matched too often with diﬀerent treated observations. If this
problem is severe (e.g. table 2.3), the noreplacement option may improve the results and
allows each control to be matched only once.
Balancing property: The intension of matching is to balance the distribution of all co-
variates X between treated and untreated after matching. This balancing property is a striking
challenge in order to obtain good matching quality. There are several ways to check if the
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balancing property is fulﬁlled. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) calculate a standardized bias, i.e.
it calculates the balancing of each variable before and after matching in terms of standardized
bias, and t-tests for the equality of means. The standardized bias for each covariate is the
diﬀerence in the sample means in both groups as a percentage of the square root of the aver-
age of the sample variances in both groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). Before matching,
the standardized bias SB is calculated as
SB = 100
(X¯1 − X¯0)√
0.5[V1(X) +V0(X)]
. (20)
After matching, the standardized bias SBM is given by
SBM = 100
(X¯M1 − X¯M0 )√
0.5[VM1 (X) +V
M
0 (X)]
. (21)
For each covariate, X¯1 and X¯0 are the sample means in the treated and control group, and
V1(X) and V0(X) are the corresponding variances. X¯1M, X¯0M, V1M(X) and V0M(X) are
values after matching. The lower the standardized bias after matching, the more both groups
are balanced with respect to a speciﬁc variable. However, there is no benchmark for the level
of the standardized bias, but Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) assume that values above 20 imply
serious bias, and Caliendo (2006) pointed out that in most empirical studies a bias reduction
below 3 or 5% is seen as suﬃcient. The respective STATA-command for the standardized bias
is
pstest SIZE_CAT_T1_2-SIZE_CAT_T1_6 SECTOR_T1_2-SECTOR_T1_16
LEGAL_FORM_T1_2 LEGAL_FORM_T1_3 EAST_T1
The results, which are based on the caliper algorithm with e = 0.001, are shown in table 2.18.
Columns one and two report mean values of all covariates X for the matched and unmatched
sample, and the third column reports the calculated standardized bias also for both samples.
The table displays the percentage reduction of the bias in the fourth column. Finally, two-
sample t-tests check the balancing property, i.e. if diﬀerences in the means of the covariates for
both groups are insigniﬁcant after matching. Therefore, the last two columns provide the results
of the t-test and the corresponding p-values. As an example, consider variable SIZE_CAT_T1_2,
the dummy variable for the second size category measured in t = 1: the mean value for the
unmatched sample is 0.075 for treated, and 0.198 for controls, and the diﬀerence in means
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is highly statistically signiﬁcant. For the matched sample, the mean is 0.094 both for treated
and controls. That is, the standardized bias of 36.4 in the unmatched sample33 was reduced
to a bias of 0.0, and this corresponds to a bias reduction of 100%. That means, matching
completely balanced this variable.
Table 2.18: Quality checks: standardized bias
. pstest SIZE_CAT_T1_2-SIZE_CAT_T1_6 SECTOR_T1_2-SECTOR_T1_11 LEGAL_FORM_T1_2-
LEGAL_FORM_T1_3 EAST_T1 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable     Sample | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
------------------------+----------------------------------+---------------- 
SIZE_CAT_T~2  Unmatched | .07485   .19793    -36.4         |  -8.56  0.000 
                Matched | .09437   .09437      0.0   100.0 |   0.00  1.000 
                        |                                  | 
SIZE_CAT_T~3  Unmatched | .06329     .179    -36.0         |  -8.55  0.000 
                Matched | .09741    .0898      2.4    93.4 |   0.47  0.636 
                        |                                  | 
SIZE_CAT_T~4  Unmatched | .13704    .3167    -43.9         | -10.00  0.000 
                Matched | .21157   .19482      4.1    90.7 |   0.75  0.451 
                        |                                  | 
SIZE_CAT_T~5  Unmatched | .10017   .09983      0.1         |   0.02  0.981 
                Matched | .12177   .12329     -0.5  -351.4 |  -0.08  0.933 
                        |                                  | 
SIZE_CAT_T~6  Unmatched |  .5366   .03442    133.7         |  23.76  0.000 
                Matched | .37139   .38813     -4.5    96.7 |  -0.62  0.532 
                        |                                  | 
 SECTOR_T1_2  Unmatched | .04898   .00344     28.8         |   5.02  0.000 
                Matched |      0        0      0.0   100.0 |      .      . 
                        |                                  | 
 SECTOR_T1_3  Unmatched | .02091   .02065      0.2         |   0.04  0.970 
                Matched | .01218   .01218      0.0   100.0 |   0.00  1.000 
                        |                                  | 
 SECTOR_T1_4  Unmatched | .02367    .0327     -5.5         |  -1.19  0.232 
                Matched | .01979   .01979      0.0   100.0 |  -0.00  1.000 
                        |                                  | 
 SECTOR_T1_5  Unmatched | .18162   .18589     -1.1         |  -0.23  0.817 
                Matched | .27702   .28615     -2.4  -114.0 |  -0.37  0.713 
                        |                                  | 
 SECTOR_T1_6  Unmatched | .25427   .34768    -20.5         |  -4.40  0.000 
                Matched | .38813   .35616      7.0    65.8 |   1.20  0.231 
                        |                                  | 
 SECTOR_T1_7  Unmatched | .03137   .03098      0.2         |   0.05  0.963 
                Matched | .01979   .01065      5.3 -2245.7 |   1.35  0.177 
                        |                                  | 
 SECTOR_T1_8  Unmatched |  .0809   .20138    -35.1         |  -8.18  0.000 
                Matched | .13546   .16134     -7.5    78.5 |  -1.32  0.187 
                        |                                  | 
 SECTOR_T1_9  Unmatched | .14034   .04131     35.0         |   6.54  0.000 
                Matched | .05479    .0624     -2.7    92.3 |  -0.59  0.557 
                        |                                  | 
SECTOR_T1_10  Unmatched | .00055   .00172     -3.5         |  -0.85  0.395 
                Matched |      0        0      0.0   100.0 |      .      . 
                        |                                  | 
SECTOR_T1_11  Unmatched | .03687   .11015    -28.3         |  -6.83  0.000 
                Matched | .07002   .07763     -2.9    89.6 |  -0.53  0.598 
                        |                                  | 
LEGAL_FOR~_2  Unmatched | .37259   .83821   -108.3         | -21.31  0.000 
                Matched | .82953   .85693     -6.4    94.1 |  -1.37  0.172 
                        |                                  | 
LEGAL_FORM~3  Unmatched | .52119    .0241    134.5         |  23.62  0.000 
                Matched | .07458   .05936      4.1    96.9 |   1.10  0.270 
                        |                                  | 
     EAST_T1  Unmatched |  .2284   .27367    -10.4         |  -2.23  0.026 
                Matched | .19635   .16743      6.7    36.1 |   1.36  0.174 
                        |                                  | 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
For further robustness checks, the pstest-command can be extended by the option summary:
pstest SIZE_CAT_T1_2-SIZE_CAT_T1_6 SECTOR_T1_2-SECTOR_T1_16
LEGAL_FORM_T1_2 LEGAL_FORM_T1_3 EAST_T1, summary
Table 2.19 displays the results: the upper part presents the distribution of the mean standardized
33Because the mean value of controls is larger than the mean value of treated, the bias has a negative
sign. See equations 20 and 16.
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bias (MSB) across all variables, that is, the sum of the bias of all variables divided by the number
of variables, both for the unmatched and matched sample. Here, the MSB decreased from 36.7
before matching to 3.1 after matching, which can be seen as a suﬃcient bias reduction.
Table 2.19: Quality checks: mean standardized bias and other indicators
. pstest SIZE_CAT_T1_2-SIZE_CAT_T1_6 SECTOR_T1_2-SECTOR_T1_11 
LEGAL_FORM_T1_2-LEGAL_FORM_T1_3 EAST_T1, quietly summary 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Summary of the distribution of the abs(bias) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       BEFORE MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .1123461       .1123461 
 5%     .1123461       .1818326 
10%     .1818326       .2238897       Obs                  18 
25%     3.474108       1.101518       Sum of Wgt.          18 
 
50%     28.56449                      Mean           36.74933 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      43.78558 
75%     36.42978       43.89066 
90%     133.7132       108.2914       Variance       1917.177 
95%     134.4857       133.7132       Skewness       1.390628 
99%     134.4857       134.4857       Kurtosis       3.652939 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                       AFTER MATCHING 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%            0              0 
 5%            0              0 
10%            0              0       Obs                  18 
25%            0              0       Sum of Wgt.          18 
 
50%     2.815315                      Mean           3.131599 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      2.689283 
75%     5.251813        6.37194 
90%     7.000823       6.674671       Variance       7.232245 
95%     7.540554       7.000823       Skewness       .1966783 
99%     7.540554       7.540554       Kurtosis       1.695646 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Sample |    Pseudo R2      LR chi2        p>chi2 
------------+------------------------------------------------- 
  Unmatched |        0.432      1146.57         0.000 
    Matched |        0.006        11.05         0.806 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A further test in order to check the quality of the matching process is to repeat the probit
estimations for the matched sample, and to observe what happens to the values of the pseudo-R2
and LR-test. As explained earlier in this paper, the McFadden's pseudo-R2 measures how much
of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by the covariates. Thus, if matching was
successful and covariates are balanced, a variation of the dependent variable is only explained by
the treatment, but not by the covariates any more. For this reason, the respective pseudo-R2 for
the estimation of the matched sample should be close to zero. In table 2.19, it is 0.006 which is
low enough. A similar rationale applies to the calculation of the LR-test and the corresponding
prob-values. If matching was successful, the coeﬃcients of the regression should be zero or at
least close to zero. Hence, the diﬀerence between the calculated loglikelihood value for this
model, and the loglikelihood value of an alternative model in which all coeﬃcients are set to
zero, except the constant, should be small. This implies a low explanation of the independent
variables of the model. The corresponding prob-value, which describes the probability that
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coeﬃcients are zero, should be high. Here, the prob-value of 0.806 can be regarded as high
enough.
There are further possibilities to test the balancing and sensitivity of the matching results.
However, they are not automatically generated by PSMATCH2, and thus, I do not report them.
For example, Girma and Görg (2007) also tested the robustness with a Hotelling's t-squared
test, with a test cast within a regression framework developed by Smith and Todd (2005b), and
ﬁnally, with a reestimation of the propensity score model with minor changes in the regression
model as suggested by Dehejia (2005).
2.6 Conclusion - is matching better than the rest?
The objective of matching is to identify the causal eﬀects of a treatment. For this, the method
compares the outcome of individuals that participated in a treatment with a comparison group
of individuals with the same characteristics that did not participate in the treatment. Thus,
matching enables the researcher to observe what would have happened to treated individuals if
they had not participated in the treatment.
This paper is an introduction to the implementation of propensity score matching in the
software STATA with the program PSMATCH2 from Leuven and Sianesi (2003). The target
group of this paper are researchers that do not want to be held up too long with details of the
underlying theoretical framework, but wish to get a quick basic understanding of the method
and how it can be performed in STATA. For this, I present a theoretical introduction, describe
the stepwise implementation of the method, and explain and interpret the results. I use a
combined dataset from the IAB Establishment Panel and the M&A DATABASE St. Gallen.
Matching is a helpful tool within microeconometric evaluation methods, because it enables
the researcher to better analyze causal eﬀects. It exhibits several useful advantages, because its
logic is simple, it is intuitively plausible, and it is easy to handle because of only little statistical
and mathematical assumptions. Moreover, the method is based on a solid theoretical framework
from Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974), and it directly estimates the relevant causal parameter of
the model. For this, a matching analysis is technically easy to perform, and its rational is also
easy to communicate (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004).
However, there are also open questions. For example, matching is based on the strong
assumption of conditional independence which states that selection of individuals to treatment
is only based on observables. Because the assumption can't be tested statistically, it is the
researcher's task to present convincing arguments that it holds. As described in this paper, the
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CIA can be relaxed by combining the matching estimator with a DiD estimator. This combined
estimator eliminates time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between treated and controls. In
addition, details of propensity score matching are not yet standardized, e.g. how to model the
propensity score, or how to do inference. This may lead to diﬀerent conclusions from diﬀerent
researchers, even if they use the same data (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Hence, it is important to be aware of these weaknesses when performing matching. The
researcher is well advised to make sure that the data is suﬃciently good to ensure the as-
sumptions to be fulﬁlled. Moreover, the results can be expected to be more reliable the larger
the sample, and the larger the overlap of treated and control groups. Nevertheless, making
the estimation results from empirical investigation even more robust, it seems plausible not to
rely only on a single method, but also to apply other methods, e.g. to start with a regression
analysis, as also suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009).
Chapter 3
M&A and labor productivity:
new evidence from micro-data for German plants
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3.1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A)1 are an elementary component in altering the structure, scope,
or size of ﬁrms.2 Although M&A are, in principle, substitutable mechanisms to internal growth
(McGauckin and Nguyen, 1995), they lead to vivid discussions in public and among policy
makers about their impacts on the merging ﬁrms' performance and the economy as a whole.
Unfortunately, the existing empirical literature about the eﬀects of M&A on several ﬁrm perfor-
mance parameters3 fails to provide clear results.4 For example, and with respect to productivity,
existing studies - see below - found either positive, negative, or no eﬀects.
There are several reasons for this ambiguity. One explanation may be that we are comparing
the incomparable because studies diﬀer from each other in important dimensions. For example,
there are diﬀerent types of mergers, like horizontal M&A (ﬁrms which compete in the same
market combine), vertical M&A (a ﬁrm combines with its supplier), or conglomerate M&A
(ﬁrms of unrelated lines of businesses combine) (Carlton and Perloﬀ, 2005), and studies often
focus only on one type.5 Moreover, studies may focus on diﬀerent types of ﬁrms involved in the
merger, either on "acquirers" or "buyer ﬁrms" (ﬁrms which acquire other ﬁrms), on "targets",
"objects", or "acquired" (ﬁrms which are acquired by ﬁrms), or on "sellers" (ﬁrms which sell
parts of the overall entity). Additionally, studies diﬀer in further aspects, e.g. with respect to
countries and industries in which the merger occurs, underlying observation periods, domestic
or cross-border M&A, estimations on plant-level or ﬁrm-level, or deﬁnitions of performance
parameters, e.g. labor vs. total factor productivity. Therefore, the ambiguous results are
not too surprising if the observation units diﬀer in relevant characteristics. Morck, Shleifer,
and Summers (1988) conﬁrm this concern by stating that "research results on friendly bids
may have little to say about hostile bids, and vice versa". A second explanation for diﬀering
research results may be that earlier studies suﬀer from measurement errors or bias (McGuckin
and Nguyen, 1995) due to the use of random samples of non-merging ﬁrms as control groups.
1There is no consistent deﬁnition about the diﬀerence between "mergers" and "acquisitions" in the
literature. A way to distinguish between mergers and acquisitions is their legal entity: in an acquisition
or takeover, ﬁrms preserve their legal entity. In a merger, ﬁrms lose their legal entity and combine
into a new ﬁrm (Jansen, 2008). However, these diﬀerences are not accounted for in this paper, and
therefore, I use the terms M&A, mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers as synonyms.
2I use the term "ﬁrm" if no greater precision is needed. However, the empirical part of the paper is
about plants.
3See Jansen (2008), Mueller (2003a), or Tichy (2001) for a survey of empirical studies.
4Tichy (2001) presented 18 stylized facts about the eﬀects of mergers on diﬀerent performance para-
meters. However, I do not see a suﬃcient empirical support for most of these statements. This is also
critisized by Lyons (2001).
5The distinction between diﬀerent types of mergers is not always clear and highly dependent on industry
classiﬁcations (Pesendorfer, 2003).
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A comparison of both groups can lead to misleading conclusions if merging ﬁrms and non-
merging ﬁrms diﬀer in pre-merger characteristics that inﬂuence performance. In other words,
ﬁrms with speciﬁc characteristics self-select in M&A activity, and changes in performance are
then incorrectly attributed to the impact of the merger (Girma, Thompson, and Wright, 2006).
Recent studies applied diﬀerent estimation strategies with advanced econometric methods in
order to improve research about causality and self-selection.6
The objective of this paper is to study the eﬀects on plants' productivity due to M&A,
and to overcome the problem of self-selection of plants in M&A activity. I analyze productivity
because it is an applicable measure of a plant's eﬃciency (McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995), and
I believe that the analysis of eﬃciency is crucial to assess the success of mergers. I take into
account that there is no typical merger (Tichy, 2001), and thus, I distinguish between acquirers
and targets, and between horizontal and non-horizontal (vertical and conglomerate) mergers.7
In order to control for selection bias and identify the causal average eﬀect of M&A on plants'
productivity, I apply a matching approach, a newer microeconometric evaluation method.
To preview my results, I ﬁnd that merging plants are more productive than non-merging
plants. This diﬀerence is due to a pre-merger heterogeneity between plants. In particular, I ﬁnd
that more productive plants self-select in merger activities. Furthermore, I ﬁnd a weak evidence
for a causal eﬀect of M&A on productivity changes for acquirers.
There are several empirical studies about mergers and productivity performance of ﬁrms
related to my paper. For example, positive eﬀects were found in Pesendorfer (2003) or Maksi-
movic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2011). No eﬀects were found in studies from Bandick (2011),
or Mattes (2010), and negative productivity eﬀects were found in Gioia and Thomsen (2004).
The present paper sets itself apart from existing studies in two dimensions. First, I use a
new dataset combined from the IAB (Institute of Employment Research) Establishment Panel
and the M&A DATABASE, St. Gallen. To the best of my knowledge this dataset has not
been used by others so far. The dataset includes German plants that were involved in M&A
activity between 1996 and 2005, and a control group with plants not involved in any M&A
activity since 1980. The dataset allows distinguishing between acquirers, targets, horizontal,
and non-horizontal merging plants, and thus, addresses the critics about reduced comparability
of diﬀerent studies mentioned above. Moreover, other datasets are often biased towards larger
6Angrist and Pischke (2010) talk about a "credibility revolution in empirical economics" because of
better data availability and better research designs.
7Firms involved in either vertical or conglomerate mergers operate in diﬀerent markets in comparison to
ﬁrms involved in horizontal mergers. Therefore, vertical and conglomerate mergers are often considered
together as non-horizontal mergers (Church, 2004). In this study, I am not able to distinguish between
vertical and conglomerate mergers because of too few observations.
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companies, but this dataset is at plant-level and also enables an analysis of small and medium-
size plants. Additionally, since the number of observations of foreign M&A is small in this
dataset, my paper places the focus on domestic mergers. This should not be a drawback,
because most of the recent studies only analyze the eﬀects from foreign M&A. Hence, the
eﬀects from domestic M&A are ignored, although they account for at least 50% of all mergers
in Germany (Spanninger, 2011a). Second, I apply a three-step evaluation strategy. As usual,
I start with an analysis of descriptive statistics. Then, I will perform a regression analysis to
control for other variables that may inﬂuence productivity. Finally, I perform a propensity score
matching technique based on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985). Matching has increasingly
been applied in recent studies to identify causalities. It has helped to overcome biased results
from many earlier studies which simply compared merging and non-merging ﬁrms, but did not
control for self-selection eﬀects. I will combine the matching estimator with a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator as suggested by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) and Smith and Todd
(2005a) in order to eliminate time-invariant heterogeneity between groups. I will also apply a
number of robustness checks in order to test the credibility of the matching results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the economic
theory of mergers and acquisitions and presents an overview of related literature. Section 3.3
describes the data, and section 3.4 reports on the results from the empirical investigation.
Section 3.5 summarizes the results of the paper.
3.2 Theoretical background and related literature
In this section, I present several reasons for mergers that have been identiﬁed in literature
(e.g. Scherer, 2002; Mueller, 2003a), and I ask about the implications for merging ﬁrms' pre-
and post-merger performance, in particular productivity: do ﬁrms with speciﬁc characteristics
self-select in merger activity? Do ﬁrms acquire over-performing ﬁrms, so-called "cherries", or
underperforming ﬁrms, so-called "lemons"? What is the eﬀect of M&A on the merging ﬁrms'
performance? And do the results diﬀer with the type of merger?
A motivation for M&A widely discussed in the literature is synergy gains. These synergies
can occur in diﬀerent ways: the merger allows for the reorganization of business structures,
which supports business growth, allowing for changes in the mixes of goods and services, and
may improve ﬁrms' technical and organizational systems (Seth, 1990; Capron and Mitchell,
1998). I expect the eﬀect of synergies on the merging ﬁrms' productivities to be positive. Since
both ﬁrms have to participate in realizing the gains, these gains can be expected to be shared
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between the acquirer and the target (Mueller and Sirower, 2003). However, no clear prediction
of the pre-merger performance of merging ﬁrms can be made. On the one hand, acquiring ﬁrms
face several costs if they take over another ﬁrm: they have to ﬁnance the merger itself (with
stocks or cash), and they also have to bear ﬁxed costs for the integration of the acquired ﬁrm.
Hence, it seems plausible that only better performing ﬁrms are able to incur these ﬁxed costs.8
In contrast, it could also be the case that poorly performing acquirers self-select in merger
activity to improve their own performance through eﬃciency gains from synergy eﬀects. With
respect to targets, it seems more plausible to assume that gains from synergies are extracted
from good rather than bad performing targets.
A further possible motivation for takeovers is to replace ineﬃcient management which
does not maximize shareholder wealth (Scharfstein, 1988). According to Jensen (1988), the
corporate takeover market acts as a "court of last resort", i.e. takeovers are an external source
of discipline if internal control mechanisms are weak or ineﬀective. Brealey, Myers, and Allen
(2008) state that ﬁrms, which have unexploited opportunities to cut costs and increase sales
and earnings, are candidates for a takeover by ﬁrms which have better management. Hence,
if these poorly performing targets are taken over, the merger has a disciplining eﬀect on the
acquired ﬁrms' management, and improved eﬃciency in terms of productivity can be expected.
The matching theory9 of ownership changes, developed by Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992a),
states that ﬁrms permanently evaluate the ﬁt between the owner and its plants. The quality
of the match, which is reﬂected in productivity levels, is a key determinant in the ﬁrm-level
decision to maintain or to relinquish the ownership of a plant. The implications of the model
are straightforward: plants with a low productivity will be subject to ownership changes, and
the ownership change improves the match, resulting in a productivity growth.
Another strand of literature focuses on managers' opportunistic behavior as a reason for
mergers. One explanation for mergers is that managers suﬀer from hubris, e.g. they overes-
timate their abilities to improve the target's performance (Roll, 1986). In addition, empire-
building motives may also play a role: managers have personal interests, e.g. higher expected
ﬁnancial rewards when they widen the ﬁrm's size and scope (Baumol, 1959). A further motive
is that managers merge to entrench themselves and make it costly to shareholders to replace
them (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). If M&A occurs for these reasons, it is diﬃcult to make
8This argument is related to arguments discussed in the literature about heterogeneous ﬁrms, their
productivity, and the role of ﬁxed costs for export-activities and engagements in FDI (e.g. Melitz,
2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004): only more productive ﬁrms are able to bear the ﬁxed costs
of exporting and FDI.
9This theory was developed by Jovanovic (1979) and describes job turnover, and it is applied in labor
market studies.
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assumptions about the pre-merger performance of both acquiring and target ﬁrms. However, I
believe that mergers that are not primarily motivated by eﬃciency reasons are likely to decrease
productivity, or at least leave productivity unchanged.
Up to now, I have not discussed the diﬀerences between foreign and domestic mergers.
There are arguments which expect stronger productivity eﬀects from foreign M&A. First, it
has become a stylized fact in international trade literature that multinational ﬁrms outperform
domestic ﬁrms (e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007) because
of a higher stock of knowledge capital like brands, patents, technologies, etc. (Markusen, 2004),
and a better ability to exploit ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets (Caves, 1996). In foreign takeovers, targets
realize additional eﬃciency gains from their multinational parents, for example, because of a
costless transfer of the acquiring ﬁrms' assets (Bellak, Pfaﬀermayr, and Wild, 2006), or they
take advantage from the multinationals' network (Bellak and Pfaﬀermayr, 2002). Second,
there are also good arguments to assume that resources ﬂow in the other direction, i.e. from
acquired foreign aﬃliates to their parent companies (Dunning, 1998). If multinational ﬁrms are
asset-seeking, they may want to acquire local ﬁrms with better technology and know-how than
their own, leaving limited or even no scope for a knowledge transfer from parents to aﬃliates
(Salis, 2008). This implies that targets are cherries, and post-merger changes mostly occur
in the acquiring ﬁrm. In contrast, productivity eﬀects may be stronger from domestic than
foreign M&A. Information about target ﬁrms decreases as the distance between acquirers and
targets increases. For this, acquirers choose targets which are close to them. A better touch of
the local market enables intensive rationalization and radical reforms (Lehto, 2006). This may
positively aﬀect the ﬁrms' productivity, more than after foreign takeovers.
In addition to the theoretical discussions so far, there are further aspects speciﬁc about
horizontal and non-horizontal mergers worth mentioning. Horizontal mergers can lead to in-
creased eﬃciency through economies of scale, i.e. if the average costs decline as the ﬁrms'
size increase, mergers reduce the combined ﬁrms' average costs (Mueller, 2003a). In this case,
mostly smaller and high cost ﬁrms should horizontally merge, because they can expect the
largest gains.10 Horizontal mergers can also generate eﬃciencies by eliminating costly duplica-
tions, for example if they combine the ﬁrms' sales or distribution forces (Pesendorfer, 2003). A
vertical merger can create eﬃciencies if it enables ﬁrms to buy inputs at lower prices. This was
discussed by Spengler (1950) for the case of an upstream and downstream monopolist, both
setting their prices above marginal costs. A vertical integration of the upstream monopolist
10This is not empirically conﬁrmed (Mueller, 2003a).
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eliminates double marginalization, and input will be transferred within the ﬁrm at marginal
costs. Further eﬃciency gains from vertical mergers are possible, either from a reduction of
transaction costs, if goods or services are transferred between ﬁrms (Williamson, 1975), or in
the presence of hold-up problems (Church, 2004). Hold-up describes the situation in which
ﬁrms behave opportunistically and underinvest if there are relation-speciﬁc investments but
incomplete contracts. A vertical integration may instead promote investments and reduce the
hold-up problem.11 Conglomerate mergers enable ﬁrms to produce a range of goods, or to bun-
dle several products together, and the ﬁrms may realize eﬃciencies due to economies of scale,
scope, and learning in production and distribution (Church, 2004; Church, 2008a). Based on
these theoretical arguments, no clear prediction is possible for pre- or post-merger productivity
of horizontally and non-horizontally merging ﬁrms.
The literature also discusses increased market power as a motivation for mergers. All
horizontal mergers are at least slightly anticompetitive (Farrell and Shapiro, 2001), because they
reduce the number of ﬁrms in the same market, and they involve a loss of direct competition
between ﬁrms. Vertical mergers increase market power, if they establish market entry barriers
at one or more links in the vertical production chain (Comanor, 1967). For example, input and
customer foreclosure are ways to establish entry barriers.12 Anticompetitive eﬀects emerge from
conglomerate mergers due to tacit collusion (Mueller, 2003a), i.e. ﬁrms compete against each
other over time and cooperate with their rivals in order to maintain higher prices. Similarly, the
same may apply if ﬁrms meet in diﬀerent markets at the same time. No clear prediction about
pre-merger performance of plants is plausible, if increased market power is the motivation for
mergers. However, economic intuition allows for some expectations about post-merger eﬀects:
horizontal mergers reduce the number of ﬁrms in the market, leading to lower competitive
pressure on the merging ﬁrms. Thus, an increase in market power seems more likely to follow this
type of merger compared to non-horizontal mergers (Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner,
2003). Since there is evidence that competition improves productivity (e.g. Nickell, 1996), I
expect productivity to decrease if the competitive pressure decreases after horizontal M&A.
As a conclusion, the theory does not give clear predictions about pre- and post-merger
productivity performance of ﬁrms, and hence, the question is passed to empirical research. But
as I will brieﬂy show below, empirical studies also do not give a clear answer.
11Grossman and Hart (1986) pointed out that integration does not entirely solve the hold-up problem.
12Input foreclosure occurs if integrated upstream ﬁrms have market power and do not sell to downstream
rivals in the post-merger period any more, or they sell at higher prices, or oﬀer lower quality to
downstream rivals. Consumer foreclosure occurs if a downstream ﬁrm no longer sources supply from
independent upstream ﬁrms but only from the integrated upstream ﬁrm after the merger (Church,
2008b).
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Related literature: My paper is integrated into the empirical literature about research
on pre- and post-merger productivity performance of ﬁrms. There is some empirical support
that acquiring ﬁrms prefer cherries rather than lemons. For the US, McGuckin and Nguyen
(1995) observed higher pre-merger productivity for smaller plants but lower for larger plants,
and Ollinger, Nguyen, Blayney, Chambers, and Nelson (2006) found above-industry productivity
of acquired plants prior to the merger. The empirical support is even stronger for cross-border
M&A: Girma and Görg (2004) found evidence for ﬁrms in the UK, Bellak, Pfaﬀermayr, and
Wild (2006) for Austrian ﬁrms, and Salis (2008) for Slovenian ﬁrms. In a study for Norway,
Balsvik and Haller (2011) estimated that foreign ﬁrms acquire cherries, while domestic ﬁrms
acquire lemons. For Germany, Mattes (2010) found that foreign ﬁrms acquire both cherries and
lemons. In contrast to these results, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992a) observed low pre-merger
productivity levels of acquired plants for the US, Gioia and Thomsen (2004) found support
that targets are lemons in a study for Denmark, and Castellani and Zanfei (2004) also provided
evidence that domestic Italian ﬁrms acquired by foreign investors are not the most productive.
A majority of recent studies that mostly focused on cross-border M&A, examined positive
post-merger productivity eﬀects. This is in contrast to earlier studies, e.g. from Ravenscraft
and Scherer (1987), and possible explanations for diﬀerent research results have already been
mentioned at the beginning of this paper. For example, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2006)
estimated positive productivity eﬀects for acquired ﬁrms in the UK after acquisitions of European
or US multinationals. Similar results for the UK were found in Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and
Wright (2002b), and in Griﬃth and Simpson (2004). Studies from Arndt and Mattes (2010)
for Germany, Petkova (2009) for India, Arnold and Javorcik (2009) for Indonesia, Piscitello
and Rabbiosi (2005) for Italy, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992a), Maksimovic and Philips (2001),
and Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2011) for the US also estimated positive eﬀects after
cross-border M&A. Again for the US, Pesendorfer (2003) examined only horizontal mergers and
found positive eﬀects, too. For France, Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) also examined horizontal
mergers and estimated positive productivity eﬀects, but eﬀects were larger for cross-border M&A
compared to domestic M&A. Similarly, Balsvik and Haller (2011) found that Norwegian target
plants increase productivity after a foreign acquisition, but decrease after domestic mergers. In
a study about foreign acquisitions of Swedish ﬁrms, Bandick (2011) estimated a productivity
increase after vertical mergers, but no eﬀects after horizontal acquisitions. Further studies that
did not ﬁnd changes in productivity after cross-border M&A are from Bellak, Pfaﬀermayr, and
Wild (2006) for Austria, Mattes (2010) for Germany, and Salis (2008) for Slovenia. For the
US, McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) also observed post-merger productivity improvements for
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acquired plants, but productivity losses for the acquirer's existing plants. Schoar (2002) found
similar results. Negative productivity eﬀects for acquired plants after international takeovers
were estimated in a study from Gioia and Thomsen (2004) for Denmark.
3.3 The data
The panel dataset used in the following empirical analysis is a combination of two datasets:
the Establishment Panel (Betriebspanel) of the Institute for Employment Research, Nurem-
berg (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB), and the M&A DATABASE of the
University of St. Gallen. The dataset was created by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung GmbH
München.13
The IAB Establishment Panel is a representative employer survey for Germany and contains
a wide range of questions on topics related to employment policy. The survey, which has existed
since 1993 is carried out annually, and currently contains around 16,000 plants of all sizes and
sectors of the economy. The data does not report about M&A activities of plants, and thus,
the data was linked to the M&A DATABASE of the University of St. Gallen. The M&A
DATABASE contains information about 65,000 transactions since 1985 for Germany, Austria,
and Switzerland. For every deal there is information about the acquirer, target, and seller, as
well as about sales, proﬁts, employees, location, and sector. Moreover, the data also includes
information if the merger was horizontal, vertical forward, vertical backward, conglomerate,
or concentric.14 Between 1996 and 2005 - the observation period in which the plants in this
dataset merged - there is information of about 23,717 transactions with 40,736 German ﬁrms
involved.15
Based on these two independent datasets, TNS Infratest constructed a new dataset which
consists of two groups of plants. These groups exhibit a similar structure with regard to sector,
size, location, and legal form. The ﬁrst group, which is the treatment group, consists of plants
which merged between January 1996 and December 2005. To create this group of merging
plants,16 all plants which appeared both in the M&A DATABASE and in the IAB Establishment
13The creation of this dataset preceded a pilot study from Bellmann and Kirchhof (2006). They used
Thomson ONE Banker instead of M&A DATABASE. The latter's advantage is that it also includes
smaller ﬁrms.
14In a concentric merger, ﬁrms from diﬀerent but neighboring industries merge. It is comparable to
conglomerate mergers with complementary or neighboring products (Church, 2004).
15The number of companies is higher than the number of transactions because up to three companies
can be involved in a merger - as acquirer, object and seller.
16I use the terms "merged plants" and "treated" interchangeably.
M&A and labor productivity 83
Panel had to be identiﬁed. Plants were only assigned to the treatment group if they were
surveyed at least once prior and once after the merger in order to have enough information.
If plants merged more often between 1996 and 2005, they may also appear more often in the
dataset. The treated group consists of 7,801 observations from 958 diﬀerent plants.17
The second group, the control group, consists of plants that had not merged between
1980 and 2005. This group was created in a way that control plants are as similar as possible
to merged plants in the treatment group, that is, controls should act as statistical twins to
those treated plants. Hence, treated plants were categorized according to sector, size category,
location in West or East Germany, and legal form. Next, controls had to be identiﬁed with
the same combination of sector, size, location, and legal form. However, not for every treated
could a control be found with identical characteristics. In addition, control plants had also to
be surveyed at least twice between the years 1993 and 2006,18 and they were only kept in the
dataset if they had not been involved in any merger activities since 1980. This was controlled
through other datasets or the plants' websites. Several plants exist that appear more often in
the control group because plants can serve several times as a control in the referred observation
period. The control group consists of 1,009 observations from 291 diﬀerent plants.19
The dataset has some useful features and diﬀers from datasets used in other studies in a
number of ways:
 The data allow for diﬀerentiation between acquirers, targets, and sellers, and between
horizontal and non-horizontal mergers.
 The dataset includes plants of all sizes, i.e. small and medium-size plants can also be
analyzed.
 Plants are from diﬀerent sectors, from either West or East Germany, and have diﬀerent
legal forms.
 Since the data is at plant-level, each plant can be assigned to a speciﬁc sector. With
ﬁrm-level data, this is often not possible if ﬁrms are multi-plant ﬁrms.
 All plants in the control group had not merged since 1980.
17This means that the treatment group consists of 958 diﬀerent plants which all have diﬀerent identi-
ﬁcation numbers in the IAB Establishment Panel.
18The ﬁrst wave of the IAB Establishment Panel is from 1993, and the survey of 2006 provides infor-
mation about the year 2005.
19See appendix A for a more detailed description of the construction of both treatment and control
groups.
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 The dataset allows for a diﬀerentiated econometric analysis because of the availability of
a control group and a rich set of variables.
The empirical investigation in the next section requires some modiﬁcations of the dataset.
First, if a plant was involved in several mergers within a single year, the mergers were considered
as only one merger, because several information is on a yearly basis. Second, I analyze labor
productivity over an observation period of four years from t = 1 to t = 4. Thus, treated and
control observations were only kept if data existed for all four years. Third, treated plants were
dropped if a plant merged more than once within three years. This allows assigning eﬀects to
one speciﬁc merger. Fourth, labor productivity is deﬁned as sales per employee, and therefore I
excluded plants which reported balance sheet totals instead of sales. Fifth, I also dropped plants
which were surveyed without reporting about their sales, because productivity is measured as
sales per employee. Sixth, observations which exhibit abnormal values for labor productivity
growth rates were deleted. I deﬁne abnormal values if growth rates between t = 3 and t = 4
or t = 1 and t = 4 deviate two standard deviations from the respective industry average.20
Seventh, seller plants were also excluded from the dataset because the number of observations
is too small. And eighth, I only keep treated plants that merge domestically because the number
of foreign M&A is also too small for an analysis.
Table 3.1: Classiﬁcation of treated plants
Plants Horizontal Non-horizontal Unkown Total
Acquirers 46 8 22 76
Targets 22 12 15 49
Total 68 20 37 125
Note: there are plants which merged, but there is no information about the type of merger. These are labeled as
"Unknown".
However, these modiﬁcations reduce the number of observations signiﬁcantly:21 from 7,801
to 125 treated, and from 1,009 to 520 untreated observations.22 Table 3.1 presents an overview
20These extreme values may be due to errors or rare events. For example, consider a ﬁrm that produces
a certain machine in a year, and reports only low sales in the same year. If the ﬁrm sells the machine
in the next year, it will report high sales. These extreme numbers may have a high impact on the
empirical results (Wagner, 2007b).
21Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) used the Global Mergers and Acquisitions database for their study. They
also analyzed only a small fraction of the original dataset, i.e. from a large sample of 140,289 mergers
there was only suﬃcient data for 646 mergers.
22As stated above, I only kept a treated plant more than once in the dataset if there are at least three
year between the mergers in order to avoid overlapping eﬀects. There are also untreated plants that
appear more often in the control group, because they are surveyed for several times in diﬀerent waves.
Therefore, one might think that it is not a good idea that a single plant is used more often as a control
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of the number of treated plants and distinguishes between acquirers and targets, and plants
involved in horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. Unfortunately, the type of merger is not
always known for every treated plant. Moreover, due to a small number of non-horizontally
merging plants, the robustness of the results for this subgroup is limited in the following empirical
analysis.
3.4 Empirical investigation
3.4.1 Empirical strategy
Productivity measurements: Productivity is a measure of ﬁrms' eﬃciency performance.
In general, productivity is deﬁned as the relation of a ﬁrm's output to its input, and there are
diﬀerent ways to measure it. For example, total factor productivity (TFP) measures changes
in output not explained by changes in inputs such as labor or capital. TFP is a theoretically
superior measure of productivity because it takes all input factors into account. However,
the calculation of TFP requires more data about inputs, e.g. capital etc., which is often not
available in datasets. For this reason, several empirical studies alternatively measure the ratio
of a ﬁrm's output to only one single input, e.g. labor or capital. This study is based on labor
productivity because the dataset includes information about labor and output, measured in
sales, but there is not suﬃcient information about other inputs to properly calculate TFP. More
precise, for each ﬁrm i at time t, I deﬁne labor productivity LPit as sales Sit (measured in Euro)
per employees Nit. The number of employees includes all workers, i.e. independent of being
liable to social security or not:
LPit = Sit/Nit. (1)
Plant- vs. ﬁrm-level analysis: As argued at the beginning of my paper, studies exist
that analyze eﬀects at plant-level, while others use ﬁrm-level data. Headquarter activities like
because it was surveyed several times, while another single plant will be used only once because it
was surveyed less often. Consequently, the results for controls may be biased towards the plants that
were surveyed more often. Nevertheless, this should be no great problem for the following reasons:
ﬁrst, I do not believe that there is a systematic bias in relevant variables in those plants that were
surveyed more often. In particular, why should a plant that was surveyed in the IAB Establishment
Panel more often than another plant exhibit systematically higher or lower productivity changes over
time? To be sure, I tested for a correlation and did not ﬁnd any evidence. Second, if I would allow
keeping an untreated observation to appear only once in the control group, the control group would
shrink to approximately one fourth of its size, and useful information would be lost. Nevertheless, I
also performed the empirical investigation with a control group with each individual plant appearing
only once in the dataset as a robustness check. As expected, the estimations based on this smaller
control group were similar.
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marketing, R&D, ﬁnance operations, etc. are at ﬁrm-level, whereas plant-level includes activities
like production and assembling (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Thus, a merger may have
a diﬀerent eﬀect on ﬁrm-level compared to plant-level. For example, if M&A generates synergy
eﬀects in R&D or marketing, they should primarily be measured at ﬁrm-level. If, instead, M&A
leads to improved production processes, eﬀects should be measured at plant-level.
The dataset used in this paper is at plant-level. Hence, estimations of performance changes
of the overall ﬁrm are not possible. However, this must not be a drawback if the research
focus is on smaller and medium-size ﬁrms which are often single-plant ﬁrms. Moreover, a
plant-level analysis has the advantage that plants can be assigned easier to a speciﬁc industry
sector compared to ﬁrms (Bellmann and Kirchhof, 2006). Finally, the plant is the unit which
is fully involved in the merger and captures the whole productivity eﬀect of M&A, while the
eﬀect may disperse at ﬁrm-level which measures the average productivity of all plants.
Observation period: The observation period in this paper covers four years, i.e. from
t = 1 to t = 4. All mergers occur in t = 2. Due to this construction plants' pre-merger
and post-merger productivity performance can both be analyzed. Of course, longer observation
periods prior to the merger would be desirable, e.g. because a decreasing performance could
be the trigger for a merger, or because of the existence of Ashenfelter's Dip:23 if plants
prepare themselves for the merger, performance can already be aﬀected prior to the merger, and
estimations about post-merger eﬀects may then be biased. However, I am not able to lengthen
the observation period to more than one year prior to the merger because of data limitations.
For this reason, I start the observation period one year prior to the merger, similar to many
other existing studies (e.g. Girma and Görg, 2007).
I calculate post-merger performance in years t = 3 and t = 4, because it seems plausible to
assume that it takes some time for the eﬀects to arise after mergers (e.g. for the reorganization
of the merging plant's production).24 This also allows calculating post-merger growth rates
instead of levels, and it reduces selection bias that arises due to unobserved time-invariant
diﬀerences between both groups.25 In addition to changes between years t = 3 and t = 4
("post-merger period"), I also analyze growth rates over the whole observation period between
23The Ashelfelter Dip describes that the unemployed people's attempts at job seeking decrease shortly
before they participate in a labor market program.
24Data from t = 4 corresponds to at most three years after the merger, if the merger occurred at the
beginning of year t = 2 (see appendix B). Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2011) found that
most of the restructuring occurs within a three-year period. If they changed the time window to ﬁve
years, the results did not change.
25I will discuss this issue later more precisely.
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t = 1 and t = 4 ("total period"). This allows capturing changes that occur within several
weeks or months around the merger.26
For the empirical setting, I follow Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2010) and use a "rolling
observation window".27 All mergers in the dataset occur between 1996 and 2005, and these
years correspond to t = 2. As a consequence, year t = 1 corresponds to a year between
1995 and 2004, and year t = 4 corresponds to a year between 1998 and 2007. Hence, this
leads to ten cohorts with a respective four-year window (1995 - 1998, 1996 - 1999, ..., 2004
- 2007). For controls, the ﬁrst possible year for t = 1 is 1993 (the starting year of the IAB
Establishment Panel), and the last possible year for t = 4 is 2005, leading to ten cohorts with
a four-year window (1993 - 1996, 1994 - 1997, ..., 2002 - 2005).28 Finally, sales are deﬂated
by the aggregated consumer price index over the whole observation period.
The selection problem and the estimation methods: The objective of this paper
is to analyze productivity eﬀects from M&A. A simple comparison of merged plants with non-
merged plants may lead to biased results if plants are not selected randomly to the group of
merged plants. For example, if mostly better performing plants, or better performing targets
are subject to M&A, a simple comparison to a group of non-merged plants will lead to the
conclusion that merging plants are more productive than non-merging plants. However, this
simple comparison will not reveal the true eﬀects of M&A, because it does not take into
account that plants with certain pre-merger characteristics self-select in M&A activity, i.e. the
comparison suﬀers from a selection bias.
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on the selection problem and tries to identify
the causal eﬀect. As usual in empirical studies, the investigation starts with an analysis of de-
scriptive statistics. I analyze diﬀerent pre-merger characteristics between both groups, compare
productivity levels over time as well as growth rates between both groups.
Nevertheless, descriptive statistics are not a convincing test for self-selection and causal
eﬀects. Productivity diﬀerences between merging and non-merging plants may be the result
26Appendix B provides more information on the construction of the observation period and some remarks
on growth rates.
27For a better understanding, ﬁgure B2 in the appendix shows a graphical illustration of the diﬀerent
cohorts.
28The dataset includes plants which merged between 1996 and 2005. However, some of the four-year
cohorts for merged plants also cover the years 1995, 2006, and 2007, but there is no information if
plants also merged in these years, or only between 1996 and 2005. For example, a plant that merged
in 2005 could also merge in 2007 again. If this was true, my results would be biased by overlapping
eﬀects due to more mergers. Nevertheless, I choose to keep these observations because I already
excluded those multi-mergers from the dataset (see section 3.3), and thus, it is not too likely that
the remaining plants also merged in 1995, 2006, or 2007.
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of diﬀerences in other variables than M&A that determine productivity. For this, I apply
a regression analysis to control for variables that inﬂuence productivity. The construction
of the framework is similar to Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2010): the regression allows
looking at diﬀerences in the average plant productivity between both groups over time, and it
controls for plant characteristics that are expected to be related to a plant's average productivity
performance. However, the literature does not consider regression analysis as a reliable method
to clearly solve selection problems and identify causalities (e.g. Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke,
and Weiber, 2010).29
Newer econometric evaluation methods like propensity score matching from Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983, 1985) present a way to solve the selection problem and identify causalities. The
problem is that a faster productivity growth of plants that merged does not necessarily reﬂect
a causal eﬀect of M&A on the plants' productivity. Instead, it could also be that plants with
higher productivity self-select in the merged group, but would have experienced higher growth
even without merging. However, both states are never observable at the same time, which leads
to the problem of the missing counterfactual situation (Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2010).
Propensity score matching allows replacing this missing counterfactual by the construction of
an appropriate control group, i.e. the method pairs merged with non-merged plants that are
similar in their pre-merger characteristics, and therefore, exhibit a similar probability of merging.
Performance diﬀerences can then be attributed to the merger. As suggested by Blundell and
Costa Dias (2000) and Smith and Todd (2005a), I combine matching with a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimator to compare changes instead of levels. This improves the matching results
because it eliminates time-invariant heterogeneity between both groups.
In the following empirical investigation, I ﬁrst present the results for the treatment group
including all treated plants. Then, I consider the results for all subgroups of treated plants:
acquirers, targets, plants in horizontal mergers, and plants in non-horizontal mergers.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
I start with a ﬁrst look at the data. Table 3.2 presents summary statistics, and all numbers are
measured in t = 1.30 I diﬀerentiate between treatment and control groups, and the respective
numbers in the tables are absolute numbers, while the numbers in parentheses are percentages.
The table presents the distribution of treated and controls to diﬀerent size categories. The
29See Caliendo (2006), Gelman and Hill (2007), or Angrist and Pischke (2009) for a discussion about
regression analysis compared to matching methods.
30All calculations in this study are performed with STATA 11.1.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics: diﬀerent variables
Variable All Acquirers Targets Horizontal Non-horizontal Control
Size category
1-19 employees 10 4 6 4 4 112
(8.00) (5.26) (12.24) (5.88) (20.00) (21.54)
20-49 employees 8 6 2 4 2 91
(6.40) (7.89) (4.08) (5.88) (10.00) (17.50)
50-99 employees 8 4 4 4 1 90
(6.40) (5.26) (8.16) (5.88 (5.00) (17.31)
100-299 employees 29 20 9 19 3 171
(23.20) (26.32) (18.37) (27.94) (15.00) (32.88)
300-499 employees 12 6 6 7 2 34
(9.60) (7.89) (12.24) (10.29) (10.00) (6.54)
>=500 employees 58 36 22 30 8 22
(46.40) (47.37) (44.90) (44.12) (40.00) (4.23)
Total 125 76 49 68 20 520
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Sector
Mining/Quarrying/Electricity 10 8 2 7 2 3
(8.00) (10.53) (4.08) (10.29) (10.00) (0.58)
Food 1 1 0 1 0 24
(0.80) (1.32) (0.00) (1.47) (0.00) (4.62)
Consumer goods 10 6 4 5 1 29
(8.00) (7.89) (8.16) (7.35) (5.00) (5.58)
Production goods 29 13 16 14 4 78
(23.30) (17.11) (32.65) (20.59) (20.00) (15.00)
Investment goods 40 21 19 18 9 144
(32.00) (27.63) (38.78) (26.47) (45.00) (27.69)
Construction 3 2 1 0 0 26
(2.40) (2.63) (2.04) (0.00) (0.00) (5.00)
Trade 13 10 3 9 2 112
(10.40) (13.16) (6.12) (13.24) (10.00) (21.54)
Transport 10 9 1 8 0 24
(8.00) (11.84) (2.04) (11.76) (0.00) (4.62)
Education 1 0 1 1 0 7
(0.80) (0.00) (2.04) (1.47) (0.00) (1.35)
Research/Computer/Ser 2 1 1 1 1 59
(1.60) (1.32) (2.04) (1.47) (5.00) (11.35)
Other services 6 5 1 4 1 14
(4.80) (6.58) (2.04) (5.88) (5.00) (2.69)
Total 125 76 49 95 20 520
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00 (100.00)
Legal form
Partnership, individually-owned, etc. 12 8 4 7 2 105
(9.76) (10.67) (8.33) (10.45) (10.00) (21.00)
Limited 74 41 33 36 14 376
(60.16) (54.67) (68.75) (53.73) (70.00) (75.00)
Limited by shares 37 26 11 24 4 19
(30.08) (34.67) (22.92) (35.82) (20.00) (3.80)
Total 123 75 48 67 20 500
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Location in East Germany 38 19 19 24 6 136
(30.40) (25.00) (38.78) (35.29) (30.00) (26.20)
Wage per month (mean) 2215.4 2330.6 2031.1 2249.8 2126.1 1715.9
Export rate (% of sales, mean) 26.83 25.17 29.59 24.74 31.00 11.46
Plant is in foreign ownership 13 5 8 7 1 5
(15.85) (10.64) (22.86) (11.48) (8.33) (1.43)
Further training 117 70 47 65 18 340
(94.35) (93.33) (95.92) (95.59) (90.00) (66.67)
Single-plant ﬁrm 37 21 16 21 6 397
(29.84) (27.63) (33.33) (30.88) (31.58) (79.72)
Note: numbers refer to t = 1. Numbers in parentheses are percentage of total number of plants. Reduced number of
observations is due to missing data for several variables.
numbers show that treated plants are larger than control plants. For example, around 46%
of treated plants have 500 and more employees, while only 4% of controls are of this size.
Next, treated plants are mostly concentrated in the production goods and investment goods
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sector, while the largest fraction of controls belongs to the investment goods and trade sector.31
Considering the legal form of plants, most are "Limited". However, treated plants have more
often the legal form of "Limited by shares" compared to controls. In addition, the table also
shows how many plants are located in West and East Germany within both groups of plants,
and the distribution is similar. Furthermore, treated plants pay higher wages, and have higher
export rates. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of a higher productivity in treated plants
because more productive plants exhibit a higher export activity (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Greenaway
and Kneller, 2007), and exporting ﬁrms also pay higher wages (e.g. Schank, Schnabel, and
Wagner, 2010). Moreover, treated plants are more often in foreign ownership. They also oﬀer
more further training to their employees prior to the merger, which is plausible for plants that are
more productive. Finally, approximately 30% of treated plants are single-plant ﬁrms compared
to approximately 80% of control plants. In general, the numbers and distributions do not vary
substantially between subgroups of treated.
Figure 3.1: Labor productivity in diﬀerent sectors
Note: numbers refer to year t = 1.
In the next step, I compare the productivity of the treatment group including all treated
plants to the control groups in year t = 1, depending on the sector they belong to and their
size. Figure 3.1 shows that for almost all sectors the average productivity level is higher for
treated plants prior to the merger. Productivity levels diﬀer substantially between sectors, but
diﬀerences have to be analyzed with care due to a small number of underlying observations in
several sectors (see table 3.2). Figure 3.2 reveals a similar picture: treated plants have a higher
average productivity before they merge, independent of their size in terms of employees.32
31See appendix A for a description of sector classiﬁcation.
32The corresponding ﬁgures for subgroups look similar but are not reported.
M&A and labor productivity 91
Figure 3.2: Labor productivity in diﬀerent size categories
Note: numbers refer to year t = 1.
Table 3.3 presents the average productivity levels in the treatment group, in subgroups
of treated, and in the control group over the whole observation period between t = 1 to
t = 4. Merging plants have an average pre-merger productivity of approximately 185,600
(sales in Euro per employee), which reﬂects a pre-merger diﬀerential of around 94% compared
to plants that had not merged. This productivity gap persists over the whole observation
period. The picture is similar for all subgroups with a productivity diﬀerential between 82%
(targets) and 102% (horizontal M&A). I also apply a t-test to test the statistical signiﬁcance of
productivity diﬀerences between merged plants and control plants. The test does not assume
equal variances in the respective comparing groups.33 For the treatment group, and for each
subgroup of treated, I test the null hypothesis H0 in the years t = 1 to t = 4: mean of
labor productivity of treated = mean of labor productivity of controls, against the alternative
hypothesis H1: mean of labor productivity of treated 6= mean of labor productivity of controls.
P-values of at most 0.01, 0.05, or 0.1 indicate that the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected at
the 1%-, 5%- or 10%-error level in favor of the alternative hypothesis H1. The results show
that the diﬀerences in productivity are statistically signiﬁcant for the treatment groups and
all subgroups in all years, mostly at the 1%-signiﬁcance-level. I also apply t-tests to compare
productivity means between acquiring and target plants, and between plants in horizontal and
non-horizontal mergers for all years, but diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant at any level
(the results are not reported).
Table 3.3 shows small changes in the productivity levels for controls over time, but changes
33I apply Levene's statistic for a test of the equality of variances.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics: labor productivity
All Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Productivity in t=1 185686 (133530) 125 0.000
Productivity in t=2 193291 (139130) 125 0.000
Productivity in t=3 192222 (136985) 125 0.000
Productivity in t=4 194691 (139854) 125 0.000
Growth from t=3 to t=4 0.015 (0.160) 125 0.322
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.043 (0.367) 125 0.113
Acquirers Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Productivity in t=1 192909 (137048) 76 0.000
Productivity in t=2 208563 (152415) 76 0.000
Productivity in t=3 202710 (144060) 76 0.000
Productivity in t=4 205274 (146611) 76 0.000
Growth from t=3 to t=4 0.021 (0.173) 76 0.283
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.060 (0.435) 76 0.160
Targets Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Productivity in t=1 174483 (128467) 49 0.000
Productivity in t=2 169605 (112991) 49 0.000
Productivity in t=3 175955 (124918) 49 0.000
Productivity in t=4 178277 (128412) 49 0.000
Growth from t=3 to t=4 0.005 (0.140) 49 0.705
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.016 (0.223) 49 0.391
Horizontal Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Productivity in t=1 192977 (153094) 68 0.000
Productivity in t=2 202562 (164727) 68 0.000
Productivity in t=3 198637 (157976) 68 0.000
Productivity in t=4 201408 (157998) 68 0.000
Growth from t=3 to t=4 0.021 (0.187) 68 0.328
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.047 (0.465) 68 0.302
Non-horizontal Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Productivity in t=1 176996 (137674) 20 0.016
Productivity in t=2 169666 (96990) 20 0.003
Productivity in t=3 175183 (108436) 20 0.004
Productivity in t=4 179437 (126317) 20 0.007
Growth from t=3 to t=4 -0.001 (0.115) 20 0.911
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.022 (0.158) 20 0.353
Control Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Productivity in t=1 95699 (68071) 520
Productivity in t=2 95015 (66262) 520
Productivity in t=3 94076 (62966) 520
Productivity in t=4 94050 (63984) 520
Growth from t=3 to t=4 -0.004 (0.284) 520
Growth from t=1 to t=4 -0.014 (0.294) 520
Note: p-values refer to the t-test about statistical signiﬁcance of diﬀerence of means between treated and control groups.
are larger for treated and subgroups of treated. For this, I calculate percentage post-merger
productivity changes between t = 3 and t = 4, and also changes for the total period between
t = 1 and t = 4, approximated by logarithms:
lnLP(3−4)i = lnLP4i − lnLP3i, (2)
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and
lnLP(1−4)i = lnLP4i − lnLP1i. (3)
lnLP(3−4)i and lnLP(1−4)i are the variables for percentage changes between t = 3 and t = 4,
and between t = 1 and t = 4 for each plant i, and LPti with t = {1, ..., 4} is the variable for
labor productivity in year t.
The results are also shown in table 3.3. For the treatment group including all merging
plants, the post-merger growth rate is 1.5%, and 4.3% for the whole observation period. The
subgroups also exhibit positive post-merger changes, except the subgroup of non-horizontal
mergers, and changes are between 0.5% (targets) and 2.1% (acquirers, horizontal M&A).
With respect to changes for the total periods, all subgroups exhibit a productivity increase
between 1.6% (targets) and 6.0% (acquirers) on average. In contrast, the control group faces
a decrease in the post-merger period (-0.4%), and also in the total period (-1.4%). Again, I
apply a t-test to test the statistical signiﬁcance of productivity changes. In particular, I test
the null hypothesis H0: mean of percentage change of labor productivity of treated = mean
of percentage change of labor productivity growth of controls. The alternative hypothesis H1
is: mean of percentage change of labor productivity growth of treated 6= mean of percentage
change of labor productivity growth of controls. As a result, changes are not statistically
signiﬁcant at any usual signiﬁcance level. That is, plants that merge do not exhibit productivity
changes that are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from plants that do not merge.
The results of the descriptive statistics displayed in tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that merging
plants are diﬀerent from plants that do not merge even before the merger. The heterogeneity
refers to several characteristics. The pre-merger labor productivity of merging plants is almost
twice as high as of control plants, and this is true for all subgroups. The ﬁndings support the
view that more productive plants self-select in merger activity. However, according to descriptive
statistics, there is no evidence that M&A aﬀects productivity, i.e. mergers do neither statistically
signiﬁcantly change the plants' productivity in the post-merger period between t = 3 and t = 4
nor in the whole observation period between t = 1 and t = 4.
3.4.3 Regression analysis
In descriptive statistics I found statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in productivity levels, but not
for growth rates between treated and control groups. However, I do not consider descriptive
statistics as a reliable estimation strategy to analyze questions about self-selection and causality.
In this subsection, I perform an OLS-regression analysis, and I analyze the eﬀect of some
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interaction variables of interest. I also control for several plant characteristics that can be
expected to be correlated with a plant's productivity. The logarithmized regression model34 is
speciﬁed as follows:
lnLPit = β0 + β1MAi +
4
∑
t=2
βt(MAi ∗ PERIODt) + β5CONTROLit + ei (4)
lnLPit is the logarithm of labor productivity, i is an index for a plant, and t is the index for
the years t = 1 to t = 4. MAi represents a dummy with value one if a plant i merged,
and zero if the plants is a control. The coeﬃcient β1 measures the percentage diﬀerence of
the average productivity between the treated and control groups in t = 1. The interaction
terms MAi ∗ PERIODt control for changes in productivity over time. The term is a product
of the dummy variable for M&A (MAi) and a dummy variable for years t = 2 to t = 4
(PERIODt). The coeﬃcients βt measure if the diﬀerence in average productivity between
both groups changes over the years t = 2 to t = 4. The vector CONTROLit includes diﬀerent
variables - see below - that can be expected to impact a plant's productivity. Finally, ei is an
error term. I perform ﬁve diﬀerent regression speciﬁcations: the ﬁrst for the group of treated
plants, and the others for each subgroup of treated.
The results of the regressions are shown in table 3.4. In the ﬁrst regression speciﬁcation
that included all merging plants (ﬁrst column), the coeﬃcient of the M&A dummy is 0.488.
This corresponds to a productivity diﬀerential of approximately 63%.35 This magnitude is high
from an economic point of view, and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.
The coeﬃcients of the interaction dummies that control for productivity changes over time are
of low magnitude, but they are not statistically signiﬁcant at any usual signiﬁcance level. This
implies that the pre-merger productivity gap between treated and controls does not statistically
signiﬁcantly change over the years t = 2 to t = 4.
The regression framework also includes control variables which are expected to be related to
a plant's productivity: ﬁrst, larger plants may exhibit higher productivity, e.g. due to economies
of scale. Thus, I include a variable for plant size, measured as the logarithm of the number
of employees, and the squared logarithm of employees. Both variables are not statistically
signiﬁcant. In addition, a plant's productivity may also be aﬀected by the employment and
qualiﬁcation structure of its workforce. For this, I include variables for diﬀerent employment
34This speciﬁcation is similar to Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2010).
35In loglinear regression models the coeﬃcients of explaining variables can be transformed into a per-
centage change. Here, exp{0.488} ≈ 1.629, and this corresponds to a productivity diﬀerential of
approximately 63% (Verbeek, 2005).
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Table 3.4: OLS-regression (dependent variable: log. labor productivity)
Variables All (1) Acquirers (2) Targets (3) Horizontal (4) Non-horiz. (5)
M&A (D) 0.488***
(0.091)
M&A*Period=2 (D) 0.013
(0.041)
M&A*Period=3 (D) 0.021
(0.044)
M&A*Period=4 (D) -0.031
(0.052)
Acquirer (D) 0.542***
(0.113)
Acquirer*Period=2 (D) 0.070
(0.059)
Acquirer*Period=3 (D) 0.073
(0.063)
Acquirer*Period=4 (D) 0.043
(0.070)
Target (D) 0.411***
(0.123)
Target*Period=2 (D) -0.069
(0.052)
Target*Period=3 (D) -0.027
(0.052)
Target*Period=4 (D) -0.139**
(0.066)
Horizontal M&A (D) 0.548***
(0.117)
Horizontal*Period=2 (D) 0.010
(0.063)
Horizontal*Period=3 (D) -0.015
(0.068)
Horizontal*Period=4 (D) -0.108
(0.084)
Non-horizontal M&A (D) 0.274
(0.206)
Non-horizontal*Period=2 (D) -0.027
(0.074)
Non-horizontal*Period=3 (D) -0.013
(0.071)
Non-horizontal*Period=4 (D) -0.074
(0.084)
log. Employment 0.105 0.148 0.094 0.151 0.059
(0.080) (0.092) (0.096) (0.102) (0.121)
Squared log. Employment -0.012 -0.017* -0.009 -0.018* -0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Proportion of skilled employees 0.334*** 0.321*** 0.343*** 0.365*** 0.329***
(0.085) (0.087) (0.085) (0.089) (0.088)
Proportion of management 0.695 0.540 0.774 0.566 0.411
(0.468) (0.435) (0.502) (0.460) (0.421)
Proportion of apprentice -0.326 0.004 -0.117 -0.057 -0.022
(0.417) (0.382) (0.408) (0.393) (0.390)
Proportion of female employees -0.185* -0.181* -0.160 -0.162 -0.173
(0.105) (0.104) (0.110) (0.106) (0.110)
log. Investment p. employee 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Further training (D) 0.102** 0.073 0.111** 0.097** 0.083*
(0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049)
Legal form "Limited" (D) -0.104* -0.126** -0.150*** -0.123** -0.184***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056)
Legal form "Limited by shares" (D) -0.228*** -0.273*** -0.165* -0.235** -0.079
(0.083) (0.090) (0.085) (0.091) (0.094)
Location in East Germany (D) -0.277*** -0.265*** -0.265*** -0.280*** -0.253***
(0.057) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.064)
Foreign owned plant (D) 0.208** 0.233* 0.199* 0.226** 0.324**
(0.102) (0.119) (0.108) (0.111) (0.126)
Single-plant ﬁrm (D) -0.112** -0.080 -0.125** -0.119** -0.079
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056)
Constant 11.940*** 10.046*** 9.961*** 11.258*** 9.482***
(0.386) (0.467) (0.501) (0.346) (0.414)
Observations 2369 2186 2096 2168 1982
R2 0.568 0.569 0.593 0.574 0.590
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for intragroup correlation). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (D)
means variable is a dummy. Reference categories for legal form is "Partnership, individually-owned, public, and others".
Regressions include dummies for sectors and years. The reduced number of observations is due to missing data for several
variables. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel, M&A DATABASE St. Gallen.
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groups, measured as a proportion within the plant's total workforce:36 skilled employees37,
management38, and apprentices. According to the regression, the higher the proportion of skilled
employees, the higher the plant's labor productivity, and the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant.
Contrary, the coeﬃcients for the proportion of management and apprentices are not signiﬁcant.
However, there is a statistically signiﬁcantly negative correlation between the proportion of
female employees and the plant's productivity, and this may be explained by lower productive
female part time workers. Additionally, the more a plant invests, measured as logarithmized
investments per employee, the higher the plant's labor productivity. The coeﬃcient is highly
signiﬁcant. I also control for the impact of further training which is statistically signiﬁcantly
positive. The coeﬃcients of the dummies for the legal forms "Limited" and "Limited by shares"
are both negative and signiﬁcant, implying that plants that have these legal forms are less
productive compared to plants of the reference group "Partnership, individually-owned, etc.".
Plants located in East Germany obviously have a statistically signiﬁcantly lower productivity,
but if plants are in foreign property, they exhibit signiﬁcantly higher productivity. Finally, if
plants are single plants, they have a signiﬁcantly lower productivity.
The regression speciﬁcations 2 to 5 in table 3.4 refer to subsections of treated. The
respective M&A dummy is one if the plant is involved in M&A activity either as acquirer, or
as target, or as a plant involved in horizontal or non-horizontal mergers. The M&A dummy is
zero if the plant is a control. The results provide evidence that subgroups of merged plants
also exhibit higher pre-merger productivity, except for the subgroup of non-horizontal M&A:
the productivity diﬀerential is 72% for acquirers, 51% for targets, and 73% for plants involved
in horizontal mergers, and they are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. Almost all
coeﬃcients of the interaction terms are not statistically signiﬁcant at any level, i.e. there is no
evidence for a change in the productivity diﬀerence between merging and non-merging plants
over time. Only targets exhibit a statistically signiﬁcant productivity decrease of approximately
14% in t = 4 compared to t = 1. The magnitude of coeﬃcients of control variables and their
statistical signiﬁcance are mostly similar to the ﬁrst regression.
The regression estimates seem to be robust: the values of R2, which describe how much
36Similar to Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2010) I do not consider the logarithm of the propor-
tional variables because there are several observations which exhibit a value of 0 which makes a
transformation into logarithmized values impossible. Thus, a direct transformation of the value of
the coeﬃcient into percentage changes is not possible. However, the sign of the coeﬃcient and its
statistical signiﬁcance provide suﬃcient evidence about the correlation to the dependent variable.
37Skilled employees are employees doing qualiﬁed jobs that require vocational training or the equivalent,
training on the job or relevant professional experience, a university degree or higher education.
38This group includes working proprietors, directors, and managers.
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of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by the variations of the independent
variables, are suﬃciently high: for example, the ﬁrst regression speciﬁcation exhibits a R2-
value of 0.568. The R2-values of the other speciﬁcations are similar. I performed further
robustness tests (but did not report the results): the F-test tests the joint hypothesis that all
coeﬃcients, except the intercept, are equal to zero; the variance-inﬂation-factor (VIF) controls
for multicollinearity, and the Durbin-Watson-test controls for autocorrelation. The test results
provide evidence for a proper model speciﬁcation. This is also supported by the fact that the
estimated coeﬃcients have the expected signs from an economic point of view. Furthermore,
I also eliminated intragroup correlation and corrected biased standard errors.39
How do the results from regression analysis compare to ﬁndings from descriptive statistics?
Despite a few exceptions, the results are in line with each other: plants that merge exhibit a
statistically signiﬁcantly higher pre-merger productivity compared to non-merging plants. This
points to a self-selection of more productive plants into merger activity, even if I control for other
plant characteristics. However, regression does not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant productivity
diﬀerential for the subgroup of non-horizontal mergers, which may be due to the small number
of observations. A further diﬀerence between descriptive statistics and regression analysis
are the magnitudes of the productivity diﬀerential in t = 1: in regression analysis, they are
clearly smaller compared to descriptive statistics, and this is obviously due to several control
variables which are correlated to a plant's productivity. The results from descriptive statistics
and regression analysis do not point to a statistically signiﬁcant productivity change over time,
except for targets: regression estimates a statistically signiﬁcant productivity decrease in t = 4.
The coeﬃcients from control variables are mostly in line with ﬁndings from descriptive statistics.
3.4.4 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching
The objective of this paper is to analyze self-selection of plants into merger activity, and
the causality between M&A and a plant's productivity. The regression analysis from above
makes it possible to prove correlations between variables, but it is not able to unambiguously
detect causality. Even if correlation is a necessary condition for causality, it is not a suﬃcient
one (Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber, 2010). For this, I apply a diﬀerent estimation
approach in order to analyze causal eﬀects.
39In a panel context, observations on the same plant may be correlated in diﬀerent time periods,
but observations on diﬀerent plants are not correlated (Baum, Schaﬀer, and Stillman, 2003). This
intragroup correlation can bias standard errors and provide false information about the statistical
signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients. Therefore, I eliminated intragroup correlation by clustering observations
of the same plants in order to yield adjusted standard errors.
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The fundamental evaluation problem: The problem for the empirical modeling is this:
even if a plant exhibits a higher productivity growth after M&A, there must not necessarily be
a causality between M&A and productivity growth. The reason may also be that plants with
certain characteristics, e.g. higher productivity, self-select in M&A activity, and would have
experienced a higher productivity growth even in the absence of M&A. For this reason, it would
be desirable to compare both outcomes for the same plant, but the latter scenario cannot be
observed. Formally,40 this is:
∆ = Yi(1)−Yi(0). (5)
Y represents the productivity outcome. Hence, Yi(1) is the post-merger productivity if plant i
merged, and Yi(0) if the same plant had not merged. D is a treatment variable with D = 1 if
the plant merged, and D = 0 if the plant had not merged. However, there is no data for Yi(0)
because it is the missing counterfactual.
The observation of the individual treatment eﬀect is not possible. Thus, the micro-
econometric evaluation literature (e.g. Caliendo, 2006; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd, 1997) deﬁnes a (population) average treatment eﬀect (ATT) which is
ATT = E[Y(1)|D = 1]− E[Y(0)|D = 1]. (6)
Causal inference depends on the second term E[Y(0)|D = 1] which cannot be observed,
because it describes the expected productivity of the group of merged plants if they had not
merged. Taking E[Y(0)|D = 0], the expected productivity of control plants, as alternative is
possible as long as plants randomly assign to the group of non-merging plants. However, in non-
experimental data, it is most likely that there is some sort of selection, i.e. that components that
determine the decision to merge, also determine the productivity outcome (Caliendo, 2006).
Estimations based on a simple comparison of both groups would then be seriously biased.
For this, matching techniques as developed by Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), and Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith (1999), are able to construct a valid control group in order to eliminate
the endogeneity bias.41 With this approach every merged plant is matched with a "statistical
twin" that had not merged, i.e. the matching partners are as similar as possible in relevant
characteristics prior to the merger. Remaining diﬀerences in the productivity outcome are then
caused by the merger.
The method requires that selection is only on observables, i.e. conditioning on the values
40The notations are similar to Caliendo (2006).
41See Caliendo (2006) for a comprehensive introduction to the method of propensity score matching.
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of a set of observable characteristics X which are not aﬀected by the merger decision, the
productivity outcome of both groups would be the same in the absence of M&A (Lechner,
1999). This is also known as the "conditional independence assumption" (CIA). Moreover, the
"common support condition" ensures that propensity scores of both groups overlap, and all
treated have a counterpart in the control group. Hence, only individuals which are suﬃciently
similar to each other will be matched (Caliendo, 2006). Additionally, the Stable Unit-Treatment
Value Assumption (SUTVA) states that the behavior of one individual has no impact on the
behavior of another individual.
Since the matching partners are compared with respect to several observable characteristics
X, a dimensionality problem arises. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that the use of a
propensity score P(X) as a single index is also suﬃcient: it is a measure of the plant's probability
to merge conditional on observed characteristics X. The ATT can now be estimated as
ATT = E[Y(1)|D = 1, P(X)]− E[Y(0)|D = 0, P(X)]. (7)
Estimation of the propensity score: The propensity score is estimated with a probit
or logit model.42 I use a probit model which consists of a dummy variable for merger activity
as a dependent variable (with value one if plants merged and zero otherwise), and a set of
explaining variables which have to fulﬁll the CIA. The explanatory variables are expected to
determine the plant's choice for M&A and the productivity outcome simultaneously, and they
are all measured in t = 1. There are diﬀerent opinions about the correct number of variables:
Rubin and Thomas (1996) suggest that variables should only be excluded if they are not related
to the outcome or if they have no relevance. In contrast, Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd
(1998), Augurzky and Schmidt (2001), and Bryson, Dorsett, and Purdon (2002) yield better
estimation results with a smaller set of variables. The latter argue that including insigniﬁcant
variables leads to a less exact estimation of the propensity score. Here, I follow the arguments
of Bryson, Dorsett, and Purdon (2002) and use less variables.43 Nevertheless, the objective of
the matching process is to balance the covariates and not to obtain an exact estimation of the
propensity score (Caliendo, 2006).
I perform a probit regression including all treated observations, and also for all four sub-
42Both models usually yield similar results (Caliendo, 2006).
43I performed several probit models with diﬀerent numbers of variables to address the arguments about
the proper number of explaining variables. The results that were most robust are based on this model
speciﬁcation.
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groups:
P(MAit=2 = 1) = F(labor productivityit=1, size dummiesit=1,
legal f ormit=1, locationit=1, industry dummiesit=1, year dummiesit=1). (8)
The choice of the explanatory variables is determined by the theoretical and empirical literature
about acquisitions, e.g. from Girma and Görg (2007), Margolis (2006a), Harris and Robinson
(2002), and Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2002a). I include a variable for the
logarithm of labor productivity in order to address the argument that only better performing
plants are able to acquire, as well as the cherry-picking-argument which states that acquirers
only buy the best performing targets. Moreover, empirical evidence shows that size is an
important determinant for M&A (e.g. Girma and Görg, 2007). In addition, I include dummies
for legal forms, for the location in East Germany, for diﬀerent industries, and for diﬀerent years.
Table 3.5: Probit regression (dependent variable: M&A dummy)
Variables All (1) Acquirers (2) Targets (3) Horizontal (4) Non-horiz. (5)
log. Productivity in t=1 1.257*** 1.753*** 1.018*** 1.468*** 1.019***
(8.105) (6.837) (5.037) (6.344) (3.734)
Employees 20-49 (D) -0.458 -0.156 -0.819* -0.201 -0.783*
(-1.462) (-0.362) (-1.872) (-0.431) (-1.683)
Employees 50-99 (D) -0.631* -0.450 -1.019** -0.603 -1.913**
(-1.926) (-0.959) (-2.367) (-1.227) (-2.400)
Employees 100-299 (D) 0.029 0.741* -0.601* 0.660 -0.916**
(0.107) (1.829) (-1.751) (1.616) (-2.104)
Employees 300-499 (D) 0.409 1.252** -0.006 1.271** -0.132
(1.093) (2.286) (-0.013) (2.364) (-0.222)
Employees >=500 (D) 1.766*** 2.585*** 1.253*** 2.413*** 0.958*
(5.410) (5.130) (3.279) (4.841) (1.891)
Legal form "Limited" (D) -0.049 0.072 -0.207 -0.128 -0.073
(-0.212) (0.246) (-0.622) (-0.404) (-0.157)
Legal form "Limited by shares" (D) 1.442*** 1.869*** 0.978* 1.712*** 0.865
(4.144) (4.404) (1.905) (3.962) (1.163)
Location in East Germany (D) 0.757*** 0.764*** 0.871*** 0.985*** 0.869**
(3.910) (2.868) (3.347) (3.584) (2.275)
Constant -14.134*** -20.159*** -11.970*** -16.852*** -11.771***
(-8.057) (-6.778) (-5.348) (-6.452) (-3.726)
Observations 622 567 499 540 441
Pseudo-R2 0.496 0.584 0.423 0.552 0.386
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (D) means variable is a dummy. The reference
category for employees is "Employees 1-19", and for legal form it is "Partnership, individually-owned, public, and others".
Regressions also include dummies for sectors and years. The reduced number of observations is due to missing data for
several variables. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel, M&A DATABASE St. Gallen.
The results are shown in table 3.5. The ﬁrst column presents estimations for the whole
group of treated. The coeﬃcient44 of the productivity variable is positive, of high magnitude,
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. This means, the higher a plant's productivity, the
more likely it merges. The coeﬃcients of the dummies for diﬀerent size categories have to be
44The interpretation of coeﬃcients in binary treatment models is more diﬃcult than in linear regression
models (see Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber, 2010). However, the magnitude and sign of
the coeﬃcient provide suﬃcient information about the impact of the dependent variable.
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interpreted with respect to the reference category (number of employees <20): the negative
coeﬃcient of the dummy for employment size of 50-99 is statistically signiﬁcant. Plants with
employees of 500 and more have a statistically signiﬁcantly higher probability to merge. If
plants have legal form "Limited by shares", their probability to merge statistically signiﬁcantly
increases. Finally, if plants are located in East Germany, they are more likely to be involved
in M&A. A McFadden's pseudo-R2 of 0.496 is suﬃciently high, and implies that around half
of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by the regression.45 The results of the
regression speciﬁcations for subgroups are similar with some exceptions, in particular for the
subgroup of non-horizontal mergers. Moreover, they conﬁrm that plants that acquire others
are better performers, and targets are cherries.
Figure 3.3: Distribution of propensity scores for treated and control group
Finally, these probit estimations generate a propensity score P(X) for each observation,
expressing the pre-merger probability of being involved in M&A activity in t = 2. Figure 3.3
presents a graphical illustration of the distribution of propensity scores for the groups of treated
and controls:46 the distribution is diﬀerent for both groups, and matching partners with similar
propensity scores are rare for certain ranges. The matching quality suﬀers if treated with high
propensity scores are matched with controls having low propensity scores, and vice versa.47
Thus, when pairing treated with control plants, it has to be taken into account that the ATT
is only deﬁned for the region of common support as mentioned above. However, this does also
45Values above 0.2 are considered as acceptable, and values of 0.4 and above can be considered as
good (Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber, 2010).
46The distributions of propensity scores for subgroups of treated are not reported, but they look similar.
47Several treated observations exist with a propensity score close to one. This may be because plants
with a certain combination of characteristics exhibit a strong merger activity. The same is true for
several controls with a propensity score close to zero.
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mean that causal inference is restricted to these observations.
Matching algorithm: It is not very likely to ﬁnd a matching partner with exactly the same
score because the propensity score is a continuous variable. For this, a neighborhood has to
be deﬁned, and each control has to be assigned with a speciﬁc weight. A general form of the
treatment eﬀect is
∆ =
1
N1
∑
i∈I1
[
Y1i − ∑
j∈I0
WN0(i, j)Y
0
j
]
. (9)
I1 and I0 are the respective groups of treated and control plants. N1 and N0 are the number
of plants in the treatment group I1 and control group I0. WN0(i, j) is the weight of a control j
from the control group which is assigned to a treated plant i. For each treated plant i the sum
of the weights of all controls j is equal to one: ∑jWN0(i, j) = 1, ∀ i. For every treated plant
i with propensity score Pi, a neighborhood C(Pi) is deﬁned, and neighbors of i are controls
j ∈ I0 with Pi ∈ C(Pi). Y1i is the outcome of a treated plant i, and Y0j is the outcome of a
control j.
There are several matching algorithms which diﬀer with respect to the deﬁnition of the
neighborhood, and the weights assigned to the controls. In larger samples, the results from
diﬀerent algorithms should be similar (Smith and Todd, 2005a). However, if samples are smaller,
the choice of the algorithm is important. For this, I tested diﬀerent algorithms48 and achieved
the most robust results - see below - with kernel matching. Whereas other algorithms only
use one or few controls as matching partners for each single treated observation, the kernel
algorithm uses all individuals j from the control group as neighbors for each single treated i.
Thus, the neighborhood in kernel matching contains all observations in the control group I0:
C(Pi) = {I0} (10)
The weights of controls j depend on their distance to the treated i, i.e. controls which are
closer receive a higher weight than others:
WKMN0 (i, j) =
Gij
∑k∈I0 Gik
, (11)
where Gik = G[(Pi − Pj)/aN0 ] is a kernel function49 that downweighs observations j which are
48I also applied nearest neighbor matching with diﬀerent numbers of neighbors, caliper and radius caliper
matching with diﬀerent maximum distances of propensity scores between treated and controls, and I
modiﬁed all of them with respect to a replacement option for controls.
49For an introduction to kernel density estimation see Fahrmeir, Künstler, Pigeot, and Tutz (2009).
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distant from the treated i. aN0 is a bandwidth parameter which impacts the form of the kernel
function. I use a kernel based on a Gaussian normal function and a bandwidth of 0.06.50
In smaller datasets like here, kernel matching has an important advantage: compared to
other algorithms, it uses more information from a lager number of controls that ﬂow into the
parameter estimation. Hence, this may reduce the variance of the estimator. However, the
algorithm may also lead to bad matches, because all controls are used as matching partners,
even those which lie far away. For this reason, it is important to impose a common support
condition (Caliendo, 2006). In addition, I also apply a trimming condition as suggested by Smith
and Todd (2005a): if there are no controls for some intervals within the region of common
support, which is the case according to ﬁgure 3.3, the respective treated observations will be
excluded.51
After conditioning on observables, there may still be diﬀerences between the productivity
outcomes of treated and control plants. They can be due to systematic diﬀerences in both
groups because of selection into the treatment based on unmeasured characteristics (Smith
and Todd, 2005a). For this reason, I combine propensity score matching with a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences (DiD) estimator, i.e. I compare changes over time instead of levels. This eliminates
unobserved time-invariant diﬀerences between both groups, relaxes the strong assumption of
selection on observables, and improves the quality of the results signiﬁcantly (Blundell and
Costa Dias, 2000).
Under the consideration of the common support condition, the estimator can be imple-
mented as
∆DiDATT =
1
N1
∑
i∈I1∩SP
[
(Y1it=4 −Y0it′)− ∑
j∈I0∩SP
W(i, j)(Y0jt=4 −Y0jt′)
]
, (12)
with SP denoting the region of common support, and t′ being either t = 1 or t = 3, because I
analyze growth rates between t = 1 and t = 4, and between t = 3 and t = 4.
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) discussed kernel matching estimators.
50There are several types of kernel functions like Gaussian (normal), biweight, epanechnikov, uniform,
and tricube kernel. DiNardo and Tobias (2001) stated that the choice of the kernel function is of
minor interest. Silverman (1986) and Pagan and Ullah (1999) argued that the choice of the bandwidth
parameter aﬀects the results more strongly.
51If, for example, the common support is from 0.1 to 0.9, but there are no controls between 0.3 and
0.4, the trimming condition excludes the treated observations within this range. In other words: the
region of common support only consists for those values of propensity scores which have a positive
density within the distribution of both groups. If the density is exactly zero, the propensity scores
will be excluded. To ensure that the densities are strictly positive, a further percentage of propensity
score values - here 10% - with a very low density are also excluded (Caliendo, 2006).
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Results: For the matching process, I use the STATA-module PSMATCH2 of Leuven and
Sianesi (2003). The results of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching estima-
tions are shown in table 3.6. It displays the average percentage productivity change for treated
and control, the ATT which describes the average diﬀerence between both groups, the standard
error of the ATT, as well as t-statistics. In order to test the statistical signiﬁcance of the ATT,
I apply bootstrapping with 150 replications to estimate standard errors again.52 For this, the
table presents the respective p-values, indicating whether the ATT is statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero or not.
Table 3.6: ATT for labor productivity changes
Labor productivity changes between t = 3 and t = 4:
Group of treated Treated Controls ATT S.E. T-statistic p-value
All 0.017 0.008 0.009 0.040 0.22 0.779
Acquirers -0.009 0.014 -0.023 0.047 -0.49 0.502
Targets -0.005 0.008 -0.013 0.037 -0.36 0.677
Horizontal 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.044 0.03 0.973
Non-horizontal 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.049 0.04 0.974
Labor productivity changes between t = 1 and t = 4:
Group of treated Treated Controls ATT S.E. T-statistic p-value
All 0.072 -0.064 0.135 0.060 2.26 0.019
Acquirers 0.091 -0.081 0.171 0.093 1.84 0.047
Targets 0.030 -0.044 0.074 0.044 1.67 0.214
Horizontal 0.065 -0.065 0.131 0.106 1.23 0.195
Non-horizontal 0.008 -0.007 0.015 0.058 0.26 0.761
Notes: p-values are estimated for bootstrapped standard errors with 150 replications.
The upper part of the table presents the estimated results for percentage changes for the
matched sample in the post-merger period. The ﬁrst row displays the results for the treatment
group including all treated observations ("All"). Average changes for treated and controls are
both positive, and the ATT is 0.009, i.e. plants that merge exhibit a productivity growth that is
0.9% higher compared to control plants. However, this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at any acceptable level. This implies that M&A obviously does not aﬀect
the merging plants' post-merger productivity growth. The estimated ATTs are negative for
acquirers and targets, and positive for the subgroups of horizontal and non-horizontal M&A,
but none of them is statistically signiﬁcant.
52Abadie and Imbens (2008) argue that no formal justiﬁcation has been provided to use bootstrapping
in the context of matching. In contrast, many recent empirical studies applying matching also use
bootstrapping (e.g. Girma, Görg, and Wagner, 2009).
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The lower part of the table presents the results for percentage changes for the total period.
Starting with the treatment group including all treated observations, the average productivity
change is positive for treated, and negative for matched controls, leading to a positive ATT
of 0.135, which is also statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%-level. This result implies that M&A
positively impacts the merging plant's productivity growth over the whole observation period.
For subgroups, productivity changes are all positive, and the respective ATTs are also positive.
For the subgroup of acquirers the ATT is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%-level, but not for the
other subgroups. This implies that the eﬀect measured in the treatment group that included
all plants results from the subgroup of acquirers.
Robustness tests: The matching literature has developed several robustness tests in order
to assess the quality of results. First, the objective of matching is to balance the covariates, i.e.
matched observations should be similar. This means that after matching there should be no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the mean values of all explanatory variables between the treated and
the control group. This can be analyzed by the standardized bias by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985) which is given by
SB = 100
(X¯1 − X¯0)√
0.5[V1(X) +V0(X)]
. (13)
After matching, the standardized bias is deﬁned as
SBM = 100
(X¯M1 − X¯M0 )√
0.5[VM1 (X) +V
M
0 (X)]
. (14)
X¯1 and X¯0 are the mean values for a speciﬁc variable of the treatment and control group and
V1 and V0 are the respective variances. X¯M1 , X¯
M
0 , V
M
1 and V
M
0 are the corresponding values
after matching.
The upper part of table 3.7 reports the mean standardized bias (MSB) for all variables
before and after matching for the kernel algorithm. With respect to the matching procedure
that includes all variables the MSB is approximately 8. There is no clear benchmark for the
MSB which indicates if a sample is balanced or not. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggested
that values for the standardized bias should be smaller than 20. However, in most empirical
studies a bias reduction below 3 or 5% is seen as suﬃcient (Caliendo, 2006). Hence, one can
conclude that the balancing was acceptable, but not ideal, which has to be kept in mind for
the interpretation of the results. The values of the MSB for the subgroups are similar with
values of 9 for the groups of acquirers and horizontal merging plants, and 10 for the subgroup
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of targets. The group of non-horizontal M&A exhibits a poor value of 17.
Table 3.7: Robustness tests
Mean standardized bias (MSB)
Group of treated Mean/Std. Err. Before matching After matching
All Mean 32.168 7.965
Std. Dev. 29.426 5.066
Acquirers Mean 34.000 9.418
Std. Dev. 33.431 6.020
Targets Mean 34.544 10.846
Std. Dev. 27.250 7.428
Horizontal Mean 33.122 9.118
Std. Dev. 30.093 5.645
Non-horizontal Mean 33.191 17.361
Std. Dev. 25.641 12.948
Common Support
Group of treated Sample Oﬀ support On support Total
All Untreated 0 499 499
Treated 46 77 123
Acquirers Untreated 0 492 492
Treated 35 40 75
Targets Untreated 0 451 451
Treated 22 26 48
Horizontal Untreated 0 473 473
Treated 34 33 67
Non-horizontal Untreated 0 421 421
Treated 10 10 20
Pseudo-R2 and log likelihood test
Group of treated Sample Pseudo-R2 LR chi2 p>chi2
All Unmatched 0.496 307.02 0.000
Matched 0.040 8.61 0.979
Acquirers Unmatched 0.584 258.61 0.000
Matched 0.054 5.90 0.994
Targets Unmatched 0.423 133.79 0.000
Matched 0.056 4.05 0.999
Horizontal Unmatched 0.552 223.41 0.000
Matched 0.037 3.34 1.000
Non-horizontal Unmatched 0.386 62.91 0.000
Matched 0.272 7.10 0.851
In addition, I also reported the results for the region of common support. The middle part
of table 3.7 shows that a large fraction of treated observations - almost 40% - lies outside
the region of common support, i.e. these observations are not used for the estimation. In the
subgroups, the fraction of treated lying outside the region of common support is even higher,
up to approximately 50%. The exclusion of a high fraction of treated from the analysis due
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to the imposition of a common support condition creates diﬃculties for the interpretation of
the results (Lechner, 2008): ﬁrst, useful information is ignored because treatment eﬀects could
still be estimated outside the region of common support. Moreover, if treatment eﬀects are
heterogeneous inside and outside the common support, estimated treatment eﬀects may no
longer correspond to the original parameter of interest. Consequently, the expressive power
and generality of these matching results is reduced, and inference is only valid for the region
of common support. This means that estimations only provide information about what would
have happened to a merged plant's productivity growth if the same plant had not merged.
There are further indicators for the quality of the results: pseudo-R2, likelihood ratio-
test (LR), and respective p-values are calculated for the matched sample. If matching was
successful, there is no diﬀerence in the covariates between subsamples of treated and controls,
and a probit estimation of only matched ﬁrms has no explanatory power (Sianesi, 2004). This
would be reﬂected by a low pseudo-R2 value. Moreover, a low value for the LR-test and a
p-value close to value one also indicate that the matched sample has no explanatory power.
According to the numbers displayed in the lower part of table 3.7, the results are satisfying,
except for the subgroup of non-horizontal M&A.
The conclusion from matching is that the results are in line with ﬁndings from descriptive
statistics and regression analysis with respect to post-merger productivity eﬀects: there is no
evidence for a merger-induced change between t = 3 and t = 4. With respect to changes
between t = 1 and t = 4, there are two diﬀerences to the results from descriptive statistics and
regression: ﬁrst, matching estimated a positive causal eﬀect on plants' productivity between
t = 1 and t = 4 for the treatment group including all treated. After diﬀerentiating between
subgroups, the eﬀect obviously originates from acquirers. This eﬀect was neither estimated in
descriptive statistics nor in regression analysis. Second, regression estimated a negative change
on targets' productivity in t = 4, and this estimation is not conﬁrmed by matching. The
diﬀerences in the results can be explained as follows: the estimated eﬀects of the matching
method only refer to those treated which ﬁnd comparable controls, i.e. which lie within the
region of common support as explained above. In contrast, and due to its functional form, a
regression produces estimates even if there are no untreated comparables to treated, i.e. the
functional form ﬁlls in the missing data and extrapolates for those treated without comparable
controls (Caliendo, 2006).
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3.5 Conclusion - what do we learn?
This study analyzes the causal eﬀect of M&A on labor productivity of German plants that
merged between 1996 and 2005. I diﬀerentiate between acquirers, targets, horizontally, and
non-horizontally merging plants. The ﬁndings provide strong evidence for a self-selection of
plants into merger activity, as already found in earlier studies (e.g. McGuckin and Ngyuen,
1995; Salis, 2008). Productivity is signiﬁcantly higher for merged plants prior to the merger in
all subgroups.53 With respect to acquirers, this implies that only better performing plants are
able to acquire other plants, e.g. due to ﬁxed or other costs accompanied by a merger. Based on
these estimations, it is less likely that poor performers see the acquisition of other ﬁrms as a way
to improve their own performance. The ﬁndings also show that acquirers buy over-performing
targets (cherries). This suggests that the likely motivation behind M&A are potential gains
from synergies, but there is no support for the matching theory of ownership from Lichtenberg
and Siegel (1992a), and the theory of ineﬃcient management from Scharfstein (1988) and
Jensen (1988) which both imply that targets are poor performers prior to the merger.
What about causal eﬀects? First, with respect to post-merger changes between t = 3 and
t = 4, I do not ﬁnd any eﬀects for all subgroups. This is in line with existing studies, e.g. from
Bellak, Pfaﬀermayr, and Wild (2006), or Salis (2008). Hence, it can be concluded that there
is no statistically signiﬁcant post-merger productivity change in German plants after domestic
M&A. Second, matching estimates a weak positive eﬀect for acquirers with respect to the total
period between t = 1 and t = 4. However, the common support condition imposed in matching
excludes a large fraction of observations that lie outside the region of common support. Hence,
the generality of the results is limited, and inference is restricted to observations within this
region. For the interpretation of the matching results, this means that the productivity of
acquirers increases after M&A in comparison to a non-merging plant that is identical (or at
least similar) in relevant pre-merger characteristics, and the productivity increase is only caused
by the merger. In other words: acquirers face a higher productivity growth as if they would
have had not merged. The positive productivity eﬀects on acquirers from mergers suggest
that ﬁrms acquire others in order to increase eﬃciency and to gain synergies, e.g. in the form
of a reorganization of business structures, or from adapting eﬃciency improving technical or
organizational systems from the target. These ﬁndings support the arguments from Dunning
53The results for the subgroup of non-horizontal M&A are not fully in line with the results for other
subgroups, e.g. the results from regression do not conﬁrm a higher pre-merger productivity. However,
the results for non-horizontally merging plants are not robust due to a small number of observations.
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(1998) who states that resources ﬂow from acquired to parent companies.54 The fact that
I only ﬁnd eﬀects in acquiring plants over the observation period t = 1 to t = 4, but not
between t = 3 and t = 4 suggests that productivity changes take place immediately around
the merger. There are no eﬀects for targets which imply that they do not obviously gain from
the acquirers' advantages like technology, organization, etc. This does also not support the
argument from Mueller and Sirower (2003) who state that synergy gains are equally distributed
between acquirers and targets.
The estimations for the subgroup of acquirers are mostly in line with newer empirical ﬁnd-
ings that showed a tendency towards productivity improvements (e.g. Girma, Thompson, and
Wright, 2006), or that found no eﬀects (e.g. Bellak, Pfaﬀermayr, and Wild, 2006). The ﬁnd-
ings contradict earlier studies which estimated negative eﬀects (e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer,
1987), and diﬀerent explanations are possible, e.g. better data availability or improved econo-
metric methods controlling for selection bias. Alternatively, my estimation results may also be
a cautious indication that fewer and fewer acquirers can aﬀord to merge for non-proﬁt maxi-
mizing reasons in an economic environment that becomes more and more competitive through
internalization. Finally, the results legitimate the criticism of "comparing the incomparables"
mentioned at the beginning of my paper: only a diﬀerentiation into subgroups shows that the
causal eﬀect that was estimated from matching for the treatment group including all treated is
caused by the subgroup of acquirers.
54However, Dunning's (1998) arguments refer to foreign acquisitions.
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A Remarks on the dataset
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on a combined dataset of the IAB Establishment
Panel and the M&A DATABASE from St. Gallen, by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung GmbH
München.55 In an earlier pilot study, Bellmann and Kirchhof (2006) showed that the IAB
Establishment Panel is capable of an analysis of the eﬀects of mergers. The focus of their
study was on the eﬀects on employment, and the data about mergers was from Thomson ONE
Banker. Since Thomson ONE Banker only includes ﬁrms of a larger size, the M&A DATABASE
also includes small and medium-size ﬁrms, and thus, is more comprehensive. In addition, the
M&A DATABASE also lists information about the seller of each deal56 (Thomson ONE Banker
only reports about buyer and target ﬁrms), location, number of employees, sales, etc.
The treatment group: The observation period for plants that merged is from January
1996 to December 2005. The creation of the treatment group was carried out in several steps
by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung. First, in order to combine both datasets, companies in
the M&A DATABASE were compared to plants in the IAB Establishment Panel and classiﬁed
according to the degree of similarity with respect to name, location, and sector. Next, merged
plants were only kept if they were surveyed at least once before and once after the merger.
This led to some complications due to the set up of the survey: information about employees
refers to June 30th of the respective year, whereas information about sales, investments, etc.
refer to the previous year. To take these circumstances into account, the following deﬁnition
was chosen:
 If M&A was between January 1st and June 30th of year T, the survey in year T was
considered to be conducted after M&A, even if some information refers to a point of
time before M&A.
 If M&A was between July 1st and December 31th of year T, the survey in year T was
considered to be conducted before M&A, even if some information refers to a point of
time after M&A.
55Two methodology reports exist about the creation of the treatment group and the control group
from TNS Infratest: Beschäftigungseﬀekte von Fusionen und Übernahmen - Methodenbericht Un-
tersuchungsgruppe (März 2007); Beschäftigungseﬀekte von Fusionen und Übernahmen - Methoden-
bericht Untersuchungsgruppe (December 2007).
56Nevertheless, this study does not analyze the eﬀects on sellers because the number of observations
is too small.
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This restriction reduced the number of plants which were found in both datasets to 7,801.
According to the degree of similarity of plants in both datasets, observations are distributed
across four diﬀerent categories:
 Quality class 1: name, location, and sector match exactly (1,426);
 Quality class 2: name, location, and superior sector match exactly (146);
 Quality class 3: name and sector match exactly; multi-plant ﬁrm (5,961);
 Quality class 4: name and location match exactly (268).
These 7,801 merger cases consist of 958 diﬀerent plants in the IAB Establishment Panel.
This is because one plant may be involved in several mergers within the observation period.
The control group: Next, a group of control plants that had not merged between 1980
and 2005 had to be found. These controls must be as similar as possible to plants in the
treatment group. Each of the 7,801 treatment observations exhibits an individual combination
of sector, size, legal form, and location in West or East Germany. Therefore, TNS Infratest
Sozialforschung deﬁned 2,143 categories which diﬀer with respect to these characteristics, and
each of the 7,801 treatment observations was assigned to one of these 2,143 categories. Now,
the objective was to ﬁnd controls for each category. This is, within a category, treated and
controls are homogeneous with respect to the characteristics. An example: there are three
treated plants which all belong to the agriculture sector, have less than 10 employees, have
"GmbH" as legal form, and are located in West Germany. The combination of these speciﬁc
characteristics constitutes one of the 2,143 categories. After that, three control plants should
also be identiﬁed which exhibit the same characteristics of this speciﬁc category.
30,110 plants from the IAB Establishment Panel were identiﬁed as statistical twins to
treated plants (with respect to sector, size, legal form, and location in West or East Germany),
and they may potentially act as a control. Within these 30,110 observations, several plants
appear more often if they were surveyed for the IAB Establishment Panel for several years.
The challenge was to identify those "true" controls within the 30,110 potential controls, that
is, plants for which we can be sure that they have not been involved in any M&A activity.
Hence, plants which already appeared in the treatment group were excluded, as well as plants
which were similar to plants from the M&A DATABASE, but which were not in the treatment
group, because they merged outside the reference period between 1996 and 2005. This step
excludes 1,204 from the 30,110 observations. Then, plants which were not surveyed at least
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twice between 1993, the starting year of the IAB Establishment Panel and 2006,57 the end of
the observation period, were dropped.
The rest of the remaining 27,676 potential controls had to be checked manually. As a ﬁrst
check, plants were eliminated if their name appeared in the M&A DATABASE. In addition,
the dataset "Markus" from Bureau van Dijk also provided information about M&A activities
of plants. Finally, for most plants websites were used as a source of information about merger
activity.
As stated above, the number of treated should equal the number of controls within each
of the 2,143 categories. Hence, for each category, potential controls were checked for whether
they were "true" controls. This was repeated until the number of true controls equaled the
number of treated, and the remaining potential controls for the respective category were no
longer considered. However, for several categories no controls could have been found, because
potential controls have all merged.58 Figure A1 presents a graphical illustration of this process.
In total, 12,755 plants were checked in 400 hours of research by TNS Infratest. As a result,
1,009 controls from 291 diﬀerent plants appear in the control group. This is because a plant
can act as a control over several years and for diﬀerent categories as well. The structure of the
control group is similar to the structure of the treated group with respect to sector, size, legal
form, and location, but controls were not involved in any merger activity during the reference
period.
A note on sector classiﬁcation: The 2-digit sector classiﬁcation of the IAB Establish-
ment Panel follows the NACE code (Nomenclature Générale des Activités Économiques). The
NACE code changed in 1999 and in 2003, leading to diﬀerent classiﬁcations of plants over time.
Whereas the classiﬁcation change in 2003 is not a problem, the break in 1999 is more severe.
Due to this, I transfered the sector classiﬁcation of the year 2000 to the years before in order to
achieve a consistent sector classiﬁcation of plants. However, this leads to a drawback if plants
changed sectors due to a merger: they may not be classiﬁed correctly. I checked this aspect
manually and could not identify incorrect classiﬁcations.
57The observation period for treated plants ends in December 2005. To gain information about controls
for the year 2005, the 2006 survey is relevant, because several questions refer to the year before, e.g.
sales.
58For example, almost no controls were found in the ﬁnancial sector.
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Figure A1: Graphical illustration of the creation
of the control group by TNS Infratest
Category 1
True control
Affected
by M&A
Not checked
any more
True control
True control
Controls
Potential controls
Treated
Category 2
Affected
by M&A
Affected
by M&A
Affected
by M&A
Controls
Potential controls
Treated:
N = 7,801
Controls: 
N = 1,009
Potential controls:  
N = 30,110
Treated
Category 2,143
…
Note: the large boxes represent diﬀerent categories. In each of the 2,134 cate-
gories, plants are homogeneous with respect to sector, size classiﬁcation, location
in West or East Germany and legal form. The number of controls should equal the
number of treated in each category. Therefore, 30,110 potential controls from the
IAB Establishment Panel, which represent statistical twins to the treated, were
assigned to these diﬀerent categories. Then, each potential control was checked
for whether it had merged since 1980. If this was true, the respective plant was
identiﬁed as a "true" control. If, however, a potential control had merged since
1980, it was discarded. If the required number of controls was found, remaining
controls were not considered anymore (category 1). It could also be that no
controls were found for a certain category (category 2). Finally, 1,009 controls
were identiﬁed.
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B The observation period
The four-year observation period: The calculation of a plant's productivity from the
IAB Establishment Panel creates some diﬃculties which will be brieﬂy explained here. There
are some questions in the IAB Establishment Panel wave, e.g. about numbers of employees,
which refer to June 30th of the same year the survey is carried out. For example, the survey of
the year 1999 delivers information about the number of employees the plants employed at June
30th 1999. Other questions, e.g. about sales or investments, refer to the year before. These
diﬀerent reference dates create some challenges which are relevant for the empirical setting.
Consider an example shown in ﬁgure B1: M&A takes place between January 1st and
December 31th 2000 (t = 2). The analysis starts with the observation of the data prior to the
merger, i.e. in year 1999 (t = 1). The 1999 wave asks for the number of employees on June
30th 1999. However, to get information about sales in 1999, the survey of 2000 provides the
respective information. The same applies to data for the periods t = 2 to t = 4.
Figure B1: Illustration of the observation period
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For the calculation of post-merger growth-rates, data from years t = 3 and t = 4 is
needed: imagine, M&A occurs in September 2000. Then, labor productivity (deﬁned as sales
per employee) for t = 2 is calculated from data before and after the merger, in particular,
from employment data prior to the merger (June 30th) and - depending on the end of the
ﬁnancial year - from sales data after the merger (e.g. December 31th). This may lead to
biased estimates for changes between t = 2 and t = 3. Thus, calculations of post-merger
growth rates seem to be more reliable for the period t = 3 to t = 4, because numbers of both
years refer to post-merger time. Alternatively, I could change the observation window for M&A
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activity to July 1st 1999 and June 30th 2000. But this may lead to a biased calculation of
labor productivity in t = 1, because employment data refers to a point of time prior to M&A,
but sales may refer to a point of time after M&A.
In addition to changes between t = 3 and t = 4, I also analyze changes between t = 1 and
t = 4. This is because M&A may quite quickly (within several weeks or months) aﬀect labor
productivity rather than one or two years later. Imagine M&A occurs in January 2000 (t = 2).
For an estimation of post-merger changes in productivity, data for year 2001 (t = 3) refers to
June 30th in 2001 (employment), i.e. almost one and a half years later, and to December 31th
in 2001 (sales), i.e. almost two years later. The same applies to data for year 2002 (t = 4),
that is, data refers to two and a half and three years after the merger. Therefore, the main
eﬀects may not be measured any more. An alternative calculation of changes between years
t = 2 and t = 4 is not a good idea: again, data about employment refers to June 30th and sales
(probably mostly) to December 31th. If the merger occurred between July 1st and December
31th of year t = 2, I would consider pre-merger employment data and post-merger sales data.
The rolling observation window: For my empirical investigation, I use a "rolling ob-
servation window" which is illustrated by ﬁgure B2. For treated, ten four-year windows exist,
the ﬁrst between 1995 and 1998, and the last between 2004 and 2007. Correspondingly, for
controls the ﬁrst four-year window is from 1993 to 1996, and the last is from 2002 to 2005.
Figure B2: Graphical illustration of cohorts
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…
…
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Note: for the ﬁrst cohort in the treatment group, year t = 1 corresponds to 1995, t = 2 to
1996, t = 3 to 1997, and t = 4 to 1998. This applies to all cohorts in both groups analogously.
Chapter 4
Anybody afraid of M&A?
Eﬀects on German plants' employment
and skill-intensity
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4.1 Introduction
News about mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is often accompanied by announcements about
job reductions. For example, unions feared job losses due to a hostile takeover of the German
construction company Hochtief by the Spanish construction company ACS in 2011,1 the in-
ternet company AOL signalized a reduction of employment due to a merger with the online
magazine Huﬃngton Post in 2011,2 the media reported about larger layoﬀs in the German banks
Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank due to their merger in 2009,3 and the same happened when
the German bank HypoVereinsbank and the Italian bank Unicredit merged in 2005.4 These
reports create a picture of M&A as employment-reducing events that impact public optinion
and political debates.
Despite these examples for job reductions after M&A, the research results do not conﬁrm
a negative causality between M&A and employment changes in the merging ﬁrms.5 Instead,
eﬀects are not clear. One explanation for these ambiguous results may be that no typical
merger exists (Tichy, 2001) because mergers are diﬀerent with respect to several dimensions.
Studies exist - see below - which analyzed diﬀerent types of mergers, i.e. horizontal (ﬁrms
which compete in the same market combine), vertical (ﬁrms combine with their supplier), or
conglomerate mergers (ﬁrms of unrelated lines of businesses combine) (Carlton and Perloﬀ,
2005). Moreover, some studies diﬀer with respect to the type of the ﬁrm they considered, i.e.
between acquirers ("acquirers" or "buyer ﬁrms" are ﬁrms which acquire other ﬁrms or plants6),
targets ("targets", "objects", or "acquired" are ﬁrms which are acquired by ﬁrms), and sellers
("sellers" are ﬁrms which sell parts of the overall entity). In addition, the results may diﬀer
because some studies analyzed cross-border M&A while others analyzed domestic M&A, or
because the empirical investigation was based on diﬀerent observation periods, or due to a
diﬀerentiation between ﬁrm- and plant-level. Hence, I suppose that we may be comparing the
incomparable, and thus, should no longer wonder why the results diﬀer. Another explanation of
the ambiguous results may be that studies applied diﬀerent estimation strategies. For example,
measurement errors may emerge because earlier studies simply compared samples of merged
1N24, June 17th 2011: http://www.n24.de/news/newsitem_6983386.html [June 19th 2011].
2Welt Online, March 4th 2011: http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/kultur/article12705115/Kompak
t.html [June 6th 2011].
3Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 1st 2008: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/stellenabbau-nach-b
ankenfusion-bittere-briefe-im-advent-1.691076 [June 18th 2011].
4WirtschaftsWoche, July 29th 2005 http://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen-maerkte/hypovereinsbank-ko
mmt-nicht-zur-ruhe-301728/ [June 18th 2011].
5I use the terms "ﬁrm" and "plant" interchangeably as long as no greater precision is needed.
6I will use the terms "acquirer" or "buyer" interchangeably in this paper.
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and control ﬁrms, not controlling for a potential self-selection of ﬁrms with certain pre-merger
characteristics into M&A activity. Changes in performance parameters were then incorrectly
attributed to the impact of the merger (Girma, Thompson, and Wright, 2006). For this, recent
studies took advantage of newer and more advanced econometric methods which improve
research about questions of causality and self-selection.
Hence, from existing studies it is diﬃcult to draw any conclusions about causalities for the
reasons mentioned above. The objective of my paper is to overcome some of these problems
by distinguishing between buyer and target plants,7 and between horizontal and non-horizontal
(including both vertical and conglomerate) mergers.8 Moreover, I use a matching approach, a
newer estimation method to control for self-selection and identify the average eﬀect of M&A
on employment. I consider all employees, i.e. independent of their liability to social security or
not. In addition, I also analyze changes in the skill-intensity of the merging plant's workforce,
deﬁned as the percentage of skilled employees within the workforce.
To preview my results, I found that plants that merge and plants that do not merge diﬀer
in their pre-merger characteristics. For example, there is a self-selection of larger plants into
M&A activity, and this is true for all subgroups. However, I do not ﬁnd causal eﬀects of M&A
on employment, but there is evidence for an eﬀect of M&A on targets' skill-intensity, creating
a U-shaped skill-intensity development path over time.
This paper is integrated in the existing literature about employment and skill-intensity
performance of merging ﬁrms, taking ﬁrm heterogeneity into account. With respect to M&A
and employment eﬀects, there are studies that estimated a positive impact (e.g. McGuckin and
Nguyen, 2001). In contrast, other studies found negative eﬀects (e.g. Margolis, 2006b), or no
eﬀects (e.g. Bellak, Pfaﬀermayr, and Wild, 2006). The number of studies on the impact of
M&A on ﬁrms' skill-intensity is scarce. The results are also ambiguous, i.e. studies either found
a decrease in high-skilled workers (e.g. Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2003), or a reduction of low-skilled
workers (e.g. Grima, 2004).
I extend the existing literature in a number of ways. First, only very few studies - see below -
that discussed M&A and employment also analyzed possible changes of the plant's educational
mix. Second I use a dataset that has not been used by others as far as I know. The dataset,
which is a combination of the IAB Establishment Panel and the M&A DATABASE St. Gallen
7The number of seller plants in the dataset is too small for a separate analysis.
8Horizontal mergers involve ﬁrms that both operate in the same market, while ﬁrms that merge vertically
or conglomerately operate in diﬀerent market. For this, these mergers are also considered as non-
horizontal (Church, 2004). In my study, a separation between vertical and conglomerate mergers is
not possible because of too few observations.
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contains plants that merged between 1996 and 2005, and also a control group of plants that
have not merged since 1980. It diﬀers from other datasets used for similar research questions
because it allows distinguishing between the types of merging ﬁrms (acquirers and targets)
and the types of mergers (horizontal and non-horizontal). Furthermore, the data includes not
only large ﬁrms and major M&A, but plants and M&A of practically all sizes, and it also
includes plants from diﬀerent industries. In addition, the dataset focuses on domestic M&A,
while most recent studies only analyze foreign acquisitions, even if domestic M&A account for
a large fraction.9 Third, I apply a diﬀerentiated estimation strategy. As usual, I start with
descriptive statistics. Then, in order to control for other variables than M&A that inﬂuence
a plant's employment and skill-intensity, I perform a regression analysis. However, neither
descriptive statistics nor regression analysis are able to reliably detect causality and deal with
the problem of self-selection. For this, I apply a propensity score matching approach developed
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985). A matching method compares a group of merging
plants with a group of plants that had not merged, but which are as similar as possible in
their pre-merger characteristics. Thus, the matching method allows the construction of the
counterfactual situation in which the merger did not occur. To improve the robustness of the
results, I combine matching with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator as suggested by Blundell
and Costa Dias (2000) and Smith and Todd (2005a).
The paper is structured as follows: section 4.2 provides a theoretical background and
presents the results from related literature. Section 4.3 describes the data, and section 4.4
performs diﬀerent estimation strategies: for each strategy, I present the results for employment
eﬀects ﬁrst, and then, describe the results from the empirical investigation of skill-intensity
eﬀects. Section 4.5 summarizes the results from this study.
4.2 Theoretical background and related literature
From pre-merger characteristics of merging ﬁrms, and from estimated eﬀects on employment
and skill-intensity some predictions about the underlying motives for M&A can be inferred.10
One broad strand of literature focuses on managers that merge in order to maximize proﬁts.
In particular, mergers are often motivated by increasing returns to scale. The combination of
several ﬁrms into one ﬁrm can lead to eﬃciency gains through a reduction in the number of
9In Germany, approximately 50% of all mergers are domestic (Spanninger, 2011a).
10See Jansen (2008), Margolis (2006b), Scherer (2002), Tichy (2001), and others for a discussion of
reasons for mergers.
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employees required to maintain the level of production. If eﬃciency gains are achieved through
a reduction of ﬁxed costs in central administration it seems more likely that employees working
in central administration are disproportionately laid oﬀ. These layoﬀs can occur both in the
acquiring and acquired ﬁrms (Margolis, 2006b). If the workers laid oﬀ in central administration
are skilled, one might expect a decrease of the plants' skill-intensity after M&A.
Another prominent explanation for the existence of mergers is the ineﬃcient management
hypothesis (Manne, 1965). It states that ﬁrms acquire poorly performing ﬁrms with managers
that do not maximize shareholder wealth. After the takeover managers will be replaced by
better managers that maximize proﬁts. These are able to realize eﬃciency gains which most
likely include cost economies and labor reductions.
However, in a neoclassical framework employment changes due to M&A must not necessarily
be negative. The eﬀects will also depend on the complementarity of the merged ﬁrms and the
post-merger market position (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright, 2002a). Moreover, there
may be no employment eﬀects if the takeover is a capital investment. Eﬀects may even be
positive if the takeover brings new capital to the target and improves its ﬁnancial possibilities,
for example because investments and innovations can now be realized which could not have
been ﬁnanced before (Bellmann and Kirchhof, 2006).
Synergies from mergers can also come from reorganization processes in the respective ﬁrms.
Reorganization processes include measures like incentive wages, job rotation, restructuring of
departments, etc. which can be implemented in a ﬁrm, and more likely in the target ﬁrm.
These organizational changes can enhance productivity (e.g. Kölling and Schank (2002) or
Bauer (2003) provided empirical evidence) and create new ﬁelds of activities and new qual-
iﬁcation proﬁles (Beckmann, 2000) which may have a positive impact on employment. In
contrast, employment should fall if organizational change leads to a streamlining of production
processes. Thus, there is no clear prediction for employment changes due to a reorganization
process (Bellmann and Kohaut, 1999). With respect to the impact of organizational changes
on the qualiﬁcation structure, Bellmann and Pahnke (2006) argued that diﬀerent measures of
reorganizational changes (e.g. shifts of competences, group work, close contact to customers)
require skills like social and communicative competences, the ability to judge, taking the ini-
tiative, etc. Assuming that skilled rather than unskilled employees are endowed with these
skills, organizational changes should lead to a reduction of the number of employees with lower
qualiﬁcation.11
11Bellmann and Pahnke (2006) conﬁrmed these considerations in their empirical study.
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Shleifer and Summers (1988) argued that a new management is less committed to em-
ployees, and thus, renegotiate about implicit aspects of employment contracts and conditions.12
These renegotiations may be seen as a "breach of trust" by employees: a renegotiation dis-
courages employees from making ex ante commitments to the ﬁrm, and they will not invest in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. Hence, if the new management is able to renege on implicit labor
contracts, employment is likely to be reduced.
Building on Shleifer and Summers (1988), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) discussed that ﬁrms
merge in order to restore an optimal employment level in rigid labor markets. It seems plausible
that the speed of labor adjustment with which ﬁrms respond to shocks is lower the higher the
costs of labor adjustment. If labor adjustment costs are high, hiring employees is a somewhat
irreversible decision, making it likely that some ﬁrms in countries with rigid labor markets carry
excess labor. If a merger brings new management which is less committed to upholding past
contracts with stakeholders, the merger is an eﬀective way to achieve a desired restructuring
and to reduce the excess labor. Depending on the level of rigidity in diﬀerent labor markets,
employment eﬀects from M&A should diﬀer: in countries with rigid labor markets, like Germany,
labor demand can be expected to decrease more after M&A compared to countries with relatively
ﬂexible labor markets, for example the US.13
In contrast to the proﬁt maximizing motives, there also exist other reasons for mergers that
focus on managers' opportunistic behavior. For example, managers pursue the ﬁrm's growth
and want to widen its scope and size, but do not maximize proﬁts. For this, managers who
follow this empire-building strategy may have a preference for larger targets. Other reasons
that do not focus on proﬁt maximizing are hubris, i.e. managers overestimate their abilities to
improve the target's performance (Roll, 1986), or they merge in order to entrench themselves
and make it costly to shareholders to replace them (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). The impact
of M&A on the ﬁrms' employment and skill-intensity can hardly be predicted if mergers occur
for these reasons, but employment losses are expected to be less likely compared to mergers
motivated by proﬁt maximizing.
Employment eﬀects diﬀer depending on the type of mergers. Employment losses are more
likely in horizontal mergers than in non-horizontal mergers if the respective industry exhibits
increasing returns to scale as argued above. Moreover, if there is a declining industry, that is,
ﬁrms face a reduction in output due to a declining demand and bear excess capacity, a horizontal
12Shleifer and Summers (1988) place their focus on hostile M&A.
13Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) provided empirical support for their hypothesis. Similarly, Abraham and
Houseman (1993, 1995) found out that employment levels in the manufacturing sector adjust faster
in the US than in Germany and Japan.
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merger allows these ﬁrms to retire older and surplus capacity, leading to negative employment
eﬀects (Dutz, 1989). Vertical mergers are a way to reduce transaction costs (Williamson,
1975). As a consequence, employees in the sales function in the upstream ﬁrm may be laid
oﬀ, and the downstream ﬁrm may react with a reduction of employees in the procurement
function. However, these cost savings may generate an output expansion which is suﬃciently
high to oﬀset the job losses associated with transaction cost reductions, but this scenario
seems unlikely. The employment eﬀects of conglomerate and unrelated mergers are not clear:
no negative employment eﬀects should be expected if managers undertake unrelated mergers
in order to diversify ﬁrm earnings. If, however, the unrelated merger is a disciplinary merger in
order to use the market for corporate control to divert assets to a better management - see the
arguments for the ineﬃcient management hypothesis above -, cost savings and employment
losses are possible (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright, 2002a).
Eﬀects on employment can vary between domestic and foreign M&A (Lehto and Böcker-
man, 2008). Employment losses may be larger after domestic M&A for the following reason:
information about target ﬁrms become more incomplete with an increase in the geographic
distance between both ﬁrms (Lehto, 2006). Therefore, acquirers are located close to targets
in order to have better knowledge of the local markets. Closer proximity enables ﬁrms to un-
dertake profound rationalization and radical structural reforms after a merger, causing negative
employment eﬀects. In contrast, a foreign acquirer may be less committed to fulﬁlling implicit
contracts that preserve employment, leading to larger employment losses after cross-border
M&A compared to domestic M&A.
Finally, some predictions about the ﬁrms' pre-merger characteristics are possible. There
are several reasons why larger ﬁrms may self-select in M&A activity: acquiring ﬁrms have to
ﬁnance the merger itself, and they have to bear ﬁxed costs for the integration of the acquired
ﬁrm. For this, it seems plausible that only better performing ﬁrms are able to incur these ﬁxed
costs. If there is a positive relation between a ﬁrm's size and its productivity (see studies from
Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007, or from Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007), one can
expect that acquiring ﬁrms are larger on average. The same applies to targets if acquirers
"cherry-pick": only better performing ﬁrms are acquired, which should then be expected to be
larger. In contrast, if ﬁrms buy poor performing ﬁrms ("lemons"), targets should be expected
to be smaller. In addition, acquirers are also expected to be larger if a merger is ﬁnanced by
debts: larger ﬁrms face lower credit constraints, whereas smaller ﬁrms have a smaller equity
basis to acquire other ﬁrms (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Audretsch and Elston, 2002).
Contrary to this, Mueller (2003a) presents arguments why smaller ﬁrms self-select in horizontal
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mergers: assume an industry which exhibits signiﬁcant scale economies, and the average costs
decrease as the ﬁrm's scale increases. If the decrease in average costs falls as scale increases,
cost reductions are higher for smaller ﬁrms and vice versa. Thus, if scale economies are the
motivation for horizontal M&A, mostly smaller ﬁrms in an industry should merge.14 Assuming
that a ﬁrm's size is an indicator for higher market share, one can expect that a ﬁrm that
merges in order to increase its market power primarily looks for larger targets. With respect to
pre-merger skill-intensity, one could theoretically expect that plants with a higher skill-intensity
self-select in M&A activity if also more productive plants self-select in M&A, because higher
productivity may be a result of higher skill-intensity.
Summarizing the theories, there is no clear prediction for employment eﬀects, but a negative
employment eﬀect seems more likely than a positive, as already argued by diﬀerent authors,
e.g. Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2002a). Nevertheless, questions about net
employment eﬀects and corresponding changes in the merging plants' skill-intensities are passed
to empirics, which have not been able to give a clear answer either.
Related literature: My paper relates to several earlier papers that also discussed the eﬀects
of M&A on employment. Several studies exist for the US. For example, Brown and Medoﬀ
(1988) reported negative eﬀects on employment for smaller ﬁrms in the state of Michigan
between 1978 and 1984. Similar results were found in Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)
who provided evidence for negative eﬀects based on labor data from press reports for the years
1984 to 1986. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992b) also estimated negative employment eﬀects for
larger US manufacturing ﬁrms between 1977 and 1987. In contrast to these studies, positive
eﬀects were reported in a study from McGuckin, Nguyen, and Reznek (1995) who used US
plant-level data. They found an increase in employment in acquired plants. However, they did
not estimate signiﬁcant employment eﬀects at ﬁrm-level. In another study from McGuckin,
Nguyen, and Reznek (1998), the authors analyzed the US food manufacturing sector for the
period 1977 to 1987 and estimated positive employment eﬀects. Again, positive eﬀects from
mergers were reported by McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) for the entire US manufacturing sector
for the years 1977 to 1987, but they also found job losses after mergers in bigger plants. In
a study by Ollinger, Nguyen, Blayney, Chambers, and Nelson (2005) about mergers between
1977 and 1987 in eight US food industries, employment increased after M&A.
The picture for Europe is also ambiguous, but with a tendency to negative eﬀects. There
are several studies for the UK. Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2001) distinguished
14Mueller (1980a) did not empirically conﬁrm this hypothesis.
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between hostile and friendly mergers and found negative employment eﬀects for the period from
1983 to 1996. Similar results were found in another study by Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and
Wright (2002a). They analyzed employment eﬀects after M&A between 1967 and 1996 and
distinguished between related versus unrelated as well as friendly versus hostile takeovers, and
they reported signiﬁcant decreases in employment. Negative eﬀects after a foreign takeover
were also found in Girma and Görg (2004) for the electronics industry. Girma (2005) identiﬁed
negative as well as positive employment eﬀects for targets in the manufacturing sector after
foreign takeovers, depending on their size. Also positive eﬀects were found in Amess and Wright
(2007), but they only analyzed management buyouts. In addition to these studies for the
UK, further studies exist for other European countries. For the Austrian manufacturing sector,
Bellak, Pfaﬀermayr, and Wild (2006) did not identify eﬀects on employment growth after foreign
acquisition. For France, Margolis (2006b) provided evidence for negative employment eﬀects of
M&A, with more workers laid oﬀ in acquired ﬁrms compared to their acquirers in the short term.
Siegel and Simons (2010) reported negative employment eﬀects for Sweden, but they were not
able to diﬀerentiate between cross-border and domestic M&A. In a study about employment
eﬀects of M&A in Europe and the USA, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) estimated negative eﬀects
for Europe, but not for the USA. Lehto and Böckerman (2008) identiﬁed negative employment
eﬀects for cross-border mergers and for domestic mergers for Finnish ﬁrms. Arndt and Mattes
(2010) did not ﬁnd employment eﬀects for cross-border M&A in Germany between 1997 and
2003. Mattes (2010) also used data for Germany for the years 2000 to 2007 and did not
estimate employment eﬀects for acquired plants after foreign takeovers.
In comparison to a considerable number of studies of M&A and employment eﬀects, evi-
dence for changes in plants' skill-intensity after M&A is rare, and it is also diﬃcult to draw any
general conclusions. For example, in a study based on US manufacturing data, Lichtenberg
and Siegel (1990) reported employment losses mostly for central oﬃce staﬀ. In a study about
the UK electronics industry, Girma and Görg (2004) found negative employment eﬀects from
foreign takeovers, especially for unskilled workers. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2003) found a decrease
in white-collar workers after M&A and an increase in blue-collar-workers in Indonesian manu-
facturing plants. In a study for Portugal, Almeida (2003) did not identify signiﬁcant changes in
the workforce educational composition after foreign acquisition. Huttunen (2007) showed that
the share of highly educated workers declines, although slightly and slowly, after the ownership
has changed from domestic to foreign in the acquired plants. In addition to this literature,
there exist some empirical studies about eﬀects from hostile takeovers15 which point to job
15See Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2001) for an overview of the empirical results on
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losses especially for white-collar workers and less for blue-collar workers: for the UK, Franks
and Mayer (1996) provided evidence for higher resign rates of directors after a hostile takeover
in comparison to a friendly takeover; Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) found out that mostly board
members are subject to high levels of displacement after a hostile takeover for the US and UK;
Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) reported about mainly white-collar job losses in the US
due to hostile takeovers; Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) came to similar results, also for the US.
4.3 The data
The dataset used for this investigation is a merged dataset from the Establishment Panel
(Betriebspanel) of the Institute of Employment Research Nuremberg (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-
und Berufsforschung, IAB), and the M&A DATABASE of the University St. Gallen. The dataset
was created by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung GmbH München.
The IAB Establishment Panel is a representative employer survey for Germany, and ques-
tions are on topics related to employment policy. The survey exists since 1993 and currently
covers around 16,000 plants of all sizes and from all sectors of the economy.16 The M&A
DATABASE contains information about 65,000 transactions since 1985 for Germany, Austria
and Switzerland, and it provides information about acquirer, target, and seller ﬁrms, their sales,
proﬁts, number of employees, location, and sector. The data allows further distinction between
horizontal, vertical forward, vertical backward, conglomerate, or concentric mergers.17 In this
study, plants merged between 1996 and 2005. For this period, the dataset includes information
about 23,717 transactions with 40,736 German ﬁrms.18
Based on the IAB Establishment Panel and the M&A DATABASE, TNS Infratest con-
structed a new dataset consisting of two groups of plants which exhibit a similar structure with
regard to several characteristics: sector, size, location, and legal form. The ﬁrst group, the
treatment group, consists of plants which were involved in merger activity between January
1996 and December 2005. To create this group of merged plants,19 all plants which appeared
employment eﬀects after hostile mergers.
16See Fischer, Janik, Müller, and Schmucker (2009) for a comprehensive description of the IAB Estab-
lishment Panel.
17If ﬁrms from diﬀerent but neighboring industries combine, the merger is concentric. This kind of
merger is comparable to a conglomerate merger with complementary or neighboring products (Church,
2004).
18In a pilot study, Bellmann and Kirchof (2006) tested the capability of a similar dataset, combined from
the IAB Establishment Panel and Thomson ONE Banker. The advantage of the M&A DATABASE
compared to Thomson ONE Banker is that it also includes information about smaller ﬁrms.
19I use the terms "merged plants" and "treated" interchangeably.
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in the M&A DATABASE as well as in the IAB Establishment Panel had to be identiﬁed. Plants
were only considered as treated if they were surveyed at least once prior and once after the
merger in order to have enough information. If plants merged more often between 1996 and
2005, they may also appear more often in the dataset. The original treatment group consists
of 7,801 observations from 958 diﬀerent plants.20
The second group, the control group, consists of plants which were not involved in any
M&A activity between 1980 and 2005. This group was created in such a way that control
plants are as similar as possible to treated plants in the treatment group, i.e. controls should
act as statistical twins to the treated. Therefore, treated plants were categorized according
to sector, size, legal form, and location (West or East Germany). Then, controls had to be
identiﬁed with the same combination of sector, size, legal form, and location. Of course,
not for every treated plant was it possible to ﬁnd a control with an identical combination of
characteristics. In addition, controls also had to be surveyed at least twice between 1993 and
2006,21 and they were only kept in the dataset if they had not been involved in any merger
activity since 1980. This was checked via other datasets or the plants' websites. Several plants
appear more often in the control group because plants can serve several times as a control in
the referred observation period. The original control group consists of 1,009 observations from
291 diﬀerent plants.22
This new dataset has some useful features in comparison to datasets used in other studies:
 It allows distinguishing between acquirer, target, and seller plants and between diﬀerent
types of mergers, i.e. between horizontal and non-horizontal mergers.
 The data includes plants of diﬀerent sizes, i.e. small and medium-size plants are also
included in the analysis.
 Plants in the dataset are also not restricted to a certain sector, a location in West or
East Germany, or a legal form.
 Due to the analysis at plant-level a plant can be assigned to a speciﬁc sector. This is
often not possible for (mostly larger and multi-plant) ﬁrms.
20This means that the treatment group consists of 958 diﬀerent plants which all have diﬀerent identi-
ﬁcation numbers in the IAB Establishment Panel.
21The ﬁrst wave of the IAB Establishment Panel was conducted in 1993, and the survey of 2006 includes
questions referring to the preceding year 2005.
22See appendix C for a more detailed description about the construction of the treatment and control
groups.
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 There are only plants in the control group which had not merged for a long time, i.e. at
least since 1980.
 The dataset makes a diﬀerentiated econometric analysis possible because of the avail-
ability of a control group, and a rich set of variables.
For the empirical strategy performed in the next section, some modiﬁcations of the dataset
are inevitable. First, if a plant is aﬀected by more than one merger activity within the same
year, they are taken together as only one merger because much of the information is on a
yearly basis (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004). Second, the analysis covers an observation period
of four years from t = 1 to t = 4. Thus, treated and controls are only kept if data exists for
all four successive years. Third, treated plants were dropped if there are less than three years
between the merger activities of a single plant. This avoids overlapping eﬀects, i.e. eﬀects
can be assigned to a speciﬁc merger. Fourth, observations which exhibit abnormal values for
employment or skill-intensity growth rates will be deleted. I deﬁne abnormal values if growth
rates deviate two standard deviations from the respective industry average.23 Fifth, seller plants
were excluded from the dataset because too few observations exist. Finally, in very few cases
plants were involved in foreign M&A. However, the number was too small for a separate analysis,
and thus, I also dropped these plants in order to study only domestic M&A.
Table 4.1: Classiﬁcation of treated plants
Plants Horizontal Non-horizontal Unknown Control
Acquirers 55 7 26 88
Targets 40 21 16 77
Total 95 28 42 165
Note: there are plants which merged, but there is no information about the type of merger. These are labeled as
"Unknown".
These modiﬁcations reduced the number of observations signiﬁcantly:24 from 7,801 to 165
treated, and from 1,009 to 563 untreated observations.25 Table 4.1 presents an overview of
23These extreme values may be due to errors or rare events. For example, consider a plant that produces
a certain machine in a year, and reports only low sales in the same year. If the plant sells the machine
in the next year, it will report high sales. These extreme numbers may have a high impact on empirical
results (Wagner, 2007b).
24Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) use the Global Mergers and Acquisitions database for their study. They
also analyze only a small fraction of the original dataset, i.e. from a large sample of 140,289 mergers
there is only suﬃcient data for 646 mergers.
25As stated above, I only kept a multi-merging plant more than once in the dataset if there were at
least three years between the mergers, in order to avoid overlapping eﬀects. There are also several
untreated plants that appear more often in the control group, because they were surveyed several
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treated plants, i.e. plants are distinguished according to the subgroups of acquiring and target
plants, and plants involved in horizontal and non-horizontal mergers. The number of observa-
tions in the subgroup of non-horizontal mergers is small, which leads to a limited robustness
of estimations for this subgroup in the following empirical analysis. In addition, table 4.1 also
shows that the type of merger is not known for every treated plant.
4.4 Empirical investigation
4.4.1 Empirical strategy
Employment and skill-intensity measurements: In this study, I analyze the total
number of a plant's employment. The dataset allows distinguishing between employees who are
liable to social security, and those who are not. Liable to social security means that employees
and trainees are liable to health, pension, and unemployment insurance, or their contributions
to pension insurance are partly paid by the employer. In contrast, workers who are not liable
to social security are civil servants, self-employed persons, unpaid family workers, and so-called
"marginal" part-time workers.26
In addition to employment analysis, I also analyze changes in the plants' skill-intensity. I
deﬁne two groups of employees, respectively measured as proportion within total workforce.
First, skilled employees, that is skilled workers, employees, and civil servants for qualiﬁed jobs,
working proprietors, directors, and managers. Second, unskilled employees, that is unskilled or
semi-skilled workers, employees and civil servants for menial jobs. I do not include trainees,
apprentices, and candidates for civil service into any of these groups.27
times. Hence, one might think that it is not a good idea that a single plant is used more often as
a control because it was surveyed several times, while another single plant will be used only once
because it was surveyed less often. As a consequence, the results for controls may be biased towards
the plants surveyed more often. Nevertheless, I do not worry about this for the following reasons:
ﬁrst, I do not assume that there is a systematic bias in relevant variables in those plants that were
surveyed more often. In particular: why should a plant that was surveyed more often in the IAB
Establishment Panel exhibit systematically higher or lower employment or skill-intensity changes over
time? Second, if I allowed keeping untreated plants with only one observation in the control group,
the control group would shrink to approximately a quarter of its size, and useful information would
be lost. As a robustness check I also performed the empirical investigation with a control group
with each individual plant appearing only once in the dataset. The estimations based on this smaller
control group (133 plants) were similar as expected.
26These workers are either employed only short-term (i.e. for a maximum of two month or 50 days
per year), or have an agreed working week of less than 15 hours and a monthly wage of max. EUR
400 (formerly DM 630). See the introduction to the questionnaire for the IAB Establishment Panel,
available on the website of the Research Data Centre (FDZ) at the IAB (http://fdz.iab.de).
27At the beginning of their vocational training, trainees, apprentices, and candidates for civil service
should be assigned to the group of unskilled employees, but at the end of their vocational training they
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Plant- vs. ﬁrm-level analysis: Existing empirical studies diﬀer with respect to the ob-
servation level, i.e. between plant- and ﬁrm-level. The ﬁrm-level typically includes headquarter
activities like marketing, R&D, ﬁnance operations, etc., whereas plant-level includes activities
like production and assembling (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004). Thus, ﬁrm- and plant-
levels may be aﬀected diﬀerently by mergers. For example, synergy eﬀects in R&D or marketing
should primarily be measured at ﬁrm-level, but if M&A leads to improved production processes,
one would expect to observe the eﬀects at plant-level.
The data at hand are at plant-level. That is, plant-level data cannot be used for any analysis
at ﬁrm-level, and this may be seen as a drawback. However, this drawback is reduced if smaller
and middle-size ﬁrms are also of interest. Firms of this size are often single-plant ﬁrms. It is a
further advantage of plant-level analysis that plants can more easily be assigned to a speciﬁc
industry sector compared to ﬁrms (Bellmann and Kirchhof, 2006). And, in addition, the plant is
the unit which is fully involved in the transaction capturing the whole eﬀects of M&A, whereas
employment and skill-intensity eﬀects may disperse at ﬁrm-level which measures the average
employment and skill-intensity of all plants.
Observation period: I create an observation period of four years, i.e. from t = 1 to t = 4,
with mergers all occurring in t = 2. The dataset contains information about mergers that occur
between 1996 and 2005, i.e. year t = 2 corresponds to one of these years. Consequently, year
t = 1 corresponds to a year between 1995 and 2004, and year t = 4 corresponds to a year
between 1998 and 2007. This leads to ten cohorts with a respective four-year window (1995
- 1998, 1996 - 1999, ..., 2004 - 2007). For controls, the ﬁrst possible year for t = 1 is 1993
(the starting year of the IAB Establishment Panel), and the last possible year for t = 4 is 2005,
leading to ten cohorts with a four-year window (1993 - 1996, 1994 - 1997, ..., 2002 - 2005).28
Figure D1 in the appendix provides a graphical illustration of this "rolling observation window",
which is common in empirical studies (e.g. Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2010).
The four-year observation period makes the analysis of both plants' pre-merger and post-
should be assigned to the group of skilled employees. However, the data does not include respective
information. For this reason, I performed the empirical analysis for both cases, and also estimated
results if these workers were excluded from the analysis. The results were all similar, and thus, I
decided to exclude them, because an assignment to one of both groups would be arbitrary.
28The dataset includes plants which merged between 1996 and 2005. However, some of the four-year
cohorts for merged plants also cover the years 1995, 2006, and 2007, but there is no information if
plants also merged in these years, or only between 1996 and 2005. For example, a plant that merged
in 2005 could also merge in 2007 again. If this was true, my results would be biased by overlapping
eﬀects due to more mergers. Nevertheless, I choose to keep these observations because I already
excluded those multi-merges from the dataset (see section 4.3), and thus, it is not too likely that the
remaining plants also merged in 1995, 2006, or 2007.
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merger employment and skill-intensity performance possible. Generally, a longer observation
period prior to the merger would be desirable, for example because a decreasing performance
could be the trigger for a merger, or because of the existence of Ashenfelter's Dip:29 if plants
prepare themselves for the merger, employment can already be adjusted prior to the merger, and
estimations about post-merger eﬀects may then be biased. However, due to data limitation, I
am not able to lengthen the observation period to several years prior to the merger. Therefore,
I follow most of the existing studies which also start their observation period one year prior to
the merger (e.g. Girma and Görg, 2007).
There are good reasons to assume that it takes some time for eﬀects to arise after mergers
(e.g. for the reorganization of the merging plant's production). For this reason, I calculate
post-merger performance in years t = 2 and t = 4. I believe that this time window is long
enough to capture most of the merger-induced changes.30 This also allows the calculation
of post-merger growth rates instead of levels, and helps to reduce selection bias that arises
due to unobserved time-invariant diﬀerences between both groups, as will be discussed later in
the paper. In addition to changes between years t = 2 and t = 4 ("post-merger period"), I
also analyze growth rates over the whole observation period between t = 1 and t = 4 ("total
period") in order to capture changes that occur within several weeks or months around the
merger.31 Finally, sales are deﬂated by the aggregated consumer price index over the whole
observation period.
The selection problem and the methods applied: A simple comparison of per-
formance parameters between plants that merged and plants that had not merged may show
diﬀerences between both groups. However, this comparison is not able to analyze a causal eﬀect
of M&A on performance parameters like employment or skill-intensity for a simple reason: there
may be a selection of plants in M&A activity, i.e. plants that merge are not randomly assigned
to the group of merging plants. Instead, it is more likely that plants with certain pre-merger
characteristics become acquirers or targets. Thus, if plants are not selected randomly in the
merger activity, a simple comparison between merged and non-merged plants suﬀers from a
selection bias.
The empirical analysis in this paper aims at solving this selection problem to identify causal
29The Ashelfelter Dip describes that the unemployeds' eﬀorts in job-seeking decrease shortly before
they participate in a labor-market program.
30Similar, Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2011) found that most of the restructuring occurs within
a three-year period. Changing the time window to ﬁve years does not change their results.
31In particular, most data in the IAB Establishment Panel refers to June 30th of the respective year.
Mergers occur in year t = 2, i.e. somewhere between July 1st and June 30th of the following year.
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eﬀects. As usual in empirical studies, I start my investigation with an analysis of descriptive
statistics. I analyze diﬀerent pre-merger characteristics between both groups, compare employ-
ment (skill-intensity) over time as well as growth rates for treated and control groups.
However, employment (skill-intensity) diﬀerences between merging and non-merging plants
may be the result of diﬀerences in other variables than M&A that determine employment and
skill-intensity. For this, I apply regression analysis to control for variables that inﬂuence employ-
ment (skill-intensity). The construction of the framework is similar to Schank, Schnabel, and
Wagner (2010): the regression allows looking at diﬀerences in the average plant employment
(skill-intensity) between both groups over time, and it controls for plant characteristics that are
thought to be related to a plant's average employment (skill-intensity). Nevertheless, regression
analysis is able to detect correlations, but it is not a reliable method for identifying causalities
(Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber, 2010).32
Econometric evaluation methods like propensity score matching introduced by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983, 1985) can be regarded as a solution to the selection problem and identify
causalities. The problem is that a faster employment (skill-intensity) growth of plants that
merged does not necessarily reﬂect a causal eﬀect of M&A on the plants' employment (skill-
intensity). Instead, plants with higher employment (skill-intensity) could also self-select in the
merged group, but would have experienced higher growth even without merging. Since both
states are never observable at the same time, the problem of the missing counterfactual situation
arises (Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2010). With propensity score matching, this missing
counterfactual can be replaced by the construction of an appropriate control group, i.e. the
method pairs merged plants with controls that are similar in their pre-merger characteristics.
Therefore, they exhibit a similar probability of merging. If there are performance diﬀerences,
they can then be attributed to the merger. As suggested by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000)
and Smith and Todd (2005a), I combine matching and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator
to compare changes instead of levels in order to conduct causal analysis without neglecting
time-invariant heterogeneity between treated and control plants.
Throughout the empirical investigation, I ﬁrst perform the analysis for employment eﬀects,
and then for skill-intensity eﬀects. I discuss the results for the treatment group including all
treated, and the control group. I will also perform the analysis for all four subgroups: acquirers,
targets, plants in horizontal mergers, and plants in non-horizontal mergers.
32However, Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue that regression analysis is also able to solve the selection
problem if it controls for the correct covariates. See Caliendo (2006) or Gelman and Hill (2007) for
a further discussion of regression analysis compared to matching methods.
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4.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for diﬀerent variables which are all measured prior to the
merger in t = 1. The table compares the diﬀerent treatment groups to the control group. Plants
are assigned to diﬀerent size categories, and the table shows that mergers are concentrated in
larger plants (percentage numbers in parentheses): for example, while approximately 67% of
all merged plants have 100 and more employees, approximately 60% of all control plants have
less than 100 employees. The majority of treated plants belongs to the sectors of production
goods, investment goods, and trade. Most of the plants in the diﬀerent groups have the legal
form "Limited", but the share of plants that have the legal form "Limited by shares" is clearly
higher in treated groups compared to the control group. Most of the plants are located in West
Germany, and this is similar across all groups. A comparison of plants with respect to labor
productivity (sales per employee), wages (per month), and export rates (as percentage of sales)
shows that merging plants are on average more productive, pay higher wages, and export more.
In addition, treated plants are more often in foreign ownership compared to control plants,
and they oﬀer further training more often. Finally, treated plants are less often single-plant
ﬁrms (e.g. independent plants or head oﬃces) compared to control plants. All in all, summary
statistics from table 4.2 point to a substantial pre-merger heterogeneity between merging and
non-merging plants, and the numbers do not substantially vary between subgroups.
Descriptive statistics for employment: In table 4.3 I present the number of employees
over the years t = 1 to t = 4 for all groups, and also describe growth rates. In year t = 1, the
average number of employees is higher in all treatment groups compared to the control group.
With an average number of employees ranging from 378 (non-horizontal) to 516 (horizontal)
in treated plants, the size diﬀerential of merging plants is between approximately 215% and
330%, and the size gap persists over the whole observation period. In order to test the statistical
signiﬁcance of diﬀerences between each treatment group and the control group in all years, I
apply a t-test which does not assume equal variances in both groups.33 In particular, I test the
null hypothesis H0: mean of employees of treated = mean of employees of controls, against
the alternative hypothesis H1: mean of employees of treated 6= mean of employees of controls.
P-values of at most 0.01, 0.05, or 0.1 indicate that the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected at
the 1%-, 5%-, or 10%-error level in favor of the alternative hypothesis H1. For all treatment
groups, the average size is statistically signiﬁcantly higher at the 1%- or 5%-signiﬁcance-level
33I apply Levene's statistic for a test of the equality of variances.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics: diﬀerent variables
Variable All Acquirers Targets Horizontal Non-horiz. Control
Size category
1-19 employees 2 9 11 9 12 127
(12.73) (10.34) (14.29) (10.23) 15.58 (22.56)
20-49 employees 22 14 8 14 8 110
(13.33) (16.09) (10.39) (15.91) 10.39 (19.54)
50-99 employees 12 5 7 5 7 96
(7.27) (5.75) (9.09) (5.68) 9.09 (17.05)
100-299 employees 40 26 14 26 14 174
(24.24) (29.89) (18.18) (29.55) 18.18 (30.91)
300-499 employees 24 10 14 11 13 39
(14.55) (11.49) (18.18) (12.50) 16.88 (6.93)
>=500 employees 46 23 23 23 23 17
(27.88) (26.44) (29.87) (26.14) 29.87 (3.02)
Total 165 87 77 88 77 563
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Sector
Mining/Quarrying/Electricity 13 10 3 11 2 5
(7.88) (11.36) (3.90) (11.58) (7.14) (0.89)
Food 3 3 0 2 0 26
(1.82) (3.41) (0.00) (2.11) (0.00) (4.62)
Consumer goods 12 6 6 8 0 34
(7.27) (6.82) (7.79) (8.42) (0.00) (6.04)
Production goods 36 13 23 20 6 82
(21.82) (14.77) (29.87) (21.05) (21.43) (14.56)
Investment goods 40 21 19 20 9 155
(24.24) (23.86) (24.68) (21.05) (32.14) (27.53)
Construction 8 4 4 0 1 36
(4.85) (4.55) (5.19) (0.00) (3.57) (6.39)
Trade 23 13 10 13 4 115
(13.94) (14.77) (12.99) (13.68) (14.29) (20.43)
Transport 10 9 1 7 1 24
(6.06) (10.23) (1.30) (7.37) (3.57) (4.26)
Hotels/Restaurants 2 0 2 1 1 0
(1.21) (0.00) (2.60) (1.05) (3.57) (0.00)
Education 1 0 1 1 0 7
(0.61) (0.00) (1.30) (1.05) (0.00) (1.24)
Human health 1 0 1 1 0 0
(0.61) (0.00) (1.30) (1.05) (0.00) (0.00)
Research/Computer/Ser 9 5 4 6 3 74
(5.45) (5.68) (5.19) (6.32) (10.71) (11.37)
Other services 7 4 3 5 1 15
(4.24) (4.55) (3.90) (5.26) (3.57) (2.66)
Total 165 88 77 95 28 563
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00 (100.00)
Legal form
Partnership, individually-owned, etc. 16 8 8 7 4 119
(9.82) (9.20) (10.53) (7.45) (14.82) (21.99)
Limited 118 59 59 64 21 402
(72.39) (67.82) (77.63) (68.09) (77.78) (74.31)
Limited by shares 29 20 9 23 2 20
(17.79) (22.99) (11.84) (24.47) (7.40) (3.70)
Total 163 87 76 94 27 541
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Location in East Germany 52 29 23 33 7 153
(31.71) (32.95) (30.26) (34.74) (25.00) (27.22)
Labor productivity (mean) 204344.5 230619.3 173046.6 221995.9 167243.7 100059.1
Wage per month (mean) 2170.6 2210.6 2121.2 2215.5 2152.27 1742.3
Export rate (% of sales, mean) 24.09 23.04 25.33 24.41 26.70 12.46
Plant is in foreign ownership 19 8 11 14 2 5
(14.29) (12.12) (16.42) (15.05) (8.00) (1.13)
Further training 150 79 71 86 26 373
(90.91) (89.77) (92.21) (90.53) (92.86) (67.57)
Single-plant ﬁrm 51 20 31 27 15 539
(31.29) (22.99) (40.79) (29.03) (53.57) (80.52)
Note: numbers refer to t = 1. Numbers in parentheses are percentage of total number of plants. Reduced number of
observations is due to missing data for several variables.
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compared to the control group in all years. In addition, I also test the statistical signiﬁcance
of size diﬀerences between subgroups, but these are not statistically signiﬁcant at a usual level
(not reported).
Table 4.3: Summary statistics: employment
All Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
No. of employees in t=1 461.0 (736.3) 165 0.000
No. of employees in t=2 453.2 (724.0) 165 0.000
No. of employees in t=3 450.5 (733.5) 165 0.000
No. of employees in t=4 450.0 (738.6) 165 0.000
Growth from t=2 to t=4 -0.028 (0.254) 165 0.934
Growth from t=1 to t=4 -0.040 (0.294) 165 0.664
Acquirers Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
No. of employees in t=1 419.7 (554.2) 88 0.000
No. of employees in t=2 413.3 (544.9) 88 0.000
No. of employees in t=3 408.8 (550.7) 88 0.000
No. of employees in t=4 406.7 (544.9) 88 0.000
Growth from t=2 to t=4 -0.033 (0.299) 88 0.820
Growth from t=1 to t=4 -0.050 (0.334) 88 0.560
Targets Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
No. of employees in t=1 508.3 (902.2) 77 0.000
No. of employees in t=2 498.7 (887.2) 77 0.000
No. of employees in t=3 498.1 (899.8) 77 0.000
No. of employees in t=4 499.4 (912.5) 77 0.000
Growth from t=2 to t=4 -0.021 (0.193) 77 0.850
Growth from t=1 to t=4 -0.027 (0.244) 77 0.987
Horizontal Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
No. of employees in t=1 515.9 (877.6) 95 0.000
No. of employees in t=2 511.3 (867.3) 95 0.000
No. of employees in t=3 503.9 (875.9) 95 0.000
No. of employees in t=4 506.0 (884.8) 95 0.000
Growth from t=2 to t=4 -0.030 (0.297) 95 0.906
Growth from t=1 to t=4 -0.052 (0.333) 95 0.517
Non-horizontal Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
No. of employees in t=1 377.8 (538.3) 28 0.018
No. of employees in t=2 362.9 (511.0) 28 0.018
No. of employees in t=3 379.2 (550.0) 28 0.019
No. of employees in t=4 366.7 (527.4) 28 0.019
Growth from t=2 to t=4 -0.033 (0.15) 28 0.815
Growth from t=1 to t=4 -0.026 (0.145) 28 0.948
Control Mean (Std. Dev.) N
No. of employees in t=1 120.4 (133.0) 563
No. of employees in t=2 119.5 (129.9) 563
No. of employees in t=3 118.5 (128.3) 563
No. of employees in t=4 117.7 (127.8) 563
Growth from t=2 to t=4 -0.026 (0.282) 563
Growth from t=1 to t=4 -0.028 (0.33) 563
Note: p-values refer to the t-test of statistical signiﬁcance of diﬀerence of means between treated and control groups.
Table 4.3 also reports growth rates for the number of employees. I calculate changes
between t = 2 and t = 4, and between t = 1 and t = 4. The percentage growth rates are
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approximated by logarithms:
lnEMPLOY(2−4)i = lnEMPLOY4i − lnEMPLOY2i, (1)
and
lnEMPLOY(1−4)i = lnEMPLOY4i − lnEMPLOY1i. (2)
lnEMPLOY(2−4)i and lnEMPLOY(1−4)i are the variables for percentage changes of a plant i's
number of employees between t = 2 and t = 4, and between t = 1 and t = 4, while EMPLOYti
with t = {1, ..., 4} describes the number of employees in year t. All treatment groups and
the control group exhibit negative mean employment changes for both observation periods.
Again, I apply t-tests which do not assume equal variances, and I test the null hypothesis H0:
mean of employment growth of treated = mean of employment growth of controls, against
the alternative hypothesis H1: mean of employment growth of treated 6= mean of employment
growth of controls. The negative growth rates of the respective treatment groups are statistically
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the negative growth rates of the control group at any usual level,
implying that M&A has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on employment.
Descriptive statistics for skill-intensity: In table 4.4 I analyze the plants' skill-intensity
over time. The merging plants exhibit a higher skill-intensity than plants that do not merge.
In t = 1 the merging plants' average skill-intensity is between 74% (acquirer) and 81% (non-
horizontal) compared to 65% in non-merging plants. Similar to above, I apply a t-test to test
whether the mean diﬀerences between treated and non-treated plants are statistically signiﬁcant.
The table shows that a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in skill-intensity exists for all groups
compared to controls, and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at usual levels over the whole
observation, except for year t = 4 in the group of non-horizontally merging plants.
In order to take a closer look at the development path of skill-intensity over the four years,
I estimate growth rates. Similar to employment changes, I calculate skill-intensity changes
between t = 2 and t = 4, and between t = 1 and t = 4. Again, the percentage growth rates
are approximated by logarithms:
lnSKILLED(2−4)i = lnSKILLED4i − lnSKILLED2i, (3)
and
lnSKILLED(1−4)i = lnSKILLED4i − lnSKILLED1i. (4)
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics: skill-intensity
All Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Proportion of skilled in t=1 0.751 (0.240) 165 0.000
Proportion of skilled in t=2 0.738 (0.228) 165 0.000
Proportion of skilled in t=3 0.753 (0.231) 165 0.000
Proportion of skilled in t=4 0.781 (0.233) 165 0.000
Growth from t=2 to t=4 0.055 (0.353) 165 0.983
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.046 (0.396) 165 0.237
Growth from t=1 to t=2 -0.009 (0.340) 165 0.155
Acquirers Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Proportion of skilled in t=1 0.737 (0.248) 88 0.004
Proportion of skilled in t=2 0.751 (0.225) 88 0.002
Proportion of skilled in t=3 0.751 (0.234) 88 0.008
Proportion of skilled in t=4 0.776 (0.238) 88 0.002
Growth from t=2 to t=4 0.025 (0.319) 88 0.449
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.062 (0.397) 88 0.563
Growth from t=1 to t=2 0.037 (0.313) 88 0.978
Targets Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Proportion of skilled in t=1 0.766 (0.231) 77 0.000
Proportion of skilled in t=2 0.724 (0.233) 77 0.057
Proportion of skilled in t=3 0.754 (0.230) 77 0.008
Proportion of skilled in t=4 0.787 (0.229) 77 0.000
Growth from t=2 to t=4 0.089 (0.388) 77 0.466
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.027 (0.396) 77 0.213
Growth from t=1 to t=2 -0.062 (0.363) 77 0.031
Horizontal Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Proportion of skilled in t=1 0.762 (0.227) 95 0.000
Proportion of skilled in t=2 0.744 (0.229) 95 0.004
Proportion of skilled in t=3 0.746 (0.236) 95 0.001
Proportion of skilled in t=4 0.815 (0.221) 95 0.000
Growth from t=2 to t=4 0.101 (0.370) 95 0.273
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.071 (0.395) 95 0.686
Growth from t=1 to t=2 -0.030 (0.324) 95 0.080
Non-horizontal Mean (Std. Dev.) N P-value
Proportion of skilled in t=1 0.811 (0.202) 28 0.000
Proportion of skilled in t=2 0.771 (0.212) 28 0.018
Proportion of skilled in t=3 0.787 (0.224) 28 0.018
Proportion of skilled in t=4 0.757 (0.247) 28 0.162
Growth from t=2 to t=4 -0.047 (0.310) 28 0.110
Growth from t=1 to t=4 -0.101 (0.335) 28 0.074
Growth from t=1 to t=2 -0.053 (0.154) 28 0.011
Control Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Proportion of skilled in t=1 0.653 (0.292) 562
Proportion of skilled in t=2 0.668 (0.283) 562
Proportion of skilled in t=3 0.677 (0.279) 562
Proportion of skilled in t=4 0.688 (0.274) 562
Growth from t=2 to t=4 0.054 (0.439) 562
Growth from t=1 to t=4 0.089 (0.463) 562
Growth from t=1 to t=2 0.036 (0.411) 559
Note: p-values refer to the t-test of statistical signiﬁcance of diﬀerence of means between treated and control groups.
Table 4.4 shows that for some subgroups mean growth rates between t = 2 and t = 4 are
higher than mean growth rates between t = 1 to t = 4, pointing to a U-shaped growth path.
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For this, I additionally report percentage changes in plants' skill-intensity between t = 1 and
t = 2:
lnSKILLED(1−2)i = lnSKILLED2i − lnSKILLED1i. (5)
I apply a t-test once more to test the statistical signiﬁcance of diﬀerences in means of skill-
intensity growth rates between treated and controls. The mean decrease between t = 1 and
t = 2 is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from controls for the subgroups of targets, horizontal,
and non-horizontal M&A at usual signiﬁcance levels. Since changes between t = 1 and t = 4
are not statistically signiﬁcant in subgroups of targets and horizontal M&A, the average growth
rates imply that the skill-intensity in these two subgroups decreases after M&A, but turns back
to a level that is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the pre-merger level, and hence,
creates a U-shaped development path.
Summarizing the results from the descriptive statistics, tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 exhibit
a substantial pre-merger heterogeneity between merged and non-merged plants, i.e. merging
plants are obviously diﬀerent from non-merging plants with respect to diﬀerent characteristics
even before they merge. In particular, descriptive statistics show that merging plants are on
average larger and have a higher skill-intensity compared to plants that do not merge. These
ﬁndings give strong support to a self-selection hypothesis. I do not ﬁnd support for employment
changes over time, but with respect to plants' skill-intensity, I identify a U-shaped development
path for subgroups of targets and horizontal M&A.
4.4.3 Regression analysis
Since descriptive analysis has shown considerable diﬀerences in size and skill-intensity between
treated and control plants, it is of interest to analyze whether these diﬀerences are due to
self-selection or if they are causally determined. In the next step, I apply an OLS-regression
analysis with logarithm of employment as a proxy for plants' size in order to investigate the
eﬀect of some interaction variables of interest. I will repeat the analysis with respect to plants'
skill-intensities. Then, in section 4.4.4 I will conduct a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score
matching analysis to consider issues of causality and ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Employment regressions: The regression equation with logarithm of employment as de-
pendent variable is
lnEMPLOYit = β0 + β1MAi +
4
∑
t=2
βt(MAi ∗ PERIODt) + β5CONTROLit + ei. (6)
Effects on German Plants' Employment and Skill-Intensity 138
The variable lnEMPLOYit describes the logarithm of employees in plant i at year t. The dummy
MAi is one if a plant i merged and zero if the plant is a control. The regression coeﬃcient β1
measures the average size diﬀerential of merged plants prior to the merger in t = 1. To estimate
employment changes over time I construct three interaction dummies MAi ∗ PERIODt for the
years t = 2 to t = 4, with t = 1 being the reference period. These dummies are a product of
the M&A dummy (MAi) and a time dummy (PERIODt, with t ∈ [2, 4]). The coeﬃcients βt
measure whether the size diﬀerential between treated and controls becomes smaller or larger
over time. The variable CONTROLit is a vector for several control variables, and ei is an error
term. I perform this regression for all ﬁve groups of treated, i.e. the ﬁrst including all treated,
and the others for the respective subgroups of treated.
The results are displayed in table 4.5. The coeﬃcient of the M&A dummy in the ﬁrst
regression speciﬁcation is 0.485, and corresponds to a size diﬀerential of approximately 62%,34
i.e. ceteris paribus, the number of employees in treated plants is 62% higher compared to
control plants in t = 1. The coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. Coeﬃcients
of the interaction dummies are either positive or negative, but they are small from an economic
point of view, and not statistically signiﬁcant at any usual signiﬁcance level. In other words,
the size gap between treated and control plants does not change in any statistically signiﬁcant
way over time. The coeﬃcients of the control variables have all the expected signs and are in
line with ﬁndings from descriptive statistics: the higher a plant's investment per employee, the
larger the plant. The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable for further training is also positive and
highly signiﬁcant. Moreover, plants that have the legal form "Limited", or "Limited by shares"
are statistically signiﬁcantly larger compared to plants that have other legal forms. Plants
located in East Germany are smaller, while being foreign owned has no statistically signiﬁcant
correlation with a plant's size. If the plant is a single plant, its size is statistically signiﬁcantly
smaller.
The estimations for the regressions for subgroups of treated are similar. Regressions for
acquirers, targets, and plants in horizontal mergers exhibit a highly statistically signiﬁcant pre-
merger size diﬀerential for treated between 50% (target) and 85% (acquirer). Only for the
subgroup for non-horizontally merging plants I do not estimate a statistically signiﬁcant pre-
merger size diﬀerence. Similar to the ﬁrst regression, the coeﬃcients of the interaction dummies
are not statistically signiﬁcant, i.e. the size diﬀerence does not change over the years in any
subgroup, and coeﬃcients of control variables are also similar across these regressions.
34In loglinear models coeﬃcients can be transformed into a percentage change. Here, exp{0.485} ≈
1.62, which corresponds to a diﬀerential of approximately 62% (Verbeek, 2005).
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Table 4.5: OLS-regression (dependent variable: log. employment)
Variables All (1) Acquirers (2) Targets (3) Horizontal (4) Non-horiz. (5)
M&A (D) 0.485***
(0.171)
M&A*Period=2 0.013
(0.053)
M&A*Period=3 -0.063
(0.070)
M&A*Period=4 -0.085
(0.096)
Acquirer (D) 0.616***
(0.221)
Acquirer*Period=2 -0.040
(0.081)
Acquirer*Period=3 -0.132
(0.099)
Acquirer*Period=4 -0.162
(0.128)
Target (D) 0.404*
(0.221)
Target*Period=2 0.058
(0.070)
Target*Period=3 -0.000
(0.090)
Target*Period=4 -0.018
(0.137)
Horizontal M&A (D) 0.606***
(0.212)
Horizontal*Period=2 -0.050
(0.071)
Horizontal*Period=3 -0.087
(0.102)
Horizontal*Period=4 -0.050
(0.151)
Non-horizontal M&A (D) 0.060
(0.387)
Non-horizontal*Period=2 0.052
(0.129)
Non-horizontal*Period=3 -0.076
(0.153)
Non-horizontal*Period=4 -0.337
(0.240)
log. Investment p. employee 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.024**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Further training (D) 1.162*** 1.178*** 1.130*** 1.178*** 1.154***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.103) (0.101) (0.103)
Legal form "Limited" (D) 0.483*** 0.492*** 0.625*** 0.511*** 0.634***
(0.138) (0.136) (0.143) (0.136) (0.144)
Legal form "Limited by shares" (D) 0.633** 0.656*** 0.218 0.731*** -0.139
(0.245) (0.248) (0.286) (0.251) (0.284)
Location in East Germany (D) -0.474*** -0.448*** -0.368*** -0.406*** -0.372**
(0.132) (0.141) (0.133) (0.134) (0.145)
Foreign owned plant (D) 0.155 0.334 0.325 0.278 0.715*
(0.239) (0.342) (0.275) (0.278) (0.407)
Single-plant ﬁrm (D) -0.334*** -0.318** -0.438*** -0.294** -0.513***
(0.122) (0.126) (0.118) (0.125) (0.132)
Constant 2.191*** 2.955*** 2.617*** 1.688 3.807***
(0.684) (0.357) (0.943) (1.123) (0.463)
Observations 2566 2302 2246 2316 2077
R2 0.413 0.399 0.428 0.417 0.404
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for intragroup correlation). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (D)
means variable is a dummy. Reference categories for legal form is "Partnership, individually-owned, public, and others".
Regressions include dummies for sectors and years. The reduced number of observations is due to missing data for several
variables. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel, M&A DATABASE St. Gallen.
The robustness of estimations for all ﬁve regressions is satisfying. The value for R2 is
between 0.399 and 0.428 which is suﬃciently high, and the results of other tests (not re-
ported) like F-test, variance-inﬂation-factor (VIF), and Durbin-Watson-test, controlling for the
signiﬁcance of the overall model, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation also yield good results.
Moreover, the coeﬃcients of variables have the expected signs from an economic point of view.
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In addition, I also eliminated intragroup correlation and corrected biased standard errors.35
The results for employment so far are in line with ﬁndings from descriptive statistics. Es-
timations point to a self-selection of larger plants into M&A activity, and there is no evidence
that plants change employment after M&A in a statistically signiﬁcant way. This is true for
all groups of treated. However, the estimated size diﬀerential in treated plants prior to the
merger is substantially smaller compared to the results from descriptive statistics, i.e the size
diﬀerence between merging and non-merging plants is obviously also explained by diﬀerences
in other variables than M&A that determine the number of employees.
Skill-intensity regressions: Similar to the regressions above, I also perform regression
analysis with respect to skill-intensities. The corresponding regression equation is
lnSKILLEDit = β0 + β1MAi +
4
∑
t=2
βt(MAi ∗ PERIODt) + β5CONTROLit + ei. (7)
The explanation of regression equation 7 is similar to equation 6. The dependent variable
lnSKILLEDit describes the logarithm of the skill-intensity of the plant's workforce.
Table 4.6 presents the estimations. The coeﬃcient of the M&A dummy in the ﬁrst regres-
sion speciﬁcation is 0.074 and corresponds to a pre-merger skill diﬀerential in treated plants of
approximately 8%. In contrast to descriptive statistics, it is not statistically signiﬁcant. The
coeﬃcients of the interaction terms are also statistically insigniﬁcant and do not point to a
change in the plant's skill-intensity. Several control variables are also included in the regres-
sion: the larger the plant, the lower the skill-intensity. This may be because each plant - also
smaller plants - has a management. The smaller the plant, the higher the proportion of the
management, which is by my deﬁnition also part of the skilled workforce. The coeﬃcient of
the variable for squared employment is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, i.e. as plants be-
come very large, their skill-intensity increases. Moreover, the higher a plant's sales volume, the
higher a plant's skill-intensity. Furthermore, as the proportion of female employees increases,
the skill-intensity of a plant decreases, which may be caused by low-skilled part-time female
workers. There is no statistically signiﬁcant correlation between a plant's investment and its
skill-intensity, but further training obviously increases the skill-intensity of a plant's workforce.
Plants with the legal form "Limited" have a lower skill-intensity, while plants which are located
35In order to eliminate intragroup correlation - i.e. in a panel context, observations on the same
individual may be correlated in diﬀerent time periods, but observations on diﬀerent individuals are
not correlated (Baum, Schaﬀer, and Stillman, 2003) - I cluster observations of the same plants. This
corrects biased standard errors.
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Table 4.6: OLS-regression (dependent variable: log. skill-intensity)
Variables All (1) Acquirers (2) Targets (3) Horizontal (4) Non-horiz. (5)
M&A (D) 0.074
(0.059)
M&A*Period=2 (D) -0.029
(0.030)
M&A*Period=3 (D) -0.033
(0.033)
M&A*Period=4 (D) -0.010
(0.043)
Acquirer (D) -0.024
(0.082)
Acquirer*Period=2 (D) 0.061
(0.041)
Acquirer*Period=3 (D) -0.011
(0.050)
Acquirer*Period=4 (D) 0.067
(0.061)
Target (D) 0.106
(0.077)
Target*Period=2 (D) -0.138***
(0.046)
Target*Period=3 (D) -0.052
(0.051)
Target*Period=4 (D) -0.096
(0.061)
Horizontal M&A 0.005
(0.078)
Horizontal*Period=4 (D) -0.003
(0.041)
Horizontal*Period=4 (D) -0.075
(0.053)
Horizontal*Period=4 (D) 0.009
(0.065)
Non-horizontal M&A 0.144
(0.110)
Non-horizontal*Period=2 (D) -0.128***
(0.044)
Non-horizontal*Period=3 (D) -0.023
(0.090)
Non-horizontal*Period=4 (D) -0.158
(0.104)
log. Employment -0.536*** -0.595*** -0.625*** -0.605*** -0.648***
(0.062) (0.074) (0.070) (0.068) (0.088)
Squared log. Employment 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.021**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
lnSales 0.248*** 0.267*** 0.302*** 0.270*** 0.317***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.045)
Proportion of female employees -0.782*** -0.823*** -0.896*** -0.837*** -0.978***
(0.096) (0.106) (0.102) (0.102) (0.103)
log. Investment p. employee 0.006 0.010* 0.007 0.009* 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Further training (D) 0.157*** 0.162*** 0.135*** 0.149*** 0.132***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046)
Legal form "Limited" (D) -0.197*** -0.189*** -0.197*** -0.195*** -0.183***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
Legal form "Limited by shares" (D) 0.069 0.137* 0.006 0.094 -0.025
(0.062) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.083)
Location in East Germany (D) 0.327*** 0.323*** 0.309*** 0.321*** 0.285***
(0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043)
Foreign owned plant (D) 0.102 0.130 0.216** 0.132 0.334**
(0.080) (0.138) (0.086) (0.096) (0.139)
Single-plant ﬁrm (D) 0.086** 0.087* 0.067 0.111** 0.071
(0.044) (0.049) (0.051) (0.048) (0.053)
Constant -1.944*** -2.259*** -2.519*** -2.590*** -2.428***
(0.363) (0.322) (0.448) (0.427) (0.503)
Observations 2461 2226 2169 2227 2024
R2 0.373 0.391 0.412 0.395 0.438
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for intragroup correlation). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (D)
means variable is a dummy. Reference categories for legal form is "Partnership, individually-owned, public, and others".
Regressions include dummies for sectors and years. The reduced number of observations is due to missing data for several
variables. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel, M&A DATABASE St. Gallen.
in East Germany have a higher skill-intensity. Foreign ownership does not have any statistically
signiﬁcant impact, but if a plant is a single plant, the skill-intensity is higher.
Effects on German Plants' Employment and Skill-Intensity 142
I also found no statistically signiﬁcant pre-merger diﬀerence in skill-intensity for all sub-
groups. However, I found a statistically signiﬁcant decrease in skill-intensity in t = 2 of ap-
proximately 15% in target plants. Regression also ﬁnds evidence for a skill-intensity decrease of
approximately 14% in non-horizontally merging plants in t = 2. Again, I also apply robustness
tests as before, and they point to a proper model speciﬁcation.
Summarizing results from regression analysis for skill-intensity, the estimations suggest that
the included control variables explain the pre-merger diﬀerences in skill-intensity between treated
and controls that were found in descriptive statistics. However, and in line with descriptive
statistics, I ﬁnd evidence for a statistically signiﬁcant decrease of skill-intensity in t = 2 for
targets which conﬁrms the hypothesis of a U-shaped development path. I also ﬁnd this U-form
for the subgroup of non-horizontal M&A, but this result is not fully in line with descriptive
statistics which also found a statistically signiﬁcant decrease in t = 2, but no U-form. For
the subgroup of horizontal M&A, the U-form that was found in descriptive statistics is not
supported by the regression analysis.
4.4.4 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching
The regression analysis performed above is able to show correlations between variables, but it is
not a proper method for detecting causality.36 For this, I address the issue of causality and ﬁrm
heterogeneity with a matching method in this section. Matching allows the construction of a
comparison group that is identical or at least as similar as possible to the treatment group prior
to the merger, eliminating the problem of a self-selection of plants with certain characteristics
into M&A activity. Diﬀerences in size or skill-intensity are then attributed to the merger.
The fundamental evaluation problem: The fundamental evaluation problem that
arises in the evaluation of eﬀects of M&A on employment (skill-intensity) is that it is not
possible to step back in time and observe how the number of employees (skill-intensity) of the
same plant would have developed if it had not merged. Let Y be the variable for employment
(skill-intensity), and let D ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator of whether the plant merged or not. Then,
Yi(1) describes the post-merger size (skill-intensity) if plant i merged, and Yi(0) if the same
plant had not merged. The causal eﬀect is then:
∆ = Yi(1)−Yi(0). (8)
36See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for a comprehensive discussion.
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However, the outcome Yi(0) cannot be observed because it is the missing counterfactual, and
thus, the observation of the individual treatment eﬀect is not possible. The microeconometric
evaluation literature (e.g. Caliendo, 2006; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Heckman, Ichimura, and
Todd, 1997) deﬁnes the (population) average treatment eﬀect (ATT) on the merging plants as
ATT = E[Y(1)|D = 1]− E[Y(0)|D = 1]. (9)
Again, the second term E[Y(0)|D = 1] can't be observed, because it describes the expected
size (skill-intensity) of merging plants had they not merged. However, the causal inference
depends on the construction of the counterfactual of this second term. One possibility is
E[Y(0)|D = 0], i.e. the expected size (skill-intensity) of control plants, but this is only a good
idea if plants randomly assign to the treatment and control groups. In non-experimental data,
it seems more realistic that plants self-select in the groups, i.e. that pre-merger characteristics
that determine the decision for M&A also inﬂuence the plant's post-merger size (skill-intensity)
performance. For this reason, it could be misleading if employment (skill-intensity) changes
following a merger are interpreted as being caused by this merger.
Since E[Y(0)|D = 1] is not a useful comparison group, a diﬀerent and valid control group
has to be identiﬁed. Matching provides a way to construct such a valid control group. This
approach, which has been developed by Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), and Heckman, LaLonde,
and Smith (1999), pairs treated and control plants which are "statistical twins", i.e. they are
similar (ideally identical) to each other in relevant pre-merger characteristics.37 Because treated
and untreated only diﬀer with respect to their treatment status, post-merger diﬀerences in size
(skill-intensity) can then only be caused by the merger.
The creation of a valid control group implies that both groups have to be similar across a
number of diﬀerent pre-merger characteristics X. But this leads to a dimensionality problem,
and therefore, it would be desirable to match plants according to only one single index that
includes all information from those variables. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest using a
propensity score P(X) as a measure of the plant's probability to merge, conditional on observed
characteristics X. The ATT can now be estimated as
ATT = E[Y(1)|D = 1, P(X)]− E[Y(0)|D = 0, P(X)]. (10)
To apply matching, several assumptions have to hold: ﬁrst, the "conditional independence
37"Relevant" means that these plant characteristics inﬂuence the decision to merge.
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assumption" (CIA) states that - conditioning on the values of a set of observable characteristics
X which are not aﬀected by the merger treatment - the number of employees (skill-intensity)
in both groups would be the same in the absence of a merger (Lechner, 1999). A second
assumption is the "common support condition": it ensures that propensity scores of both
groups overlap and all merging plants have a counterpart in the control group. With this
assumption, only plants which are suﬃciently similar to each other will be matched (Caliendo,
2006). Third, the "Stable Unit-Treatment Value Assumption" (SUTVA) states that a plant's
behavior has no impact on that of another plant.
Estimation of the Propensity Score The propensity score p(X) estimates the proba-
bility for a plant to merge, based on characteristics X prior to M&A, and it is estimated with
a probit model.38 Economic theory and empirical literature about M&A from Girma and Görg
(2007), Margolis (2006a), Harris and Robinson (2002), Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright
(2002a), and others provide a guideline for the variable choice. According to these studies, size
is identiﬁed as a determinant for M&A, as well as legal form, location (West or East Germany),
and sector. In addition, I include dummies for diﬀerent years.39 Hence, the probit model is
speciﬁed as
P(MAit=2 = 1) = F(size dummiesit=1, legal f ormit=1,
locationit=1, industry dummiesit=1, year dummiesit=1). (11)
Table 4.7 presents the results from the probit regression. Focusing on the ﬁrst regression,
size is a determinant for M&A activity. In particular, the coeﬃcients for the dummies for
employees between 300 and 499 and for employees of 500 and more are both positive, of relevant
magnitude, and statistically highly signiﬁcant. This means that plants of this size have a higher
probability for merging compared to the reference group of plants with less than 20 employees.
These ﬁndings are in line with existing empirical evidence (e.g. Girma and Görg, 2007), and
conﬁrm the hypothesis of a self-selection of larger plants into M&A activity. In addition, plants
with legal form "Limited by shares" are more likely to be merging plants compared to plants of
38Using a logit model is also possible and yields similar results (Caliendo, 2006).
39There are diﬀerent views about the proper number of explanatory variables in the model: Bryson,
Dorsett, and Purdon (2002) recommend a smaller set of variables whereas Rubin and Thomas (1996)
argue for a broader and more generous model. I performed the whole matching process with diﬀerent
model speciﬁcations including additional explaining variables (e.g. productivity, wages, etc.). How-
ever, I obtained the most robust matching results with a reduced number of variables. Nevertheless,
it should be noted that the objective of matching is not an exact estimation of the propensity score,
but the balancing of relevant variables (Caliendo, 2006).
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the reference group "Partnership, individually-owned, public, and others", and plants located
in East Germany are also more likely to be involved in M&A. Dummies for sectors and years
are also included, but not reported in the table. The results from the probit regression are
consistent with the results from descriptive statistics and regression analysis above. In addition,
the McFadden's pseudo-R2-value is acceptable.40
Table 4.7: Probit regression (dependent variable: M&A dummy)
Variables All (1) Acquirers (2) Targets (3) Horizontal (4) Non-horiz. (5)
Employees 20-49 (D) 0.05 0.26 -0.21 0.22 -0.42
(0.27) (1.06) (-0.81) (0.89) (-1.22)
Employees 50-99 (D) -0.37 -0.42 -0.40 -0.94*** -0.65
(-1.59) (-1.35) (-1.38) (-2.58) (-1.63)
Employees 100-299 (D) 0.27 0.49** -0.11 0.32 -0.58*
(1.46) (2.13) (-0.46) (1.39) (-1.76)
Employees 300-499 (D) 0.86*** 0.90*** 0.75** 0.86*** 0.85**
(3.54) (2.95) (2.51) (2.81) (2.30)
Employees >=500 (D) 1.71*** 1.73*** 1.52*** 1.80*** 0.84**
(6.92) (5.51) (5.21) (5.87) (2.13)
Legal form "Limited" (D) 0.20 0.28 0.01 0.28 -0.05
(1.18) (1.30) (0.04) (1.20) (-0.16)
Legal form "Limited by shares" (D) 1.22*** 1.47*** 1.01** 1.68*** 0.41
(4.35) (4.51) (2.55) (4.88) (0.58)
Location in East Germany (D) 0.26** 0.33** 0.12 0.39** 0.06
(1.98) (2.08) (0.69) (2.32) (0.24)
Constant -1.09*** -1.60*** -1.11** -1.35*** -0.96
(-2.88) (-3.45) (-2.26) (-2.90) (-1.51)
Observations 699 620 588 597 502
Pseudo-R2 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.28 0.16
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (D) means variable is a dummy. The reference
category for employees is "Employees 1-19", and for legal form it is "Partnership, individually-owned, public, and others".
Regressions also include dummies for sectors and years. The reduced number of observations is due to missing data for
several variables. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel, M&A DATABASE St. Gallen.
In addition to the ﬁrst regression speciﬁcation, I also perform probit regressions for all
subgroups of treated plants. That is, the respective dependent variables are dummies with
value one if the plant is an acquirer - analogous for targets, horizontal, and non-horizontal
M&A - and zero if the plant is a control. The results are similar to estimations from the ﬁrst
regression, with few exceptions (e.g. in regression 4, plants with employees between 50 and
99 are signiﬁcantly less likely to merge horizontally, and regression 5 yields a poor value for
pseudo-R2 which may be due to the low number of treated observations in this group).
Based on this probit regression, for every treated and control plant, a propensity score P(X)
is now estimated. Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of propensity scores estimated in the ﬁrst
regression speciﬁcation which includes all treated plants: the distribution is diﬀerent between
both groups, and for certain ranges of propensity scores, there are no or only few matching
partners. If matching partners are not suﬃciently similar in terms of propensity scores, the
matching quality suﬀers. This has to be kept in mind when choosing how to pair treated and
controls.
40Values of 0.2 and above as seen as suﬃcient (e.g. Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, and Weiber, 2010).
Effects on German Plants' Employment and Skill-Intensity 146
Figure 4.1: Distribution of propensity scores for treated and control group
Matching algorithm: The propensity score is a continuous variable, and thus, it is diﬃcult
to ﬁnd matching pairs with exactly the same score. For this, the matching literature has
developed diﬀerent algorithms about how to assign treated and control plants to each other,
and how to weight each of the matching partners.41 In this paper, I choose a kernel matching
algorithm.42 The kernel algorithm assigns all controls j to each single treated i. That is, for
each treated i a neighborhood C(Pi) is deﬁned which contains the whole control group I0:
C(Pi) = {I0}. (12)
Controls are assigned with diﬀerent weights depending on the distance to the treated cases in
terms of propensity scores:
WKMN0 (i, j) =
Gij
∑k∈I0 Gik
, (13)
with N0 denoting the number of controls in the control group I0, and Gik = G[(Pi − Pj)/aN0 ]
as a kernel function that downweighs controls j which have a larger distance to the treated i. I
use a kernel based on a Gaussian normal function with a bandwidth parameter aN0 of 0.06.
43 In
addition, I only match observations which lie in the region of common support, and I also apply
41I use the STATA-module PSMATCH2 of Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
42Because the smaller the dataset, the more important the choice of the algorithm (Caliendo, 2006). For
this reason, I tested several algorithms (nearest neighbor, caliper, radius caliper, and kernel algorithms
in diﬀerent modiﬁcations) and found out that kernel yields the most robust results.
43A bandwidth parameter impacts the form of the kernel function. The choice of the bandwidth
parameter aﬀects the results more strongly (Silverman, 1986; Pagan and Ullah, 1999), whereas the
choice of the kernel function (i.e. Gaussian (normal), biweight, epanechnikov, uniform, or tricube
kernel) is of minor relevance (DiNardo and Tobias, 2001).
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a trimming procedure as suggested by Smith and Todd (2005a): 10% of treated for which the
density of controls is the lowest are dropped. This is useful if there are no observations for
several regions of the controls' propensity scores, as ﬁgure 4.1 shows.
Due to the availability of longitudinal data, I am able to analyze changes instead of levels,
i.e. I combine the standard matching approach with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DiD) estimator.
This estimator measures the diﬀerence between the arithmetic mean values of changes in em-
ployment and skill-intensity. The combination of the standard approach with a DiD estimator
is suggested by Smith and Todd (2005a): even though the combined estimator is still based
on the assumption of "selection on observables", it relaxes this strong assumption, because it
eliminates all unobserved time-invariant plant characteristics between treated and control plants
that the standard matching estimator fails to eliminate. For this, a combined estimator has the
potential to improve the quality of the results signiﬁcantly (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).
Under the consideration of the common support condition, the estimator can be imple-
mented as
∆DiDATT =
1
N1
∑
i∈I1∩SP
[
(Y1it −Y0it′)− ∑
j∈I0∩SP
W(i, j)(Y0jt −Y0jt′)
]
, (14)
with N1 denoting the number of treated in the treatment group I1, and SP the region of
common support. t and t′ represent the years of the respective observation periods.
Matching results for employment changes: The results of the matching procedure
with respect to changes in employment are shown in table 4.8. The upper part of the table
presents the results for the observation period between t = 2 to t = 4, and the lower part of
the table for the period between t = 1 and t = 4.
Taking the group including all treated ("All"), percentage changes in both groups are
negative (ﬁrst and second column), but the diﬀerence in means for the matched sample (ATT)
is 0.035, indicating that merging plants exhibit a lower negative employment growth than non-
merged plants. However, this eﬀect is statistically not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at any
level, which implies that matching does not ﬁnd any eﬀect of M&A on employment changes for
the post-merger period.44 With respect to subgroups of treated, the results are similar. The
ATTs are positive except for the subgroup of horizontal M&A, but they are not statistically
signiﬁcant.
44For the test of the statistical signiﬁcance of the ATT, I apply bootstrapping with 150 replications in
order to yield robust standard errors. However, Abadie and Imbens (2008) criticize that no formal
justiﬁcation for the use of bootstrapping methods in the context of matching has been provided.
Nevertheless, many empirical studies applying matching used bootstrapping (e.g. Girma, Görg, and
Wagner, 2009).
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Turning to the observation period between t = 1 and t = 4, the results are similar, too.
For all groups of treated, the estimated ATTs are positive except for the subgroup of horizontal
M&A, but they are not statistically signiﬁcant at any level.
Table 4.8: ATT for employment changes
Employment changes between t = 2 and t = 4:
Group of treated Treated Controls ATT S.E. T-statistic p-value
All -0.028 -0.063 0.035 0.031 1.12 0.305
Acquirers -0.025 -0.047 0.022 0.043 0.51 0.582
Targets -0.020 -0.071 0.050 0.033 1.51 0.250
Horizontal -0.021 -0.015 -0.006 0.045 -0.14 0.883
Non-horizontal -0.034 -0.061 0.026 0.037 0.71 0.587
Employment changes between t = 1 and t = 4:
Group of treated Treated Controls ATT S.E. T-statistic p-value
All -0.038 -0.078 0.040 0.036 1.10 0.290
Acquirers -0.041 -0.055 0.013 0.049 0.27 0.792
Targets -0.020 -0.071 0.050 0.033 1.51 0.166
Horizontal -0.042 -0.021 -0.021 0.051 -0.42 0.692
Non-horizontal -0.021 -0.074 0.052 0.037 1.41 0.256
Notes: p-values are estimated for bootstrapped standard errors with 150 replications.
Matching results for skill-intensity changes: Table 4.9 presents the results for the
estimated ATT with respect to potential merger induced skill-intensity changes. The upper
part of the table displays percentage changes for the matched sample for treated and controls
between t = 2 and t = 4 and the respective ATT. The treatment group including all treated
estimates both positive changes for treated and controls, and the ATT is 0.010, but it is not
statistically signiﬁcant at any usual level. That is, merging does not aﬀect the plants' skill-
intensity. For the subgroups, the ATTs are also not statistically signiﬁcant, except the negative
ATT for the subgroup of non-horizontal M&A.
With respect to the observation period between t = 1 and t = 4, changes in the treatment
groups are positive except for the subgroup of non-horizontal M&A. The estimated ATTs are all
negative, and this implies that the skill-intensity of merging plants increases more slowly over
time compared to plants that do not merge. But again, this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant,
except for the subgroup of non-horizontal M&A.
Because of the results from descriptive statistics and regression analysis which point to a
U-shaped development path of the merging plants' skill-intensity over time for some subgroups,
I also analyze changes between t = 1 and t = 2. The results are displayed in the lower part of
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table 4.9. Changes are negative for all treatment groups except for acquirers, and the same is
true for the respective estimated ATTs. For the subgroup of targets and non-horizontal M&A,
the ATTs are statistically signiﬁcant at usual signiﬁcance levels. Targets exhibit a decrease in
their workforce's skill-intensity of approximately 7.5% immediately around the merger, and this
change is around 10.5% lower compared to plants that do not merge. For non-horizontally
merging plants, the diﬀerence is around 11.8%. For targets, the results are fully in line with
ﬁndings from descriptive statistics and regression analysis. For the subgroup of non-horizontal
M&A the results are in line with regression analysis.
Table 4.9: ATT for skill-intensity changes
Skill-intensity changes between t = 2 and t = 4:
Group of treated Treated Controls ATT S.E. T-statistic p-value
All 0.044 0.034 0.010 0.045 0.23 0.795
Acquirers -0.002 0.037 -0.038 0.047 -0.82 0.431
Targets 0.098 0.045 0.053 0.065 0.80 0.393
Horizontal 0.097 0.052 0.045 0.056 0.80 0.363
Non-horizontal -0.068 0.071 -0.139 0.072 -1.93 0.092
Skill-intensity changes between t = 1 and t = 4:
Group of treated Treated Controls ATT S.E. T-statistic p-value
All 0.041 0.066 -0.025 0.050 -0.51 0.580
Acquirers 0.039 0.071 -0.033 0.059 -0.55 0.625
Targets 0.023 0.072 -0.048 0.065 -0.75 0.462
Horizontal 0.065 0.086 -0.021 0.061 -0.34 0.738
Non-horizontal -0.133 0.123 -0.256 0.078 -3.26 0.001
Skill-intensity changes between t = 1 and t = 2:
Group of treated Treated Controls ATT S.E. T-statistic p-value
All -0.004 0.033 -0.037 0.043 -0.85 0.378
Acquirers 0.041 0.035 0.005 0.049 0.11 0.919
Targets -0.074 0.030 -0.105 0.057 -1.84 0.077
Horizontal -0.032 0.035 -0.067 0.050 -1.34 0.167
Non-horizontal -0.064 0.053 -0.118 0.044 -2.69 0.017
Notes: p-values are estimated for bootstrapped standard errors with 150 replications.
Robustness tests: In order to assess the reliability of the results, I check the quality of the
matching procedure. First, the balancing property should be satisﬁed. That is, the distribu-
tion of variables should be balanced and no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the variables
between both groups should remain. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest the calculation
of a standardized bias. This is an indicator to assess the distance in marginal distributions of
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the variables: for each variable the standardized bias calculates the diﬀerence of sample means
in the subsamples of treated and matched controls as a percentage of the square root of the
average of sample variances in both groups (Caliendo, 2006):
SB = 100
(X¯1 − X¯0)√
0.5[V1(X) +V0(X)]
. (15)
After matching, the standardized bias is given by
SBM = 100
(X¯M1 − X¯M0 )√
0.5[VM1 (X) +V
M
0 (X)]
. (16)
X¯1 and X¯0 are the mean values for a speciﬁc variable of the treatment and control group, and
V1 and V0 are the respective variances. X¯M1 , X¯
M
0 , V
M
1 , and V
M
0 are the corresponding values
after matching.
The results for the mean standardized bias (MSB), i.e. the average standardized bias for
all covariates, are reported in table 4.10. For the ﬁrst matching procedure including all treated
the MSB is 8. This is acceptable according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) who argued that
a bias reduction below 20 is suﬃcient. However, Caliendo (2006) pointed out that in most
empirical studies a bias reduction below 3 or 5% is seen as suﬃcient, and this is not achieved
here. The subgroups yield similar balancing results with values for MSB ranging between 6 and
9. Even if values of MSB are higher than recommended by Caliendo (2006), I consider the
balancing as acceptable.
The same table also reports about the region of common support, which can be seen
as an indicator for the representativeness of the matching results. Treated observations with
propensity scores higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the
control plants are excluded, and they are not considered for the estimations any more. If the
fraction of observations lying oﬀ support is large (e.g. up to one fourth in the subgroup of
horizontal M&A), the generality of the results is reduced, and the interpretation of estimations
must be restricted only to those plants that are matched.45
There are further possibilities to test the matching quality. Sianesi (2004) recommends
performing the probit regression and calculation of propensity scores again, but now based on
the matched sample. If the matching was successful, there should be no diﬀerences in the
covariates, and the pseudo-R2 should be low. Moreover, a reestimation of the likelihood ratio
test should generate low values and a p-value close to one, i.e. the independent variables in
45See Lechner (2008) for a discussion about common support.
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Table 4.10: Robustness tests
Mean standardized bias (MSB)
Group of treated Mean/Std. Err. Before matching After matching
All Mean 19.592 8.202
Std. Dev. 17.375 6.613
Acquirers Mean 20.614 7.271
Std. Dev. 19.600 6.355
Targets Mean 21.317 6.770
Std. Dev. 18.541 4.608
Horizontal Mean 23.375 9.540
Std. Dev. 20.823 6.283
Non-horizontal Mean 20.912 7.177
Std. Dev. 18.014 5.480
Common Support
Group of treated Sample Oﬀ support On support Total
All Untreated 0 540 540
Treated 21 138 159
Acquirers Untreated 0 533 533
Treated 17 70 87
Targets Untreated 0 516 516
Treated 15 57 72
Horizontal Untreated 0 505 505
Treated 24 68 92
Non-horizontal Untreated 0 476 476
Treated 2 24 26
Pseudo-R2 and log likelihood test
Group of treated Sample Pseudo-R2 LR chi2 p>chi2
All Unmatched 0.205 153.34 0.000
Matched 0.028 10.61 0.910
Acquirers Unmatched 0.230 115.71 0.000
Matched 0.028 5.41 0.996
Targets Unmatched 0.196 85.70 0.000
Matched 0.024 3.79 1.000
Horizontal Unmatched 0.279 143.09 0.000
Matched 0.041 7.79 0.971
Non-horizontal Unmatched 0.158 32.26 0.006
Matched 0.038 2.53 1.000
the model have no explanatory power. These robustness tests yield mostly satisfying results,
as the lower part of table 4.10 shows.
Summarizing the matching process with respect to employment changes, I conﬁrm the
results from descriptive statistics and regression analysis, i.e. mergers do not statistically sig-
niﬁcantly change a plant's employment in a positive or negative way. Diﬀerentiating between
acquirers and targets, or between plants that merge horizontally and non-horizontally does not
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change the results. The results from matching with respect to skill-intensity changes also cor-
roborate earlier ﬁndings in this paper: estimates point to a U-shaped development path of the
workforce's skill-intensity in targets. For the subgroup of non-horizontal M&A, the matching
results are also in line with ﬁndings from regression analysis, providing evidence for a U-shaped
skill-intensity growth. However, the robustness of this subgroup is limited due to the small
number of only 28 observations. Matching does not identify eﬀects for the other treatment
groups.
4.5 Conclusion - what do we learn?
In this paper, I use a new dataset which is a combination of the IAB Establishment Panel
and the M&A DATABASE. It includes plants that merged between 1995 and 2005 and control
plants, and I analyze self-selection of plants into M&A activity and merger induced eﬀects
on employment and skill-intensity. I take an observation period of four years. Theory does
not give clear predictions, and the results from existing empirical literature are ambiguous.
The data allow for diﬀerentiation between subsamples of acquirers and targets, horizontal and
non-horizontal mergers. I choose a three-step estimation strategy with descriptive statistics,
regression analysis, and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences propensity score matching.
I ﬁnd evidence for a self-selection of larger plants into merger activity for all groups of
treated. With respect to acquirers this supports the argument that larger ﬁrms have better
opportunities to merge due to lower credit constraints and a better equity basis. Moreover,
an explanation why targets are large may be that acquirers seek for market power increase,
assuming that a plant's market power increases with its size. However, the ﬁndings of a higher
pre-merger size contradict Mueller (2003a) who stated that in the presence of scale economies
mostly smaller ﬁrms merge horizontally. With respect to plants' pre-merger skill-intensity, I
found no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between treated and untreated when I controlled for
other pre-merger diﬀerences.
According to the results from this study, I do not estimate statistically signiﬁcant employ-
ment eﬀects due to M&A for any treatment group, independent of the underlying estimation
method. In other words: employment neither increases nor decreases due to M&A in any
statistically signiﬁcant way. This means that estimations do not support the widely held fear
of employment losses after mergers. Moreover, these results are in line with estimations from
existing studies, e.g. from Arndt and Mattes (2010) and Mattes (2010), but nevertheless, con-
tradict the majority of studies for Europe which mostly ﬁnd negative employment eﬀects (e.g.
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Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004). As one strand of theory suggests, employment losses are more
likely if mergers occur for proﬁt maximizing reasons (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright,
2002a). In this case, one can conclude from my ﬁndings that a certain number of plants also
merges for other, non-proﬁt maximizing reasons, e.g. for empire building. However, unchanged
employment is also possible in a neoclassical framework, because the results may be evidence
that M&A are a capital investment, or improve the plants' ﬁnancial possibilities. In addition,
another diﬀerence in comparison to other studies lies in the fact that the dataset only includes
domestic mergers. Since foreign acquirers may be less committed to fulﬁll implicit contracts,
foreign M&A may lead to greater job losses than domestic M&A (Lehto, 2006).
I also do not ﬁnd any eﬀects of M&A on a plant's skill-intensity with two exceptions. First,
I found robust evidence for a U-shaped skill-intensity development path over time for targets.
In other words: considering the whole observation period, ﬁndings from this paper imply that
the skill-intensity of targets statistically signiﬁcantly decreases immediately around the merger,
but increases again, reaching a level that does not diﬀer in any statistically signiﬁcant way
from the targets' pre-merger level. The interpretation of the estimated results is not easy, since
skill-intensity changes cannot be due to changes in employment (which is held constant), but
must be due to shifts between skilled and unskilled workers. One explanation may be that
mostly targets are aﬀected by merger induced organizational changes including job rotations
or restructuring of departments. Nevertheless, these result are in accordance with Lipsey and
Sjöholm (2003) who found an increase in the number of blue-collar workers and a reduction
of the number of white-collar workers after M&A. Second, I also found statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the skill-intensity in non-horizontally merging plants. However, I no not consider the
results as robust enough because the estimates from the diﬀerent methods are not fully in line
with each other. Moreover, the number of observations in this subgroup is small, reducing the
reliability of results.
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C Remarks on the dataset
For the empirical analysis of this paper I use a combined dataset from the IAB Establishment
Panel and the M&A DATABASE from St. Gallen, performed by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung
GmbH München. Two methodology reports exist about the creation of the treatment group
and the control group.46 Prior to the creation of this dataset, a pilot study from Bellmann
and Kirchhof (2006) showed that the IAB Establishment Panel is capable of an analysis of
eﬀects of mergers. The focus of the pilot study was on the eﬀects on employment, and data
about M&A was generated from the dataset Thomson ONE Banker. However, the dataset
M&A DATABASE from St. Gallen is more comprehensive in comparison to Thomson ONE
Banker because it also includes small and medium-size ﬁrms, whereas Thomson ONE Banker
only includes ﬁrms of a larger size. Moreover, for each deal the M&A DATABASE also lists
the seller47 (Thomson ONE Banker only reports acquirers and targets) as well as additional
information like location, number of employees, sales, etc.
The treatment group: The observation period for plants covers the time from January
1996 to December 2005. The creation of the treatment group was carried out in several steps
by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung. First, in order to combine both datasets, companies in
the M&A DATABASE were compared to plants in the IAB Establishment Panel and classiﬁed
according to the degree of similarity with respect to name, location, and sector. Next, merged
plants were only kept if they were surveyed at least once before and once after the merger.
This led to some complications due to the set up of the survey: information about employees
refers to June 30th of the respective year, whereas information about sales, investments, etc.
refer to the previous year. To take these circumstances into account, the following deﬁnition
was chosen:
 If M&A was between January 1st and June 30th of year T, the survey in year T was
considered to be conducted after M&A, even if some information refers to a point of
time before M&A.
 If M&A was between July 1st and December 31th of year T, the survey in year T was
considered to be conducted before M&A, even if some information refers to a point of
46TNS Infratest: Beschäftigungseﬀekte von Fusionen und Übernahmen - Methodenbericht Unter-
suchungsgruppe (März 2007); Beschäftigungseﬀekte von Fusionen und Übernahmen - Methoden-
bericht Untersuchungsgruppe (December 2007).
47Nevertheless, this study does not analyze the eﬀects on sellers because the number of observations
is too small.
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time after M&A.
This restriction reduced the number of plants which were found in both datasets to 7,801.
According to the degree of similarity of plants in both datasets, observations are distributed
across four diﬀerent categories:
 Quality class 1: name, location, and sector match exactly (1,426);
 Quality class 2: name, location, and superior sector match exactly (146);
 Quality class 3: name and sector match exactly; multi-plant ﬁrm (5,961);
 Quality class 4: name and location match exactly (268).
These 7,801 merger cases consist of 958 diﬀerent plants in the IAB Establishment Panel.
This is because one plant may be involved in several M&A within the observation period.
The control group: Next, a group of control plants that had not merged between 1980
and 2005 has to be found. These controls must be as similar as possible to plants in the
treatment group. Each of the 7,801 treatment observations exhibits an individual combination
of sector, size, legal form, and location in West or East Germany. Therefore, TNS Infratest
Sozialforschung deﬁned 2,143 categories which diﬀer with respect to these characteristics, and
each of the 7,801 treatment observations was assigned to one of these 2,143 categories. Now,
the objective was to ﬁnd controls for each category. This is, within a category, treated and
controls are homogeneous with respect to the characteristics. An example: there are three
treated plants which all belong to the agriculture sector, have less than 10 employees, have
"GmbH" as legal form, and are located in West Germany. The combination of these speciﬁc
characteristics constitutes one of the 2,143 categories. After that, three control plants should
also be identiﬁed which exhibit the same characteristics of this speciﬁc category.
30,110 plants from the IAB Establishment Panel were identiﬁed as statistical twins to
treated plants (with respect to sector, size, legal form, and location in West or East Germany),
and they may potentially act as a control. Within these 30,110 observations, several plants
appear more often if they were surveyed for the IAB Establishment Panel for several years. The
challenge is to identify those "true" controls within the 30,110 potential controls, that is, plants
for which we can be sure that they have not been involved in any M&A activity. Hence, plants
which already appeared in the treatment group were excluded, and plants which were similar to
plants from the M&A DATABASE, but which were not in the treatment group, because they
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merged outside the reference period between 1996 and 2005. This step excludes 1,204 from
the 30,110 observations. Then, plants which were not surveyed at least twice between 1993,
the starting year of the IAB Establishment Panel and 2006,48 the end of the observation period,
were dropped.
The rest of the remaining 27,676 potential controls had to be checked manually: as a ﬁrst
check, plants were eliminated if their name appeared in the M&A DATABASE. In addition,
the dataset "Markus" from Bureau van Dijk also provided information about M&A activities
of plants. Finally, for most plants websites were used as a source of information about merger
activity.
As stated above, the number of treated should equal the number of controls within each
of the 2,143 categories. Hence, for each category, potential controls were checked for whether
they were "true" controls. This was repeated until the number of true controls equaled the
number of treated, and the remaining potential controls for the respective category were no
longer considered. However, for several categories no controls could have been found, because
potential controls have all merged.49 Figure C1 presents a graphical illustration of this process.
In total, 12,755 plants were checked in 400 hours of research by TNS Infratest. As a result,
1,009 controls from 291 diﬀerent plants appear in the control group. This is because a plant
can act as a control over several years and for diﬀerent categories as well. The structure of the
control group is similar to the structure of the treated group with respect to sector, size, legal
form, and location, but controls were not involved in any merger activity during the reference
period.
A note on sector classiﬁcation: The 2-digit sector classiﬁcation of the IAB Establish-
ment Panel follows the NACE code (Nomenclature Générale des Activités Économiques). The
NACE code changed in 1999 and in 2003, leading to diﬀerent classiﬁcations of plants over time.
Whereas the classiﬁcation change in 2003 is not a problem, the break in 1999 is more severe.
Due to this, I transfered the sector classiﬁcation of the year 2000 to the years before in order to
achieve a consistent sector classiﬁcation of plants. However, this leads to a drawback if plants
changed sectors due to a merger: they may not be classiﬁed correctly. I checked this aspect
manually and could not identify incorrect classiﬁcations.
48The observation period for treated plants ends in December 2005. To gain information about controls
for the year 2005, the 2006 survey is relevant, because several questions refer to the year before, e.g.
sales.
49For example, almost no controls were found in the ﬁnancial sector.
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Figure C1: Graphical illustration of the creation
of the control group by TNS Infratest
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Note: the large boxes represent diﬀerent categories. In each of the 2,134 cate-
gories, plants are homogeneous with respect to sector, size classiﬁcation, location
in West or East Germany and legal form. The number of controls should equal the
number of treated in each category. Therefore, 30,110 potential controls from the
IAB Establishment Panel, which represent statistical twins to the treated, were
assigned to these diﬀerent categories. Then, each potential control was checked
for whether it had merged since 1980. If this was true, the respective plant was
identiﬁed as a "true" control. If, however, a potential control had merged since
1980, it was discarded. If the required number of controls was found, remaining
controls were not considered anymore (category 1). It could also be that no
controls were found for a certain category (category 2). Finally, 1,009 controls
were identiﬁed.
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D The observation period
For the empirical investigation in this paper, I create a "rolling observation window" which is
illustrated by ﬁgure D1. For treated plants, there are ten four-year windows. The ﬁrst covers
the years between 1995 and 1998, and the last between 2004 and 2007. Similarly, for controls
the ﬁrst four-year window is from 1993 to 1996, and the last is from 2002 to 2005.
Figure D1: Graphical illustration of cohorts
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Note: for the ﬁrst cohort in the treatment group, year t = 1 corresponds to 1995, t = 2 to
1996, t = 3 to 1997, and t = 4 to 1998. This applies to all cohorts in both groups analogously.
Concluding remarks
This thesis is about the economics of mergers and acquisitions. It starts with a survey about
the literature of M&A and performance eﬀects. Then, it presents propensity score matching
as a newer econometric method and its implementation in the computer software STATA. The
heart of the thesis is about the eﬀects of M&A on plants' labor productivity, employment, and
skill-intensity, and about self-selection of plants into merger activity. It uses a new dataset
about German plants, and places the focus of the econometric analysis on a propensity score
matching approach. Each of the four chapters closes with concluding remarks, but it is worth
to draw some ﬁnal conclusions from the whole thesis.
First, as discussed in the ﬁrst chapter, the majority of newer studies found positive pro-
ductivity eﬀects and negative employment eﬀects from M&A, or they did not ﬁnd any changes.
I mostly conﬁrm these trends, because I also ﬁnd a positive productivity eﬀect for acquirers,
even if the evidence is weak. With respect to employment eﬀects, I do not identify causal
eﬀects. Nevertheless, the results of my thesis also suggest that plants merge not only for proﬁt
maximizing reasons: if all mergers were motivated by proﬁt maximizing reasons, the positive
productivity eﬀect for acquirers in my analysis should have been stronger, and other subgroups
should also have been aﬀected by these changes. Additionally, I should also have estimated
negative employment eﬀects.
Second, the phenomenon "M&A" is complex and requires a diﬀerentiated analysis. Re-
search has to diﬀer between the types of ﬁrms involved in the mergers (acquirers and targets),
or between the types of mergers (e.g. horizontal and non-horizontal). This is also true for
the distinction between domestic and cross-border, or friendly and hostile. Any researcher that
ignores these crucial diﬀerences runs the risk of biased or misleading conclusions. For example,
in chapter 3 I identify a causal eﬀect of M&A on plants' labor productivity, but only a diﬀeren-
tiation between diﬀerent types of plants shows that the causality only holds for the subgroup
of acquirers.
Third, we learned that plant heterogeneity is an important issue when assessing the eﬀects
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of mergers. The arguments from Melitz (2003), who showed that only more productive ﬁrms
can bear the extra costs of exporting, and thus, self-select in export activities, also apply to
questions about merger activity. In my thesis, I conﬁrm these arguments and show that plants
that merge are more productive, larger, have a higher skilled workforce, etc. Hence, I assume
that the results from earlier studies about eﬀects of M&A that did not control for self-selection
are seriously biased, and therefore, I suspect that ignoring ﬁrm heterogeneity is a major reason
for the diﬀerent results between earlier and newer studies.
And fourth, some lessons can be learned from the estimation strategy I used in this thesis.
As usual, I started with descriptive statistics. Then, I performed a classical regression analysis,
and ﬁnally, I applied a matching approach. Most ﬁndings are in line with each other, but some
estimation results diﬀer between the methods. This makes the presentation of a consistent pic-
ture of empirical ﬁndings more diﬃcult, but I consider this strategy as more reliable. Advanced
econometric methods like propensity score matching improved empirical work, but they are not
per se a guarantee to get unassailable results. This is, for example, because details of the
methods like propensity score matching are not yet standardized, yielding diﬀerent estimations
from the same data. Hence, starting with a classical regression analysis in addition to other
newer methods, as also suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009), makes the empirical strategy
more reliable.
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